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
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INTERNAL HISTORY  
OF  
GERMAN PROTESTANTISM  
SINCE  
THE MIDDLE OF LAST CENTURY.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

BY THE

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## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

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IN laying *Dr Kahn's* work in an English garb before the public, I feel that I have much cause to crave the reader's forbearance and indulgence, as regards the translation.

People in this country often complain that the translations of German works, especially of those on philosophy, are in an English so barbarous, that instead of relishing them, they have the greatest difficulty in even understanding them. But while it may be admitted, that such complaints are so far just, the blame, for the most part, ought to fall upon the authors, not upon the translators. The philosophical language of Germany is so entirely peculiar, is itself so dark and barbarous, that it almost defies translation. The translator, at all events, cannot be expected to render in smooth and elegant, in intelligible and perspicuous English, an original which is destitute of these qualities. If, then, the translation of even entire philosophical works and systems be encompassed with very great difficulties, how much greater must these be in a work, which, like the present, deals so much in out-

lines? The translator has done what he could; but no one is more conscious than himself of his short-comings.

The responsibility of a translator is exhausted, or at least ought to be so, when he has given a faithful translation of his original; but, whether right or wrong, he is more or less identified with, and charged with a responsibility for, the work translated. As far as the latter is concerned, I can the less refuse to bear it, that I greatly encouraged the Publishers to take the translation of this work in hand. I did so chiefly for two reasons:—

1.—I thought, and still think, that the present work will, if it do not entirely fill up, at least furnish some materials for filling up, a blank in our literature. It cannot be denied, that every where in this country there prevails the greatest interest for the développement of German theology. The numerous translations of German theological works,—the attention which, in periodicals and magazines, is paid to Germany, both as to its literary productions, and the practical efforts put forth for reclaiming to the Church the large masses which are alienated from her,—the numerous questions put to German travellers, and to myself, by Christians of all denominations, with whom I have come in contact during a residence of seven years in this country,—all bear ample testimony to this interest. And such interest is certainly well deserved, not only because Germany, as the home of the Reformation, cannot fail to be dear to the heart of every Evangelical Christian, but also, and chiefly, be-

cause the struggle which Christianity had to sustain in Germany, during the last century, was one of the noblest, and one which, more than any previous conflict, proves its Divine origin, vitality, and power! I think, moreover, that I am not wrong in saying, that there exists also, more or less consciously, a secret presentiment that, sooner or later, in some form or another, we shall have here, too, to sustain a similar struggle against similar foes; and that it is this presentiment which invests the German battle-field with such peculiar interest for the British theologian and Christian. The phenomena on the territory of theology in Germany during the last century, however, do not stand isolated, but are most intimately connected and bound up with the phenomena on the territory of philosophy, and with the political events, so that they can be understood only in connection with them. It is this circumstance which makes it so difficult for foreigners to get at a proper understanding and estimation of German theological productions; and it is just because the present work views theology in this connection, that I think its appearance in an English dress will be welcomed by not a few in this country. As far as I know, it is the first German work which has attempted such a comprehensive survey of the internal history of German Protestantism during the last century. And without here entering into details regarding the Author's position and object—which he himself explains in the introduction—it may be sufficient to mention, that the book has been received

with high approbation and applause in Germany.<sup>1</sup> Even the adherents of that school whose theology the author designates by the term "Mediating," although they have objected to the Lutheran tendencies and Churchism, have done ample justice to the merits of the Book, and of the representation.

2. Another reason which led me to believe that the translation of the present work might be acceptable to the British public, was suggested by the peculiar phenomena in the territory of British Theology. That which, in my opinion, constitutes the peculiar character and superiority of this theology, viz., its positive objective tendency, its being rooted and grounded in the word of God and the Confessions of the Reformation, is regarded

<sup>1</sup> The *Zeitschrift für Lutherische Theologie u. Kirche* (edited by Rudelbach and Guericke), 1855, H. 2., S. 384, in reviewing the work, says, among other things: "This book, which is not only written with a fresh vitality, energetic power, and deep interest and sympathy, but is also founded on the most thorough preliminary studies, honours its author as much as it does the cause of the Church of which he is a minister, and from the bosom and heart of which this testimony has sprung forth. Two things, especially, distinguish this work—first, the decision, which does not in the least derogate from and compromise the cause of the Lord and His Church; and, secondly, the true impartiality, and the willingness, undisguised and confirmed by deed, joyfully, and without envy, to acknowledge all that is in any way commendable. And closely connected with this is his charity in judging of human weaknesses, errors, and mistakes, so that the saying of the old Roman poet: '*Homo sum, et nihil humani a me alienum puto*,' is, in a Christian manner, confirmed and purified." Compare another review, l. c. S. 389.



by many of our theologians as rather a one-sidedness, and is, by not a few students in theology, felt to be a fetter and a barrier in the way of free inquiry ; and Germany is, with an envious eye, looked to as the El Dorado where a youthful and free theology is thriving and prospering. When I first came to this country, German theology was almost a *terra incognita*; and many of our leading men seemed to imagine that, by denouncing "German infidelity," they could and would keep it out. As every one might have foreseen, they have failed in this. Owing partly to the numerous translations of German theological works, and partly to a spreading knowledge of the German language, German theology is now extensively studied in this country ; and during the last few years we have seen a school springing up which, by its bold assaults on our well-established creeds and systems, has filled faithful theologians with fear, all the more well founded that these enemies come in the guise of friends, and with the pretence of thereby bringing to us a more spiritual Christianity, while, by the splendour of their style, they fascinate and dazzle not a few youthful and inexperienced minds. That these views are not of home growth, but an importation from Germany, an attempt at engrafting a little Schleiermacherianism on sound British Theology, is a fact sufficiently known and partly admitted. To all who are more or less infected with these views, it may, it is hoped, be of some advantage to learn what the position really is which Schleiermacher occupies in the de-

velopment of German theology, and how little vitality that theology possessed. Our Author, leading us step by step through the varying phenomena that appeared on the territory of German theology, from the middle of last century up to the present day, shows us that it was just the *subjective* tendency which caused there so much havoc, and which has produced all the moral and religious evils of the present time. But while, in Germany, the theology of Schleiermacher forms the turning point, and the Christian can well sympathize with it as a system, groping its way from this subjectivism to objective positive Christianity, as an attempt to clear the ground from the ruins with which that very subjectivism had covered it, and as collecting materials for the raising of a new edifice, what would and must be the position which the importation of this system would mark in British theology?

While thus willing to bear my share of the responsibility for the translation of this book, I must decline to be throughout identified with the author. *Dr Kahnis* is a Lutheran divine, belonging to the High-Church section of that denomination who, in their views of the Church and the sacraments, come pretty near the opinions entertained by the Ultra High Church party in the Anglican Church, and who, imagining themselves to be in possession of *the* truth, speak often in rather a disparaging manner of other evangelical denominations, and have revived the exclusiveness and fanaticism of bygone centuries against the Reformed Church. *Dr Kahnis's* views on these subjects lie

before us in a doctrinal monograph, "*Die Lehre vom Abendmahl.*" While, in the book before us, he is strictly impartial in representing the facts, he sometimes allows his peculiar Lutheran views to come out in judging of the events of the last years. It would have been easy to remove or alter these few passages; but altogether apart from the consideration, that by so doing I should have misrepresented the Author, I thought that this very circumstance would impart additional interest to the book. For, in this his Lutherizing tendency, our Author does not by any means stand isolated. This ultra-Lutheranism, on the contrary, is now in the ascendant in Germany, sweeping, like a powerful tide, everything before it. How little soever we in this country may approve of these sentiments, they express the opinions of a large number of leading divines in Germany, and thus throw light upon the present religious condition of that country. I have therefore faithfully translated whatever *Dr Kahnis* has written, only now and then recording my protest in a foot-note, or by an interspersed (!).

In conclusion, I beg to express to the Rev. John Laing, Librarian in the New College, Edinburgh, my best thanks for the valuable assistance which I have received from him in this, as well as in previous translations.

THEOD. MEYER.

EDINBURGH, *November* 1855.



## AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

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WHEN, in the beginning of last year, I undertook the editorship of the Church and School Magazine for Saxony (*Sächsisches-Kirchenu. Schulblatt*), it appeared to me that a comprehensive review of the course which the development of German Protestantism has taken since the middle of last century, would be the best method of effecting that which such a magazine is expected to effect, viz., the means of understanding the present condition of the Church. I have some reason to believe that the seven articles in which I carried out this idea have not remained without fruit within the immediate sphere of their destination. In now putting them together for the benefit of a wider circle, no violence is done to them, inasmuch as, from the first, they were written with the view of forming a united whole. This book is, nevertheless, not a mere reprint of those articles. I have corrected them throughout, have altered many things, and added elements by no means unimportant. Notwithstanding these things, however, the book in its tone and manner will still exhibit its origin. It is not written in the style of the Compendia.

This, however, I regard as its smallest defect. The time seems to be passed when our compendium style, with its abstract oracles, its epigrammatic and pointed periods, its exhibition of quotations and literary notices, was admired. Wherever it was feasible, the schools have been characterized in the very words of their representatives. Whatever the book may thereby have lost in its claims to historical art, it has gained in objectivity. But that which many will not pardon, is the stand-point from which I judge. The fact, however, that in historical representations of the time reviewed by me, opinions are expressed, is countenanced by the example of *Schlosser*, on the territory of universal history ; by that of *Erdmann*, on the territory of philosophy ; by that of *Tholuck*, *Neander*, *Hagenbach*, and others, on the territory of theology. That which is granted to these stand-points, a theology also, I should think, may claim, which at least has historical right in its favour.

CH. FRED. AUG. KAHNIS, D.D.

LEIPZIG, 28th August, 1854.

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## FIRST BOOK.

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It is not a history of the Protestant Church of Germany since the middle of the last century which the following pages pretend to offer, but a survey of the systems and tendencies which, since that period, have agitated Protestantism, that thus we may be enabled to understand the history of the present.

A threefold prejudice stands in the way of such a history: *First*, That we are thereby led from the fresh blooming territory of life into the dark misty land of abstractions. *Secondly*, That by the confusion occasioned by the crossing and opposition of the various systems, we are distracted rather than edified. *Thirdly*, That as regards a comprehensive view of the whole, the reader is too much at the mercy of the stand-point of the author.

It is true that such a history of systems and tendencies leads into the world of thoughts. In no age, however, have thoughts ventured farther out into life than in the second half of the eighteenth century, where philosophy sought to rule over both State and Church.

It is true, also, that it is precisely in this period that these thoughts come more into contact and conflict with

each other ; but the task which this book proposes to itself is, in substance, to point out their internal unity. This, however, we state with the conviction that our ability falls very far short of the *ideal* which we ourselves entertain of such a task.

It is farther true that the author views this movement from a stand-point which is not common to all. But, on the other hand, no true history has hitherto been obtained without forming a judgment. All that can be demanded is, that the opinion should not break in upon the phenomena like a thunderbolt from a clear sky, but should be able to point out, and bring to light the judgment which, from within, is passed upon the systems ; that the last word which the author may have to speak should not be in strict opposition to the whole movement, but should be able to vindicate itself just by the movement.

It would be moving in a circle, if the author were here to state the reasons which have induced him to divide the period here to be traversed into two, which, as far as systems can be circumscribed by numbers, have, for their boundary, the end of the eighteenth century. The second half of the eighteenth century is to him the period of *Illuminism*,<sup>1</sup> the first half of the nineteenth century the period of Renovation. Of the former we shall treat in this First Book : the Second Book will embrace the latter.

<sup>1</sup> The German word is *Aufklärung*, which means "clearing-up, illumination, enlightenment." It has not in itself a bad meaning, but is so used by all parties—although, of course, in a different sense. The context must decide the exact meaning to be attached to it. Our author designates thereby opposition to the mysteries of faith, and to all truth revealed from without. By its derivation from the adjective *klar*, *i.e.* clear, the word reminds us, moreover, of the leading principle of all these schools and systems: *Wahr ist, was klar ist*, *i.e.* true is all that which is clear, *i.e.* which agrees with man's natural sense for truth—with common sense.—Tr.

## CHAPTER I.

### ILLUMINISM.

It is scarcely possible to understand an age which undertook to determine all the forms and institutions of life by the pure *idea*, to explain all of them from it, without viewing, carefully and minutely, the course of philosophy,—that science which has, from of old, considered herself as queen in the domain of thoughts.

Proceeding from the fundamental view that philosophy is the scientific self-consciousness of an age, modern philosophy, of which *Descartes* is usually considered the father, has been declared to be the philosophy of Protestantism. That which, in the Reformation, was carried out on the territory of religion, was, as is generally affirmed, accomplished, since *Descartes*, on the domain of philosophy. It is true that, at first sight, this view is contradicted by the circumstance that *Descartes* was a zealous Roman Catholic, who even made a pilgrimage to Loretto; that *Spinoza* was a Jew; and that *Leibnitz* exerted himself, with all his might, for a final union of the separated individual churches. By such outward facts, however, a matter so purely internal in its character, cannot be determined, and this all the more, because to these external facts others may be opposed: such as, that the writings of *Descartes* were put into the *Index*; *Spinoza* was compelled to leave the Synagogue; and *Leibnitz*, after all, belonged by birth to the Protestant Church. It is argued, that as Protestantism, proceeding from subjective faith, broke through the authority and tradition of the Church of the Middle Ages, so the father of modern

philosophy proceeded from doubting all truth handed down by tradition ;—as Protestantism developed all its doctrines from subjective faith, so the father of modern philosophy acquired and formed the sum and substance of his knowledge from self-consciousness. But this dazzling combination rests on an assertion as unphilosophical as it is unhistorical. Protestantism is a religious, a Christian, and an ecclesiastical stage of development ; but being such, it demands that it shall be measured by the law of its own territory of life. He, however, who affirms that Protestantism, with its doctrine of the subjective faith, broke through the tradition of the Church of the Middle Ages, confounds Protestantism with a caricature of the Reformation—with fanaticism. Protestantism has assailed the authority of the Mediæval Church with an authority, the decisive weight of which the latter herself acknowledged, viz., with Scripture. According to the principle of Protestantism, it is not that which agrees with the subjective faith, but that which is in accordance with Scripture, which is true. It is not consistent with truth to fasten upon the Reformers who assailed, with the strongest weapons, a spirit destructive of the word of Scripture and of the right of what is historical, and who, acquainted as they were with the old philosophy and with scholasticism, denied to reason any right whatsoever to judge in matters of faith ;—it is not consistent with truth to fasten upon them the inference that the truth of their standing-point was self-consciousness,—that self-consciousness which pulls down a world in order to rebuild it out of itself.

Another question is, Whether the character of modern philosophy does not stand in vital connection with the essence of Protestantism ? In opposition to the Jewish kings, who made flesh their arm ; in opposition to the priests, who performed works which were merely external,



—the prophets of the Old Testament insisted upon the right disposition of mind, and upon the proper manifestation of it in the life; and from this spiritual point of view they prophetically saw a time when the Lord would write the law in the heart. They thus set loose a subjective spirit, proceeding from the wants of the person, and which then showed itself even in those systems which confounded the human with the divine; such as that of the Pharisees, who certainly, first of all, strove after the justification of the individual by the law. But who, for all that, would claim a prophetic tendency for the Pharisees? Thus, it could not be otherwise than that the spirit of inquiry which the Reformers claimed in the territory of faith, should be naturally followed by a spirit of inquiry, of criticism, of reflection, on the territory of the purely human life. It is indeed a very ingenious supposition on the part of Shakespeare, that Hamlet, that man of reflection, studied in *Wittenberg*. Up to the period of the Thirty Years' War, religion was the chief moving power of the time. The question regarding the Confession prevailed over everything; and even secular questions, in order that they might excite interest and be carried, were compelled to clothe themselves in the garb of religion. But the result of the Thirty Years' War was indifference, not only to the Confession, but to religion in general. Ever since that period, secular interests decidedly occupy the fore-ground, and the leading power in Europe is France. The change of the times is characterised, in a high degree, by Christina of Sweden, the daughter of that heroic king of the Lutheran Church. Possessed of a nature purely and entirely reflective, disquieted, capricious, hastening from one intellectual enjoyment to another, she soon became unsettled in her Protestant faith. It was too dry and serious for her. Led by the ancients,

she soon abandoned herself to a deistical Rationalism. But the reflecting Ego which had made this faith, felt itself also to have the mastery over everything which it had assigned to it, and she fell into an unbounded Scepticism. Against that, the learned Humanists, whom she assembled at her court, had no remedy. The Ego, freed from all fetters, but unable to bear itself, demanded an absolute authority ; and such the cunning fathers of the Society of Jesus pointed out to her as to be found in Rome. But this authority, too, was one of her own making ; the celebrated pervert stood, by her irony, above even Rome and its anointed. It was at the court of this individual, thoroughly modern, that *Descartes* closed his life. The unsteadiness which pervades Christina's life, pervades his also, which was violently tossed between the solitude of study and the noisy life of the world. Doubt, the fruit of this unsteadiness, is the starting-point of his philosophy.

The Ego which doubts of everything, cannot doubt that it is doubting ; to doubt is to think. Everything the thinking Ego may cast out of himself, except thinking itself. Thinking is its real being ; the Ego exists only because and while it thinks : I think—therefore, I am (*cogito, ergo sum*). Self-consciousness is thus the firm point on which the doubt, as to whether man be able to comprehend the truth, is broken. In the consciousness of self there is implied, as an innate idea, the *consciousness of God*. The idea of an infinite being cannot be the product of one who is finite ; it is from the infinite mind only that it can have come into the finite. The *idea* of God necessarily supposes the *existence* of God, and necessarily implies it. It is thus in the *divine substance* that the thinking Ego possesses the absolute substance of truth ; the world stands without this thinking Ego. Whatever



we perceive in the world may be resolved into *the two substances of extension and of thought*. In these three substances the sum of all existence is comprehended. But is this sum sure and certain? His own self-consciousness alone is absolutely sure to the Ego; and this is certain to him, because it is in it that thought and being are comprehended in immediate unity. If, then, that be certain to the Ego which immediately corresponds to him,—what is *clear* or obvious to him,—the thinking Ego has the measure of truth in *clearness*.<sup>1</sup> The Ego which went out from absolute doubt returns into the objective world easy and comforted, in the conviction that the God whose idea is given immediately in the self-consciousness, could not have given to men organs of untruth: *that which is clear or obvious to him will be true*.

It is within this sphere of thought that *Spinoza* consistently takes his stand. In common with *Descartes*, he held the *formal* principle of *clearness*, and the method of that science which proves with absolute evidence, *i.e.* Mathematics. But it appeared to him to be inconsistent to allow two finite substances to stand beside the absolute substance. There is only one substance, *viz.*, God. While *Descartes*, however, in the sense of the creed of the Church, explained the absolute substance, as the Infinite Spirit, the Creator of heaven and earth, *Spinoza* defined it in a manner purely philosophical, as a being which does not, for its existence, require any other being, and is hence the ground of

<sup>1</sup> *De Methodo*: Sum certus me esse rem cogitantem. Numquid ergo etiam scio, quid requiratur, ut de aliqua re sim certus? Nempe in hac prima cogitatione nihil aliud est quam clara quaedam et distincta perceptio ejus quod affirmo, quae sane non sufficeret ad me certum de rei veritate reddendum, si posset unquam contingere, ut aliquid quod ita clare et distincte perciperem falsum esset, ac provinde jam videor pro regula generali statuere, *illud omne esse verum quod clare et distincte percipio*.

himself, is absolute self-affirmation, the immanent cause of all phenomena. The God of *Spinoza* is nothing but this abstract infinite existence, this infinite space, which is indifferent towards the finite forms which arise and vanish in it, this ocean, on which the waves rise and fall. All those definitions which assign to him spirit, personality, will, etc., do so in appearance only—(See *Erdmann, Vermischte Aufsätze*, S. 124, ff.) The substance is the negation of all finite phenomena (*modi*), and yet exists only by making them proceed out of itself. All phenomena are resolved into the two last fundamental notions—*extension* and *thought*. These are the *attributes* of the substance, *i.e.* that which our understanding perceives as constituting and determining its substance. The phenomena (*modi*) are comprehended by the *perception of the senses* (*imagination*); the attributes are products of the *understanding*, and these are the Infinite which the understanding produces in the way of abstraction; the substance is for the *reason*, striving after the Infinite and one. That is the highest; after that man ought to strive; he ought not to follow those thoughts of God which are subjectively made (*confused*), but the objective thoughts of God; and that which he beholds, he ought to receive with love, as a manifestation of the Infinite (*amor intellectualis*). With such views *Spinoza* was compelled to leave the Synagogue, without being able to join the Christian Church. The logical calmness and consistency which pervade his ethics, pervade his life also. He has, for modern time, become the representative of Pantheism; and thus it is that many have forced upon him other forms of it. The unity of God which he proclaimed was, however, not an absorption into the life of the universe, an absorption still full of life, according to Eastern theory; nor was it a mystical absorption of self into the love of God, according to the views held and acted

upon in the middle ages ; but it was the logical surrender to the logically apprehended nature of the universe. This dissolution of all life into logical thoughts is, in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, exercised in the spheres of theology and politics. It is there that this whole philosophy is seen as an important link in the chain of those intellectual systems and tendencies which issued in *Illuminism*. When, therefore, German philosophy again revived the pantheistic spirit of *Spinoza*, Illuminism willingly offered its hand ; its precursor also was *Spinoza*. (See *Reichlin Meldegg, Dr H. G. E. G. Paulus*, I. S. 227).

*Spinoza*—so *Leibnitz* said—would be right if there were no monads. The universe consists of numberless monads. They are atoms determining themselves, spontaneous powers, independent individual existences. Whatever exists, from the particle of dust up to God, is a monad. But while every monad is essentially an individual existence determining itself, yet it stands, at the same time, in a relation to the universe by that notion of the universe which it carries within itself. But this notion of the universe does not imply that they are determined from without—the monads, says *Leibnitz*, have no windows ; but they are brought into a relation to the universe from within. If, then, the nature of every monad consists in self-determination, it follows that the degree of this self-determination decides the position which it occupies in the universe. God, the absolute monad, is absolute self-determination. With the degree of self-determination coincides the degree of the notion of the universe. Where life still slumbers in a stupor, as in the stone, there the notion of the universe also is confused, *i.e.*, without any distinguishing of particulars. The more perfect the life, the more distinct the notion of the universe. In man, the body is a conglomeration of monads, which the monad of the soul keeps to-

gether, as a swarm of bees is kept by the queen bee. The monad of the human soul is mind, and the fundamental powers of the mind are knowledge and volition. Man is free in his volition, in so far as he is not determined from without, and by caprice, but by rational considerations. These rational considerations, however, are nothing else but the dispositions of will, which were, from the beginning, implanted in man. Hence, not only the functions of the body, but also those of the soul, are the mechanical manifestations of dispositions which were put into him from without, just as are the movements of an automaton. That power which determines every thing is thus the predestined order, according to which all single monads act upon, and fit into one another, in a harmonious manner—the *pre-established harmony*. That—as once Leibnitz himself said—is the deity of his system. Although he himself acknowledges the God of the Christian faith, yet his system assigned to Him a very uncertain position only. (See *Erdmann, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, II. 2 S. 55, ff.)—The individuality of its author gave great strength and authority to this view of the universe. The life and views of *Descartes* bear the same character of disunion between faith and knowledge as we find, before him, with his countrymen *Montaigne* and *Charron*, and, after him, in the whole extent of its untruth, in *Bayle*. The cause of this certainly did not lie in the time only, but also in the romantic manner in which the objective forms of life were, in a mechanical way only, united with the personal life. *Leibnitz*, the German thinker, was, throughout, a positive character. The secret of the immense knowledge which this powerful spirit possessed must be found, apart from his wonderful natural gifts, in the astonishing and almost child-like manner with which he could surrender himself to the thoughts of others. “No one”—so he says of him-

self—"is less of a critic than I myself am. It is singular that I approve of most of what I read. Conscious how differently things may be viewed, I find, in reading, always that which excuses or defends the authors. My disposition is, after all, such, that in the writings of others I seek more my own profit than to discover anything to their disadvantage." Such a man, who, to mathematicians, natural philosophers, philologists, historians, and theologians, proved himself to be a master in their respective branches of knowledge,—such a man was required, in order to secure confidence to the claim of philosophy to be the mistress of all sciences. A man with this astonishing eye for all the objects of science,—with this sense of what is true in every sphere, could not, like *Spinoza*, throw the forms of the universe into the logical abyss of the substance. As, in his universe, all the contrasts are resolved into harmony, so he aimed at a philosophical view in which all the historical forms of philosophy find their true position (see *Feuerbach, Darstellung der Leibnitzischen Phil.*, S. 24, ff.),—at a reconciliation between philosophy and Christianity, in opposition to the sceptical dualism of *Bayle* (against whom he wrote his *Theodicea*) and others,—yea, even at a reconciliation of the separated individual churches. It is true that he has not overcome the mechanism which *Descartes*, especially, had introduced; and the dismemberment of the universe into monads, is a significant omen of the atomizing tendency of the age of *Illuminism* (see *Erdmann, Die Deutsche Speculation seit Kant*, I. S. 22). Like *Descartes* and *Spinoza*, he, too, saw in *clearness* the measure for truth. He gave a more distinct shape to the principle of *clearness*, by dividing it into the principles of contradiction, and of the sufficient reason. The *true* is, in the first instance, that which does not contradict itself; and, secondly, that for which a sufficient reason can



be adduced. The first principle (*principium contradictionis*) proves the possibility; the second (*principium rationis sufficientis*), the reality.

The principle of *clearness* thus established became the point of gravitation, and the centre of the philosophy of *Wolff*. *Leibnitz* had been prevented from systematically bringing out his views. This was the task which *Wolff* proposed to himself; and he has accomplished it with such an energy of distinctness, and with such consistency in the execution of it, as deserve, at all events, to be acknowledged by us. In harmony with these two principles of truth, he divides all the territories of philosophical knowledge into two parts—the theoretical, and the practical. The former develops that which reason teaches, according to the principle of what is possible; the latter, that which experience shows to be real. That which, *e.g.*, reason knows of God belongs to natural theology; but the latter, as *Wolff* modestly confesses, requires to be supplemented by revelation, which belongs to experience. Thus it is also in cosmology, psychology, etc. Now, although *Wolff* allowed its due weight to what is established by experience, yet it cannot be questioned that, in his philosophy, the main stress rests upon the rational. This appears especially in his practical philosophy, to the diligent cultivation and establishment of which he was urged on by the practical tendency of his time. There is everywhere visible the effort to change the moral forms of life into notions of the understanding, and to make the understanding itself the last moral impulse. Thus, his view of a family and of a state, is that of a contract only; and far more ostensibly than in *Leibnitz* is the principle of the monad seen in the effort to define all moral spheres from the standing-point of the individual. For *Illuminism* his system forms an important crisis. The formal principle of modern

philosophy since *Descartes* : “Clearness is the measure of truth,” which in *Descartes*, *Spinoza*, and *Leibnitz*, had changed the objective existence into corresponding definitions of thoughts, prevails, in *Wolff*, over the material principle. For, that which *Wolff* seeks for in the universe are clear notions ; clearness devours truth. Hence the unmeasured applause bestowed upon this philosopher. At a time when *Wolff* had yet a great deal to say (he died in 1754), in the year 1738, *Ludovici*, in his detailed history of the Wolffian philosophy, already counts 107 authors of this tendency. The method of mathematical demonstration was, according to the example of *Wolff*, employed by theologians, lawyers, physicians, aestheticians, etc. And this philosophy not only found its way into the sphere of science, but into that of general education also. The point of attraction in it was just the *clearness*. The adherents of it boasted :—

God said : the sun shall be,  
And a world came into sight ;  
God said : let *Wolff* be,  
And in all souls there was light.

But *Wolff* survived his fame. His heirs were the so-called *Popular Philosophers* among whom *Reimarus*, *Moses Mendelssohn*, *Garve*, *Sulzer*, *Platner*, *Nicolai*, and others, are sufficiently known. What is common to all these philosophers, is the effort to make philosophy a matter of good education. They therefore abandoned the heavy mathematical method, and philosophized in the tone of educated conversation. The criterion of truth is, according to them, sound common sense. “The only business which I assign to my speculation,”—so says *Mendelssohn* in his last work—“is merely to rectify the utterances of sound common sense, and to change them, as much as is possible, into rational knowledge.” It forms part of

sound common sense to strive after virtue, to believe in God, to hope in a life after death ; and to afford a philosophical foundation for these convictions of sound common sense, was what the popular philosophers were aiming at. *Mendelssohn* proved the existence of God in his *Morgenstunden* ; the immortality of the soul in his *Phaëdon*. The manner in which he led this proof was based upon the principle of *clearness*, in that form which *Leibnitz* had given to it. There is a God, because the idea of God not only has nothing contradictory, but has even sufficient reasons of reality. Such a philosophy was accessible to the educated world, and they willingly received it. The formal principle of modern philosophy : “ *Clearness* is the rule and criterion of truth,” has, by the *Popular Philosophy*, been implanted in the conviction of the educated of the age. *The nature and essence of Illuminism consists simply in making clearness the criterion of truth.*

This definition, however, requires to be supplemented. *Clearness* is a merely formal notion. What was it which was clear to the Popular Philosophy ? That which corresponded to common sense. Common sense was, to the philosophers of this school, the innate, natural sense of truth. This natural sense they opposed to the artificial systems of science, and to the positive forms of life in religion, state, law, etc. In these there is much error ; but not in common sense. Common sense contains, so to speak, a sunk capital of fixed truth with which God has endowed mankind. This natural sense of truth must of necessity contain the natural root of truth, even as regards all the forms of life. And it is thus, that with the formal principles of *Illuminism* : “ *Clearness* is the criterion of truth,” there is connected the material principle : “ *In all the forms of life it is the natural foundation which is clear, and, therefore, true.*” *Wolff* had admitted it to be



rational to acknowledge a revelation ; the Popular Philosophers, according to the principle which we have brought out, recognised, in all positive religions, only the natural foundation to be true. They were *Deists*. In order to understand this, we must take a retrospective glance at the development of Illuminism in England and France.

As the master of modern philosophy in England, Bacon stands out. In harmony with the practical character of his nation, Bacon turned his eye to the world of phenomena. To understand the reality, and that by means of critical observation, is the task of philosophy. The critical, experimental, and practical spirit which he asserted and maintained, advanced in *Locke* to that position which considers the human mind as an empty form which receives all which it contains by means of perception by the senses (*Nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in sensu*), until *Hume* denied generality and necessity to ideas, so that in the world of mind there remained subjective combinations only ; and in the moral world changeable principles only. In agreement with the Popular Philosophers of Germany, the Scottish philosophers maintained, in opposition to *Hume*, the generality of moral consciousness as the firm ground of all truth. *Bacon* stood on the ground of the doctrine of the Church ; but the experimental method which he impressed upon English science has contributed to mature Deism.<sup>1</sup> *Locke's* religious standpoint resembles that of our so-called Rational Supernaturalism, viz., that Christianity is the supernatural revelation of natural truths. With such a view Deism stood in closest connection ; just as our German or rational Supernaturalists also, themselves, to a large extent, went over to Rationalism (*Ammon, Bretschneider, Schott, Tzschürner*).

<sup>1</sup> See *Lechler, Geschichte des Englischen Deismus*, S. 25.

*Hume* himself was a Deist. By Deism we understand "The elevation of natural religion to be the standard and rule of all positive religion,—an elevation which is supported by free examination by means of thinking."<sup>1</sup> *Herbert of Cherbury, Hobbes, Toland, Tindal, Chubb, Shaftesbury*, and others, are the heads of this school, which attained its height at the end of the seventeenth, and beginning of the eighteenth century. The principal tenets of English Deism are the following:—Christianity is a positive religion, like Judaism and Mahomedanism. It is a prejudice which the Christians have in common with the Jews and Mahomedans, to imagine that their religion is the only true one. That which separates these religions is the positive, but that is merely the unessential—the shell. In the main point, all positive religions are at one. This main point is natural religion—the religion of sound common sense. The foundation of natural religion is the moral consciousness. It is on it that the belief in a higher Being, and the hope of immortality, are based. This natural religion was the original religion; and Christianity is, in its essence, nothing but the restored original religion. Whatever in Christianity cannot be reduced to this natural religion, is either unessential or fabulous."

It is not possible to deny to English Deism a certain moral and religious earnestness. When *Herbert of Cherbury*, the first Deist of note, had finished his book, "*De veritate prout distinguitur a revelatione etc.*" (1624), he was full of doubts as to whether its publication would promote the glory of God. "Thus filled with doubts, I was, on a bright summer day, sitting in my room; my window to the south was open; the sun shone brightly; not a breeze was stirring. I took my book *On Truth* into

<sup>1</sup> See *Lechler*, S. 490.

my hand, threw myself on my knees, and prayed devoutly in these words, ‘O thou one God, thou Author of this light which now shines upon me, thou Giver of all inward light, I implore thee, according to thine infinite mercy, to pardon my request which is greater than a sinner should make. I am not sufficiently convinced whether I may publish this book or not. If its publication shall be for thy glory, I beseech thee to give me a sign from heaven. If not, I will suppress it.’ I had scarcely finished these words, when a loud, and yet, at the same time, a gentle sound came from heaven, not like any sound on earth. This comforted me in such a manner, and gave me such satisfaction, that I considered my prayer as having been heard.” Truly, one may ask, should God have given such a direct sign from heaven, in order to confirm a book which has no place for a direct divine revelation? Whatever may be the nature of this experience, might not Herbert have learnt from it that there exists a deep craving for signs and miracles—a craving which is satisfied by religion? It is not, however, this which we intended to prove by this fact, but only that there existed among the Deists deep religious earnestness.

In France, Deism assumed another form. The world, which Louis XIV. had formed around him, was a world of show. He who considered the state as only an attribute of the royal substance (*l'état c'est moi*), would impress his royal Ego upon all the forms of this attribute. It was solely for the glorification of his own name that he patronized art and science. But the intellects soon enough changed their tone. When, under the regency and the independent reign of Louis XV., the court itself no longer sought the appearance of the good, the intellects also threw off the bonds which had hitherto kept them within bounds. There arose a literature productive of the

dissolution of all existing things, which had its roots, not in the people, not in the depths of science, not in the creative soil of genius, but within the domains of the educated world. Whatever at that time was spoken in France, the country of society, whatever was uttered in the witty circles, threw itself into literature, in order that it might return into, and operate as an impulse in those very circles. While, at court, one lascivious woman after another, wielded the sceptre, women of intellect—a *Tencin*, *Geoffrin*, *Espinasse*—assembled in their drawing-rooms those who were remarkable for talent. In these, he was the hero of the day who best understood how to exercise his wit at the expense of the authorities in State and Church. In the characteristics which *Rousseau*, in the *Nouvelle Heloise*, gives of the life and manners of these societies, we read: “No disputing is here heard, no epigrams are made; they reason, but not in the stiff professorial tone; you find fine jokes without puns, wit with reason, principles with freaks, sharp satire and delicate flattery with serious rules of morality. They speak of every thing in order that every one may have to say something, but they never exhaust the questions raised; from the dread of getting tedious, they bring them forth only by the by, shorten them hastily, and never allow a dispute to arise. Every one informs himself, enjoys himself, and departs from the others pleased. But what is it that is learnt from these interesting conversations? One learns to defend with spirit the cause of untruth, to shake with philosophy all the principles of virtue, to gloss over with fine syllogisms one’s passions and prejudices, in order to give a modern shape to error. When any one speaks, it is, to a certain extent, his dress, not himself, that has an opinion; and the speaker will change it as often as he changes his profession. Give him to-day a tie-wig, to-

morrow a uniform, and after to-morrow a mitre, and you will hear him defend, in succession, the laws, despotism, and the inquisition. There is one kind of reason for the lawyer, another for the financier, and a third for the soldier. Thus, no one ever says what he thinks, but what, on account of his interest, he would make others believe; and his zeal for truth is only a mask for selfishness." While with English Deists we find a certain earnestness for truth, a certain sincerity of conviction,—here adroit reasoning and wit decide the matter; while there we find moral earnestness,—we here find, throughout, immorality and frivolity. It is true that the succeeding and last adherents of English Deism—we mention only Bolingbroke—had prepared its transition to the French form of it; on the other hand, French Deism was prepared in the school of the English. We could not conceive of *Voltaire*, *Montesquieu*, *Rousseau*, *Diderot*, without the influence of England. An important link in the transition is *Bayle*, who transferred the results of philosophy to the educated circles, and, along with these results, diffused a sceptical disposition, which, without directly contradicting religion, yet intentionally pointed out its incompatibility with reason and science.—The heads of French Deism are *Rousseau* and *Voltaire*. The former gave the programme of his literary activity in two prize-essays. The first of them establishes the proposition, that the progress of scientific education has always involved the decay of moral education. The sciences, having proceeded from immoral sources—astronomy from superstition, physical science from curiosity, morals from pride—gloss over immorality. The times of barbarism have always been the times of moral power. To this negative result the second of these essays, which, however, obtained not the prize, brought the positive, that the original, natural condition of man-



kind was the only true one. This thought now pervades all Rousseau's writings: Return to nature. By nature man is good. All that is bad in mankind is a deviation from the natural condition. It is with this proposition that the "*Emile*," that important work of Rousseau's on education, begins: "Every thing is good when it comes forth from the hand of the Creator; every thing degenerates under man's hand. In the state in which things now are, a man who, from the moment of his birth, would live among others, would, if left to himself, be most disfigured. Prejudices, authority, constraint, example, all social institutions which now depress us, would choke nature in him, and nothing would be put in its stead. He would resemble a young tree which, growing up accidentally in a street, would soon pine away in consequence of the passers by pushing it from all sides, and bending it in all directions." *Emile* is intended to be the ideal of an education according to nature; not for being a citizen, or the member of some particular class, but for being a man. But such an education only is natural which faithfully follows the hints which the nature of man itself gives in its development. It cannot be our task to follow out the stages of this development; *Raumer* has done so in a manner which exhausts the subject (see *Geschichte der Pädagogik*, II. S. 224 ff.).—The picture of this pupil, hardened in the manner of a savage, endowed with strong senses, thoroughly acquainted with his nearest neighbourhood, of clear understanding, of strong will, defying all obstacles, with self-confident courage—the picture of this pupil fell into this age thoroughly over-refined, like the picture of the ancient German which Tacitus held up to the degraded Romans. In the *Nouvelle Heloise* he represents the struggle which a heart, following the natural tendency to virtue, maintains with the unnatural social

relations. The hero of the novel, *St Preux*, halts between the over-refined, untrue, immoral, educated world in Paris, and between the natural life in his native Swiss valleys, and the people of the ocean still in a state of nature, whom he seeks after having been shipwrecked in life. Too natural for the educated world, too educated for the natural world, all that he is able to do is to prescribe natural diets for education, domestic life, art, etc. In the *Contrat Social*, *Rousseau* traces political life back to the social contract, according to which "the individual puts his person and strength, as common property, under the direction of the general will." The republic appears to him to be the only form of government in accordance with nature. And as he does education, society, and state, so *Rousseau* finally traces positive religion back to its natural root. In his *Emile*, he has put this natural religion into the mouth of the Savoy Curate. The latter judges favourably of the Gospel. How should uneducated Jews have been able to invent a history to which no ideal of the wise men of Greece approaches. Christ was He of whom Plato had only a presentiment. How far does Socrates stand behind Christ! If the former died as a wise man, the latter died as God. But how prepossessing soever such praise, it celebrates in Christ, in reality, natural religion only; for it is not revelation, not miracles, not external commandments, which are the source of religion, but reason alone. And it is this latter which teaches belief in a personal God, in the voice of conscience, and in a recompensing Future. This deistical confession brought persecutions upon *Rousseau* both in France and Geneva (1762). Against the condemning sentence of the Archbishop of Paris, *Beaumont*, he wrote a circular letter, in which, with all the brilliancy of his style, he advocates the right of natural religion, and proposes a great union of religions



on the ground of Naturalism. To his countrymen he addressed the famous *Letters from the Mountain*, the first of which treated the same subject with great skill. After *Rousseau* had thus laid open the natural condition of every thing, he exhibited himself in his true character to the world, in his *Confessions*. The life of a man who, at the age of seven years, read novels with his father, day and night,—who in his sixteenth year apostatised to the Roman Catholic Church, in order afterwards to return to the Reformed,—who, when still a youth, lived upon the favour of a woman of doubtful character,—who, in Venice, enjoyed the sensual pleasures of Italy,—who cohabited with a common woman (*Le Vasseur*) without the benediction of the Church, and without love, merely for the sake of sexual wants, and gave up to the foundling hospital the fruits of this alliance,—who held the world to be perfect every where wheresoever man does not come with his troubles, and who at last ended his misanthropic existence by poison (at least, according to the highest probability<sup>1</sup>),—such a man is not a proof of the doctrine of the natural goodness of the human heart. As a man, born in Switzerland, and grown up under natural relations, and filled with recollections of the republican simplicity of his native place, *Rousseau* rightly felt that all relations, especially in France, were caricatured; but his gospel of natural religion was nothing else than the *beatus ille* of the usurer *Alfius*, in *Horace*. His nature was an abstraction which fed upon the world of education; just as he himself could not do without the educated circles, the unnaturalness of which he described with all the declamatory skill of his time; and he would have pined away, if the world which he described and praised, had become a reality. But he is one of the

<sup>1</sup> The proofs of it are given by *Raumer* in the *Ev. Kirchen-Zeitung*, 1846, No. 88.

most characteristic representatives of the tendency of *Illuminism*, which, actuated by a natural sense of truth, would return to nature in all the relations of life.

More at home in the educated circles of France was *Voltaire*, the man of his century. He calls himself a Deist, and he knows well how most favourably to exhibit his Deism, by all the means of his brilliant style: "Worshippers of one God, friends of men, forbearing with the superstition which we reject,—we honour every society, do violence to no sect; we never speak with mockery or contempt of Jesus, who is called Christ. On the contrary, we consider him as a man distinguished by his zeal, by his virtue, by his love to his brethren. We lament over him as a reformer, perhaps somewhat too inconsiderate, who became the victim of his fanatical persecutors. We worship in him a Jewish Deist, just as we praise Socrates, who was an Athenian Deist." This assurance of his worshipping God, and of his high esteem for Christ, is perhaps equivalent to the conduct of many of our constitutionalists, who, while they disparage all the manifestations of kingly authority, and seek, if possible, to destroy all its influence, yet assure us that the person of the king is sacred in their eyes. Voltaire did not worship the living God in fear and love; but he threw himself into ecstasies for a self-made abstraction of God: he in reality worshipped only his idea of God. If he gave to a temple the inscription—"A Dieu Voltaire," what else could he thereby mean than—Free homage which one great spirit offers to the other? If he assures us that he worshipped a Deist in Christ, he worshipped in Christ the notion only which he ascribed to Him. Voltaire was a Deist, and not Christ. That Christ whom the gospels proclaim to us, he has treated with the utmost ridicule. In his *Profession de foi des Theistes*,

Voltaire calls the Old Testament a book full of contradictory fables, written more than 700 years later than is ordinarily assumed, and more contemptible than the fables of the Persians and Arabs. A view which he never wearies of advancing again and again is, that the Biblical stories are borrowed from the Ancient Mythology. In his *Epistle to the Romans* (written in opposition to St Paul's), he says: "Where, I say, is there a single event in the Old or New Testament which is not borrowed from Ancient Mythology? The sacrifice of Idomeneus—is it not that of Jephtha? The cow of Iphigenie—is it not the ram of Isaac? Do you not see Eurydice in Edith, in the wife of Lot? Minerva and Pegasus made water to spring forth from the rock; and the same miracle is ascribed to Moses. Before him Bacchus had gone with dry feet over the Red Sea, and had made sun and moon to stand still before Joshua did. There is not one single event in the New Testament which you do not find in other writers. The nymph Amatheia had the horn of plenty before Christ fed five thousand in the wilderness; the daughters of Anius had changed water into wine and oil, before the marriage in Cana was heard of." The Apostles are spoken of in the most contemptuous manner by *Voltaire*. He charges the first Christians with worse things than even the heathen did: "That which put the new machine (*i.e.*, the Christian Church) in motion, was, community of goods, secret feasts, hidden mysteries, gospels which were read by the initiated only, a paradise for the poor, a hell for the rich, charlatanry with exorcisms; such, I say, in strict accordance with truth, is the foundation of the Christian sect. If I deceive myself, or rather, if I wish to deceive, I pray the God of the universe to dry up my hand which writes what I am thinking; to crush my head, which is convinced of the

existence of this good and just God; to tear out a heart which worships Him." One may judge from this, how he deals with the Fathers of the Church,—with the doctrines of the Church,—and, above all, with popes, saints, and priests.

Although both were Deists, both masters of the ingenious mode of reasoning, and of the piquant style of those intellectual circles,—although both were, in many ways, affected by the artificiality and immorality of their age, and harbingers of an entire dissolution,—yet *Rousseau* had too much heart, too strong a moral instinct, too great earnestness, to be able to rejoice in a man who, in the general dissolution, was building up a triumphal arch to his own fame. In the views of the world which were held both by *Rousseau* and *Voltaire*, the highest Being, which they allowed to remain, and the kingdom of truth and virtue on which He rests, formed a very feeble counter-action to the gravitating power of materialism. The latter conquered in *Diderot*, *d'Alembert*, *Helvetius*, *d'Argens*, *de la Mettrie*, the men of *Holbach's* circle, and others. English and French Deism met with a very favourable reception in Germany,—the latter chiefly in the higher circles, and the former rather among the educated middle classes. The higher world was feeding upon the intellectual fragments of France. German princes considered it an honour to be introduced to those intellectual circles; and the events which occurred in them, of which commissioned individuals (such as Baron *Grimm*) gave a report, were objects of the deepest interest. It was considered a high privilege to read in the manuscript *Voltaire's* infamous poem, *La Pucelle d'Orleans*, and even to be permitted to add to it. The English freethinkers reached Germany chiefly by means of translations and refutations, and took effect when those



Popular Philosophers had, by means of the formal principle of modern philosophy, arrived at the same result. The head-quarters of Illuminism, both in the sense of French and English Deism, was Prussia, under Frederick II.

The relation betwixt Frederick William I. and Frederick II. is generally known, and has exerted the greatest influence upon the history of the world. The father represents the spirit of the olden times; the son that of the modern. In the former we have the old faith, animated by the influence of Pietism, coupled with old German rectitude and practical ability; in the latter the new faith, or rather unbelief, with French education, and abundance of human acuteness and wit. The assertion of *Ranke* (*Neun Bücher Preussischer Geschichten III.* S. 486) may be true, that the father would have destroyed himself if he had executed his son; but what appears to us to be more certain is, that Frederick's powers would have vanished like an *ignis fatuus*, unless his father, by his education and discipline, had impressed upon him the moral energy of the house of Hohenzollern. The sum and substance of all the doctrines which Frederick William I., when dying, gave to his son was, that a king of Prussia must always have his eye steadily fixed upon two objects,—the elevation of his house, and the prosperity of his subjects; upon both of these at the same time, and upon nothing else (*Ranke II.* S. 41). The sense in which Frederick understood the second part, he has, as it appears to us, expressed most distinctly in a letter to *Voltaire*:—"My occupation consists in struggling against ignorance and prejudices in the provinces, of which I have, by the accident of birth, been made a ruler; in enlightening the heads, civilizing the manners, and endeavouring to make people as happy as is consistent with human nature, and as far as the means which I can employ for

that end will allow." It is then in *Illuminism* that Frederick placed the prosperity of his subjects ; but *Illuminism* he placed essentially in freedom from all religious prejudices, *i.e.*, from the faith of the Church. Frederick, like Voltaire, professed Deism ; but he himself, in a letter to *d'Alembert*, once gave expression to the idea that he had never lived under the same roof with religion. By violent measures, which even his minister, *von Münchhausen*, ventured to oppose, he expelled the pious *Hähn* from his position as Director of *Klosterbergen*, and that for no other reason than because the piety of that man was repugnant to him ; while *Hähn's* successor, *Frommann* (*i.e.*, pious man) thought that he could introduce himself to the king only under the name of *Frohmann* (*i.e.*, a jovial man). In the instruction which Frederick gave to *Major von Borck*, for the education of his nephew, he says :—"When my nephew shall be somewhat older, it will be possible to give him an abstract of the opinions of the philosophers, and of the various religions, without inspiring him with hatred against any one of them, by directing his attention to the circumstance that all those religions worship God, but only in a different way. He need not have too much respect for the priest who instructs him (*Il ne faut pas qu'il ait trop de considération pour le prêtre qui l'instruit*), and he must not believe anything until he has examined it." It was from this deistical disregard of all that is positive in religion that there flowed his well-known principle, that in his dominions every one should be allowed to be saved in his own fashion. It is as generally known that he seized upon every occasion to vent his wit against ministers (whom he called priests or jokers), Bible texts, sacred actions, religious hymns, etc. Frederick, however, became acquainted with the darker aspects of *Illuminism* also ; for it was



not, of course, on the religious territory only that his Frenchmen took liberties. The great Voltaire, to whom Frederick had once written, "There is only one God and only one Voltaire," obliged Frederick to a confession such as that made to *Algarotti*: "Voltaire has committed a trick which is unworthy; he deserves to be branded on the Parnassus. It is indeed a pity that so worthless a soul is connected with so glorious a genius." Frederick was compelled to confess to himself that the increasing insubordination in his army had its foundation in the increasing unbelief; but he confessed that to himself at a time when it was too late.

*Berlin* was at that time the centre of Illuminism; Berlin and Illuminism were convertible terms. One may well say that this city, with its reflecting, critical, rational, witty tendency; with its rash, and for that very reason, changeable opinions; with its pre-eminently formal character, was a favourable soil for Illuminism, at all events at that time, under Frederick II. The most prominent and open mouthed there was *Nicolai*, the editor of the *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek* (General German Library). A bookseller, who had excelled in no single branch of science, sat in judgment upon all the departments of literature, in one of its most flourishing periods; a man of average intellect, without productive power, with the education of a dilettante, had the courage boldly to pass sentence against all the creations of genius which could not be accounted for from the sand-and fir-soil which he cultivated; a man of a mind wholly unphilosophical, but skilled in the use of bold and unscrupulous arguments, ridiculed the heroes of German philosophy. Against everything which had any depth whatever, he protested in the name of liberty of thought, and of Protestantism. "His Protestantism," says *Fichte* of him, "was a

protestation against all truth which pretended to remain truth; against all that is above our senses, and against every religion which by faith put an end to dispute. To him religion was only a means of education for the head, in order to furnish materials for never-ceasing talk; but by no means a matter of the heart and the life. His liberty of thinking was freedom from all that was, and is thought, the licentiousness of empty thinking, without substance and aim. Liberty of judgment was to him the right of every bungler and ignorant man to give his opinion about every thing, whether he understood it or not, and whether or not there was either head or tail in what he said." In his *Sebaldus Nothanker*, Nicolai represents a travelling theologian, of the school of *Illuminism*, who breaks his head against all the firm forms which faith everywhere as yet possesses. In the background of this territory of brutal ecclesiastical councillors, of perverse adherents of Crusius, of whining Moravian brethren, there stands, like a protecting genius, a clear-thinking bookseller,—and the reader, of course, here thinks of no one but the writer. Besides Nicolai, the clergymen *Spalding*, *Teller*, *Zöllner*, Librarian *Biester*, Rector *Büsching*, *Gedicke*, the Educationist, the Literati *Sulzer*, *Engel*, *Abbt*, *Mendelssohn*, were active in Berlin in the interest of *Illuminism*. A number of Jewish heads of families in Berlin, addressed, in a circular letter, the question to *Teller*, whether, on the ground of Mendelssohn's Deism, they could not enter into the communion of the Christians; and *Teller* could not but express himself favourably. He might as well, upon the ground of his Deism, have become a Jew. The secret of the communion, in which Christians and Jews knew themselves to be, consisted simply in their being neither Christians nor Jews, but *men*.

It was this at which *Illuminism* aimed ; as *Schiller* says, in reference to *Rousseau*, it enlisted *Christians*, for the purpose of transforming them into *men*. In the room of the authorities in Church and State, *Illuminism* put common sense ; in the room of the positive forms of life, a general disposition of mind, becoming man as such, which is termed *Humanism*. This *Humanism* levels all family traditions, all differences of rank, all nationality, all positive moral law, all positive religion,—all of them being only accidental numerators for the denominator of mankind : what man wants in the first and last place, that is, to be a *man*. What is thereby to be understood we shall now see in detail.

At the head of his *Emile*, *Rousseau* put the confession, that he was to represent the education of a *man*. In Germany, this principle called forth the *philanthropic* education, the master of which is *Basedow*, and the chief representatives of which are *Wolke*, *Trapp*, *Salzmann*, *Campe*, and others. That it was connected with *Illuminism*, is sufficiently evident from the character of the master. He was a disciple of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist* (*Raimarus*), whom the school of *Wolff* had likewise led to Naturalism, and who was filled with such an instinctive love of controversy against the doctrine of the Church,—especially against the Trinity—that, in his zeal for it, he could forget what otherwise he did not readily forget, viz., his own advantage. *Rousseau's Emile* had given rise to a great stir. Even *Kant*, who otherwise was not very easily excited, gave up his regular walks, in order to study *Emile*. But now the application was concerned, and *Basedow* was just the man to raise expectations, and both to claim and to gain good will and able men. Thus the first *Philanthropinum* arose at Dessau (1774). After the foundation had been laid, *Basedow* did not fail to

address, in a pompous manner, the guardians of mankind, for this cause of mankind. As Philanthropism agreed no less with the Absolutism of Russia than with the liberty of Switzerland, so, in the general private devotional exercises nothing should be done which would not be approved of by every worshipper of God, whether he were a Christian, Jew, Mahomedan, or Deist. "In the temple of the Father of All, crowds of dissenting fellow-citizens will worship as brethren, and afterwards they will, with the same fraternal disposition, go, one to hear the holy mass, the other to pray with real brethren 'Our Father,' the third to pray with real brethren 'Father of us'"<sup>1</sup> (see *Raumer*, l. c. S. 271, ff.).—While the former education had viewed the minds of children as vessels into which a certain amount of knowledge and faith was to be infused, whether it was easy or difficult, Philanthropism viewed these vessels as the chief thing, and the amount of knowledge as only secondary. In other words, knowledge was viewed merely as a means of training the human mind; and the aim was the natural development of all man's powers and faculties. While the former education had required all which it was in the power of youths to do, whether it gave them pleasure or pain, the philanthropic education asked, in the first place, What is in accordance with the nature of the child? What affords him enjoyment? How do all the inclinations and dispositions of childhood find their suitable sphere? The delight of children in bodily exercise is made use of as bodily gymnastics; the inclination for play, as mental gymnastics; walks, as opportunities for educating and teaching; ambi-

<sup>1</sup> One of the outward distinctions betwixt the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in Germany is that, in the latter, the Lord's Prayer begins "Unser Vater" (Our Father); while, in the former, it begins with "Vater unser" (Father of us).—TR.

tion, as a moral engine. But although the Philanthropina at first promised to teach every thing better and more quickly than the ordinary school did, yet it soon appeared that linguistic knowledge, and all matters of memory, would not thrive. Because they would not teach any thing from without, and mechanically, but would develop every thing according to nature, rational knowledge, such as logic, mathematics, arithmetic, natural religion, and morals, as well as those sciences based upon perception, experience, and advantage, were there chiefly cultivated. The fresh youth, grown up under fine bodily training, simply and easily dressed in an age of wigs and pigtails, walked about the fields and forests to acquire a knowledge of nature ; went into the workshops of tradesmen to acquire a knowledge of common life, with its arts and wants ; exercised themselves in the labour of the husbandman, in the art of the citizen, in order to stand a future like that of *Robinson Crusoe*, better than the hero of that book himself. It may be that, in *Schnepfenthal*, especially at first, there prevailed a simple patriarchal spirit ; and pupils, such as the *Humboldts*, no doubt, speak in favour of *Campe's* talent. And yet there very soon arose a coldness towards these institutions. *Kant*, who had at one time welcomed with enthusiasm the Philanthropinum at Dessau, soon gave a very hesitating opinion. *Hamann*, despairing of his own talent for educating, wrote to *Herder* : " I took on one Sunday the desperate whim of packing him (viz., his son John Michael) up precipitately, and sending him to the *Pontifex Maximus* (*Basedow*), in Dessau." *Herder* answered : " As regards the education of your John Michael, don't fret yourself ; nothing is gained by that. Have yet a little patience ; I myself come nearer the *Pontifex Maximus* in Dessau, and my boy, too, is growing up ; but, if it please God, he shall never see



or have him. Every thing there appears to me to be horrible, just like a hot-house, or rather like a stable full of human geese. When lately my brother-in-law, the forester, was here, he told me of a new method of rearing oak forests in ten years, to such a state as they would, by other means, reach only in fifty or a hundred years, viz., by cutting off from the young oaks the principal root underground; that then every thing above the ground shot out into stem and branches. I think that the whole of Basedow's secret consists in this; and to him, whom I know personally, I would not intrust any calves, far less men, with a view to their being educated." Indeed, Basedow, who considered every one to be uneducated, was a man without any education. And even Frederick II., the king of *Illuminism*, who knew men better than *Rousseau* did, had no confidence in the gospel of the goodness of human nature, on which this whole education was based. When *Sulzer* once praised to him the fruits which this conviction was bearing in the schools of Silesia, he said: "O my dear Sulzer, you don't know that d—d race."

To form useful members of human society was the aim and object of the philanthropic education, and it thus tended essentially towards *Utilitarianism*. The utilitarian view has, in substance, and as a matter of course, always been welcomed in common society; and while the single individual there seeks his own advantage, he promotes at the same time the advantage of the whole. But the spirit of the Gospel, which teaches to seek first of all the kingdom of God; and the Germanic spirit, which, by its corporative ties, had morally elevated the industrial life, formed a counterpoise to the tendency and aspiration of the single individual to material advantage. But in an age which was breaking loose from all tradition, that counterpoise was vanishing. To the single individual,



who, with his individual reason, measured every thing in heaven and on earth, his own individual interest was, of course, the most natural ; and to one who views things with his understanding only, selfish design and advantage is one of the most current notions. Ever since Descartes, philosophy had laid the mechanical measure to all moral organisms of life ; but to mechanism, design is the first and last. If the State was viewed as a mechanism,—as a machine (as it was very often said), it is easily seen how the public advantage, the common wealth (*le bien public*) came to be looked upon as the measure of all political forms. *Becker*, in his “*Noth-und Hilfsbüchlein*” (i.e., book for help in distress), told the husbandman, that he in his vocation had essentially to seek the great object of mankind, of becoming ever wiser and better, by his being an enemy to all beaten tracks, and an attentive observer of all inventions for the improvement of agriculture, and in his striving to make the soil more and more productive. The model-farmer, *William Thinker*, understands his favourite text, “Seek ye first the kingdom of God,” in such a manner that all his thoughts and aspirations are directed to the consideration of how he might arrange every thing in the best and most rational manner ; and as a reward he receives on his gravestone this praise :—

“William Thinker is here entombed. While on earth, his endeavour was to improve himself and every thing. He now receives his reward before God’s throne.”

Among the educated classes, still greater success had attended *Campe’s Robinson*, of which the moral is, after all, only this :—Learn in thy youth as many useful things as possible ; you don’t know how and where you may require them. Nor did the leaders of *Illuminism* forget

their advantage. Notwithstanding all his zeal for *Illuminism*, Nicolai always attended to his advantage as a bookseller. In the hands of Basedow, Bahrdt, Salis, the philanthropina became money speculations. And from practical life this utilitarian view found its way into the theory. Nothing in nature was so much admired as its adaptation to its purpose. With emotion, the wisdom of God was acknowledged, which gave to the poor Northlander the useful rein-deer, and to the lazy inhabitants of the South Sea, the productive bread-fruit tree. In the circumstance that the whole of nature is so thoroughly adapted to its purpose, the strongest proof for a divine reason was found; a whole literature gathered round the proof from design. (See *Fortlage, Darstellung u. Kritik der Beweise für das Dasein Gottes* [Exhibition and criticism of the proofs for the existence of God] S. 215.) In the territory of the Church, the utilitarian view had already been introduced by Pietism laying, as it did, an exclusive emphasis on practical Christianity. *Frederick William I.*, in whom a military spirit, Dutch economical sense, and practical Christianity were so strangely blended, gave, in his last days, to the court chaplain Sack, the instruction, "I will tell you what is the main point in religion: to fear God, to love Jesus, and to do good; all the rest is"—; the king here made use of one of his cynical expressions. The theology of *Illuminism* reduced practical Christianity to intellectual and moral improvement. In this sense, *Spalding* has written two volumes on the *Usefulness of the Ministerial office in the country*. The main duty of the honest minister is to make his whole congregation wiser, more intelligent, and more pious, so that God may have His delight in them. It is not as a model farmer, not as a collector of stones, not as a rearer of bees, not as a literatus,

that the minister benefits his congregation for eternity ; he must be its teacher, and attend to the cure of souls (Th. I., S. 38 ff). But soon enough voices were raised, asserting that with less theology, and more medical and juridical experience, a country minister would be more useful. In the "*Noth-und Hilfsbüchlein*," a clergyman, who, by a fortunate accident, is the son of a brewer in town, procures better beer to his village. Frederick II. found the clergyman useful for getting up tables of population, for enforcing royal edicts, such as for the extirpation of locusts, the stopping of post-boys on by-roads, the exportation of wool, etc. Forty-five such edicts were, even in 1802, read from the pulpit—(see *Mühler, Geschichte der Kirchenverfassung der Mark Brandenburg*, S. 245).

To a higher form of Humanism the classical studies led. The whole of the middle ages had been feeding upon the literary fragments of the classical world ; but the German nations became ripe for understanding the ancient life only when, after the Crusades, they gave themselves up to the cultivation of the purely human relations. In this surrender to that which is human, there was implied a silent protest against Rome, to which the classical education speedily lent expression. It has contributed to the accomplishment of the Reformation ; and thankfully, therefore, did Protestantism foster these studies in their schools and universities. They assumed a different form in different countries. Practical England drew practical wisdom from the ancients. The industrious Dutchman collected from the immense range of his reading treasures of learned remarks, which, it may be, he brought into circulation by a classical form. In Germany, it was only since the middle of last century that philological studies assumed a higher character. The philanthropic standing-

point has a certain right to exist as a reaction against the spiritless mode in which the ancients were studied in the higher schools. If they wished to maintain themselves, they were obliged to prove that they had life; and that proof they led when the Germans approached the classical world, with adequate strength and congenial sense. From the remains of antique plastic art, *Winkelmann* and *Lessing* opened up and deduced the understanding of the rules according to which ancient art produced its works. *Klopstock's* zealous Germanism awakened a taste for the genius of ancient languages. In *Voss's* hands, Homer spoke German. In *Johannes von Müller*, the spirit of ancient historiography was resuscitated. *Wieland's* novels made his contemporaries to feel at home in the ancient world, how modern soever its appearance was. *Goethe* opened up to his contemporaries, an understanding of the ancients, not only by fruitful discoveries, not only by single creations in the spirit of the ancients, but especially by being a personal representation of the unity of the Greek and German spirit. In the face of this regeneration of the ancient spirit, *Wolff* gave to classical study the form of an archæological science, in the first instance in the historical sense, but with the conviction that in the ancient world the purely human appeared in its purest form, and with the claim of being an important power in modern life.—(See *Bernhardy, Grundlinien zur Encyclopaedie der Philologie*, S. 17 ff.).

The victory of this classical Humanism over the philanthropic Humanism, was a progress; the latter degraded the single individual into a simple portion in the fair of life, while the former taught the lesson: Devote yourself to all purely human relations, to the family, to society in the higher sense, to fatherland, to art, science,

etc., in the conviction that it is only within these spheres that true life arises for man. This demand, however, was in opposition to the requirements of the Church. While Humanism is based on the belief in the excellence of human nature, the Church teaches its utter helplessness for salvation. While Humanism declares the purely human life to be the true life, Christ teaches to flee from the world in order to find life in Him. While Humanism is pleased and contented with a bright present, Christianity teaches a pilgrimage to the heavenly Church. This opposition has been perceived and felt by the deeper humanists; such confessions lie at the foundation of *Goethe's Bride of Corinth*, and of *Schiller's Gods of Greece*. Meanwhile, an elastic theology had attempted to build a bridge over the chasm. The learned quotations from the ancients were, in the theological text-books, taken more and more from the margin into the text. In ethics, too, even the stricter theology took a testimony from the ancients; and in doctrinal theology, also, they were fond of proving, by quotations from the ancients, the doctrines of general religiousness, which were regarded more and more as the essentials. In the exposition of Scripture, *Wetstein* offered rich materials to those who maintained the similarity of New Testament words to the sayings of the ancients. And with regard to pulpit eloquence, Demosthenes and Cicero were looked upon as good models. The theologian in whom this mixture of theology and classical Humanism is most characteristically exhibited, is *Herder*.

Humanism found, neither in the Church nor in the State, a sphere suitable to it. The State was too material for it; the Church was too spiritual, too superhuman, too much occupied with a future life. In both of them it found authorities which it did not like to recognise, forms



which it considered to be obsolete. It felt the want of a communion in which the purely human should have its right acknowledged more than it was in the State, and in which *Illuminism* should be permitted to speak more freely than it was in the Church. This want and craving found its gratification in *Freemasonry*. Out of the middle ages, England, the country adhering closely to traditions, had preserved its building-lodges. It had been an old habit to ascribe to the forms of those lodges a deeper meaning ; and Humanism seized them, in order to transform them into a secret world for its thoughts. From England, Freemasonry spread to the north of Europe, to Germany, and France. The first lodge in Germany arose in 1733, at Hamburg ; and soon lodges sprung up in all the larger towns. Princes—as Frederick II. ; notabilities of every kind,—even men such as Lavater, Stilling, and others, were members. Although, in the lodges, the fundamental forms and thoughts were fixed, yet a wide scope was given to reformatory tendencies, which, after all, lay in the spirit of the times. Adventurers, such as *Johnson* and *Baron von Hund* ; ambitious and covetous Illuminators, such as *Knigge* and *Bahrddt*, changed with noble-minded and serious representations of the masonic thought, such as *Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick*, *Schröder*, *Fessler*, etc. Thus the most diversified forms of Freemasonry arose ; and there exists the most thorough difference between the lodge and the order. As the fundamental thought, which floats above these differences, this appears : “ To unite in love and harmony all ranks and confessions which, in ordinary life, appear separated, and to make the purely human the object of culture ; to elevate and promote the moral element ; to disseminate a rational and liberal view of human nature and destiny ; to consider all men as children equal before God,



and, therefore, as brethren ; to exercise love to our neighbour, and to prove it by general charity.”<sup>1</sup> God, the omnipotent Architect of the universe, stands to the world substantially in the relation of Creator, and man has to do nothing but to cultivate and develop the innate natural foundation, by directing his knowledge to *wisdom*, his will to *strength*, and his sentiments to the *beautiful*. Out of the materials of natural humanity, the freemasons would rear a temple of virtue. Those who have faithfully done so in the lodge, hope to see each other again in the heavenly lodge, in the eternal East. That this fundamental view is altogether deistical, is obvious, and it is therefore quite consistent that the lodges of loose observances receive those also who are not Christians. When Freemasonry, by the establishment of the Grand Lodge in London, in 1717, received the form in which it spread itself everywhere, it could treat these thoughts, which, in Church and State, were strongly opposed by other thoughts, as much as a mystery as the symbols in which they were embodied. But, when these thoughts, in the age of Illuminism, became the general conviction, it was the form only which remained as a mystery; and to a prince, such as Frederick II., it could not fail soon to appear as a “great nothing.” This form has, no doubt, the character of an ecclesiastical community. There is a constitution, a confession, a worship. The “Constitutions of Freemasons” are the ecumenic confession which, it may be, receives an individual form in the single lodges. The constitution grants to the Master of the Chair an almost monarchical position, limited by the office-bearers (speakers, superintendents, etc.), higher degrees, and the vote of the lodge.

<sup>1</sup> Words of a Freemason in “*Die Gegenwart und Zukunft der Freimaurerei in Deutschland* (Leipzig, 1854), S. 55.

While the members of all lodges, even those of opposite systems, stand in brotherly and organic communion with one another, the lodges of the individual countries form an organised community, which may be compared to the Established Churches in the individual countries. If then, finally, we overlook the ceremonies in their working and feasting lodges, which are now-a-days sufficiently known, we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact, that they have the character of a worship; and, indeed, there have of late appeared freemason-liturgies. The rites of reception represent, in their black chambers, symbolical wanderings, fearful oaths, naked swords, vanishing flames, altars, death-heads, and coffins, etc., the penetrating from the night of the profane world into the light of the order, and hence the counterpart of baptism. And the feasting-lodges have the character of a love-feast of Humanism. Now, it is, indeed, strange that the search for light wraps itself up in the cloak of mystery; that so many men, who have broken with all that is positive in religion, should surrender themselves to a belief in the fabulous world of the masonic history, in the mythology of King Hiram, Solomon, etc.; that the men of liberty, equality, fraternity, should seek a hierarchy of lodges, in which pride, vanity, ambition, etc., are no less at home than in ordinary life; that the men who no longer find any nourishment in the forms of the Christian worship, should animate these playings with forms, by the horrors of death, by the terrors of judgment, by the mysteries of the altar. There appears here a feature which pervades the whole age of *Illuminism*, viz., the tendency towards the mysterious. It was in this age that *Swedenborg* saw spirits, that *Gassner* expelled devils, that *Cagliostro* carried on a mysterious game with superstition of every kind, that the followers of *Rosenkreuz* again appraised the stone of the

philosopher and the tincture of life ; that the mysteries of magnetism were hailed with wonderful delight ; yea, that even Nicolai saw spirits in *Tegel*, near Berlin !

This will be no matter of wonder to any one who remembers the times of sinking heathenism, in which superstition and unbelief came so closely upon each other. In an age of unbelief, the indestructible longing of man for religion seeks the pasture of unbelief. When, therefore, the Jesuits fell by the bull *Dominus ac Redemptor Noster*, their kingdom was not by any means at an end.<sup>1</sup> This strange mixing up of Jesuitism and *Illuminism* was experienced by the *Order of the Illuminati*. *Weishaupt*, professor of law in the old Jesuit University of Ingolstadt, formed, in 1776, the idea of establishing an order with a Jesuitical form, as a propaganda of *Illuminism* ; and *Weishaupt's* plan was, by *Knigge*, combined with objects of freemasonry (1780). In this mongrel form the institution found an immense number of adherents. In the many grades which it contained, it afforded scope to the various stand-points ; by a true Jesuitical system of observation and guidance, it secured the single individuals, and put into the hands of the heads, reins which could be easily employed for the management of the whole.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For particulars, see *Schlosser, Geschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts* (3d ed.), iii., S. 255, ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Cl. Th. Perthes, Das Deutsche Staatsleben vor der Revolution*, S. 262, says :—" The reigning Duke of Weimar and the hereditary Duke of Gotha, the Counts *Seefeld*, *Seinsheim*, *Constanza*, the imperial ambassador, Count *Metternich*, Prebendary Count *Kesselstadt*, the Barons *von Montjelas*, *von Meggenhoffen*, etc. ; in Göttingen, the Professors *Koppe*, *Feder*, *Martens* ; in Weimar, *Goethe*, *Herder*, *Musäus*, State-Minister *Fritsch*, Master of the Pages *Kästner* ; in Bavaria and the ecclesiastical territories, many prebendaries and priests, in the Protestant and Catholic towns many higher and lower officials, and officers, merchants, chamberlains, actors and students, belonged to the order. At the

While, in the middle grades, adherence to the positive was required, the highest rulers held the principle, that in the dissolution of all that is firm in Church and State, true liberty manifested itself. If the order had maintained itself, it would have broken up Germany into fragments ; but it fell, so early as in 1785, by the machinations of the ex-Jesuits in Bavaria. These Jesuits opened up a longed-for world of exploits to the light-knights of Protestantism,

head of it stood, as *Primus* or *National*, the founder. Under him, the order was organically divided into a number of inspections, which is differently stated ; the inspection was divided into provinces ; and in the provinces were the Illuminati meetings of the individual towns. At the head of each division was a director, assisted by a chapter. In order to secure the existence of the order, and the employment for one object of all the powers of the order, manifold trials and solemnities preceded the reception. The action of the consecration—so it was called—takes place either by day in a solitary, retired, and somewhat dark place, *e.g.*, in a forest ; or by night, in a silent, retired room, at a time when the moon stands on the sky. He who was to be received, confirmed by an oath the declaration that with all the rank, honours, and titles which he might claim in civil society, he, at bottom, was nothing else than a man. He vowed eternal silence, inviolable fidelity, and obedience to all the superiors and ordinances of the order ; he solemnly renounced his private opinion, and every free use of his power and faculties. In order afterwards, also, to keep every member of the order in the most complete dependence upon the order, every superior, not only kept the most minute records of the conduct of all his inferiors, but every inferior also was obliged, by filling up certain prescribed schedules, to give information about the state of the soul, the correspondence, the literary employment, not only of himself, but also of his relatives, friends, and patrons. Of those to be received, they preferred “persons of from eighteen to thirty years of age, who were wealthy, eager to acquire knowledge, manageable, steady, and persevering.” Of two men in Munich on whom they had cast their eyes, it is said, in a letter written between 1770 and 1780 : “These two are a couple of devilish fellows, but somewhat difficult to manage, just because they are devilish fellows. Yet, if it were possible, the acquisition would be desirable.”

and undoubtedly *Leuchsenring* and *Nicolai* obtained the prize in this.

At the same time that Jesuitism ruined its antipode, in the principal Protestant state, also, a reaction took place. *Frederick William II.* succeeded to the throne with the feeling that State and Church were shortly to be dissolved, if *Illuminism* were permitted to proceed in such a way. It was from this feeling that the so-called *religious edict of Wöllner* proceeded (9th July 1788). "With grief," so the words run in the preamble, "it has been remarked that so many clergymen have the boldness to disseminate the doctrines of the Socinians, Deists, and Naturalists, under the name of *Illuminism*. As sovereign and sole lawgiver in our state, we command and enjoin, under the penalty of immediate deposition and still severer punishment and visitation, according to circumstances, that henceforth no clergyman, preacher, or teacher of the Protestant religion, shall make himself guilty of the indicated and other errors, by venturing to spread such errors, in the discharge of his duty, or in any other way, publicly or secretly." An Immediate-Examination-Committee (*Silberschlag, Hermes, Woltersdorf, Hilmer*) was appointed to carry out this edict, but that could not be obtained. However well-founded were the facts to which the edict referred, and how much soever the king was in earnest in his intentions, cabinet orders were not the way to do away with a tendency which the former government had favoured by cabinet orders. *Frederick William II.*, who felt the need of religion, and who was animated by a German sense, has been often unjustly judged. It is true that he did not, by his example, put a stop to the moral dissolution; his government gives the impression of the melting sultriness after a bright and clear summer day, announcing the near approach of a thunder-storm. On



the contrary, this reaction gave new life to the exertions and efforts of *Illuminism*. It is only from the fears which this religious edict called forth that we can account for the great number of men who were gained by the cunning stratagem of *Bahrdr* for the project of the so-called German union, a Freemasonic union for the spread of *Illuminism*.

These were the forms which Humanism took in schools and families, in State and Church.<sup>1</sup> Let us once more consider its relation to *Illuminism*. *Illuminism* said,—True is all that is clear, *i.e.*, all that agrees with man's natural sense for truth—with common sense. Humanism said,—It is not in the positive forms of life, but in man's pure original sense of what is good and beautiful, that the root of true life lies. With the formal principle of the natural sense for truth (*Illuminism*), corresponds the material principle of natural sentiments in the moral world (*Humanism*), and of natural faith in the religious world (*Deism*). To nature, then, man is to return, in his knowledge, will, and faith. But if we consider this *nature* a little more closely, it appears to be nothing but a production of the mind. The natural sense for truth to which *Illuminism* appealed, was an aggregate of thoughts which had been deposited in the educated world by the stream of the development of the eighteenth century. As little as the state is to be deduced from the original contract, can the spirit of religion be accounted for from the three ideas God, Duty, Immortality, which evidently are

<sup>1</sup> I must confess that I have not been at all satisfied with what *Hundeshagen* says in his work *Ueber die Natur und geschichtliche Entstehung der Humanitäts-Idee* (*i.e.*, On the Nature and Historical Origin of the Idea of Humanism, 1853). What he says of the relation between Christianity and Humanism, is founded upon abstractions, which do justice neither to Christianity nor to the idea of Humanism.

nothing else but abstractions from the positive religions; and what was called Humanism was not the original sense of uncorrupted mankind, but a tracing back of the moral relations of life to general principles, by means of the understanding. *Rousseau's* life is a personal proof of the unnaturalness of this nature. Thus, *one* feature which characterizes the period of *Illuminism*, is the tracing back of all life to abstractions by the understanding. With this a *second* feature is connected: common sense, which was looked upon as the rule of truth, was a very elastic and subjective resort. While *Voltaire* and *Rousseau*, by common sense, demanded God, Duty, and Immortality, the Encyclopedists taught Atheism and Materialism. *Jacobi* says very rightly of *Mendelssohn* and his consorts, who, in philosophy, professed to follow common sense,—“They believe that their opinion is reason, and reason their opinion.” The same spirit of subjectivity we saw in Humanism. The single individual is not to be a member of this and that family, of this and that State, of this and that Church, but of humanity. But if this humanity be considered a little more closely, it is an aggregate of general principles, which the single individual adapted to his individuality. In *Rousseau's Emile*, the whole world appears only as a grinding-stone, which is to bring forth the pure humanity; all objects of knowledge only as the weights destined to exercise and increase the magnetical power of the mind; and the aim of humanity to which he is aspiring, is, if possible, not to need any man. It requires no proof to show that the utilitarian spirit which the philanthropic education evolved is connected with the Ego. And that which gave life to those Freemasonic-humanistic circles, was, no doubt, the feeling of belonging to an aristocracy of mankind, the charm of a mysterious isolation, the protest against everything existing.

In this the *third* feature is given,—*Illuminism* implied the dissolution of all authorities, of all objective forms of life. English Deism was, substantially, the fruit of the English Revolution; and that *Illuminism* would, in France, lead to the Revolution, the pious Cardinal Fleury (see Schlosser, i. S. 558) foretold, with as much confidence as *Rousseau* did in his *Emile*, and as Frederick II., if we may believe *Eylert*, announced it to his future successor.<sup>1</sup>

We have from an eye-witness, *Laharpe*, a remarkable story of a philosophical dinner, at which the poet *Cazotte* foretold to the members of the Academy, who waited with ardent desire for the final victory of reason, what their fate would be in the Revolution. It is not on the miraculous part of this story that we put any value, but on the light which it throws on the relations of that time, and on the awful contrast between the dream of philosophy, and the reality. "People in the world had at that time reached the point where it was permitted to say everything, if the object was to excite laughter. *Chamfort* had read to us from his blasphemous, unchaste novels, and the high ladies listened to them without even taking refuge in their fans. Then there followed a whole host of mockeries against religion. One quoted a tirade from the *Pucelle*; another reminded of the saying of Diderot:

<sup>1</sup> *Perthes*, in his book, *Das Deutsche Staatsleben vor der Revolution* (i.e., The Political Life of Germany before the Revolution), S. 251, has beautifully developed the character of *Illuminism* upon the territory of German politics. Three principles, he says, characterize *Illuminism*. *First*, The fundamental principle not to acknowledge anything as existing or binding, but that which one may understand and comprehend. The *second* fundamental principle is, to acknowledge the single individual as a single individual only. The *third* fundamental principle is, to seek the value of existing things in their utility only.

‘With the intestines of the last priest, strangle the last king,’ and all applauded. Another rose, held up his full glass, and cried: ‘Yes, gentlemen, I am as sure that there is no God in heaven, as I am sure that Homer was a fool.’ The conversation now became more serious. They spoke with admiration of the Revolution which *Voltaire* had effected, and they agreed that it was the chief foundation of his fame. The question then arose as to who, among the company, would live to see the complete victory of reason. Then Cazotte rose, and declared that all those present would be witnesses of the great Revolution (it was in 1788); and when they declared this to be a very cheap prophecy, he announced to *Condorcet* that he would poison himself to escape the executioners; to *Chamfort*, that he would himself open his veins; to *d’Azyr*, that he would order them to be opened six times; to *Rouchet*, that he would die on the scaffold, etc. The company asked: ‘Shall we then be subdued by the Turks or Tartars?’ ‘Anything but that; I have already told you: you will immediately be under the reign of reason, and those who treat you thus will be philosophers.’”

Be it with this prophecy as it may, it is enough that, in the Revolution, reason exercised such a dominion. Let us, from our point of view, look at its course. Government, unable to put a stop to the financial difficulties and distress, influenced by liberal theorists, and under the impression that they would be able to prevent extremities, on the advice of the notables, summoned the National Assembly. It was a representation, not of the organically constructed France, but of France consisting of heads; very soon the third estate absorbed the others in it; it assumed legislative powers, and very soon claimed, by deeds, all power whatever. The constitutional party was

in the ascendant ; every thing fell which was against the liberal doctrines, and the “rights of man” pretended to be the legal title for it ; for every thing was to be based upon philosophy, and all claimed to be philosophers. Public opinion, the National Guard, and the money obtained by the sale of the national property, gave power to this liberal party. The king had only to do what the National Assembly decreed, and with God they settled at the festival of 14th July 1790, by a mass and a *Te Deum*. The priests paid by the State, were, of course, degraded into state officials ; those who refused the oath were obliged to flee. When the National, gave way to the Legislative Assembly (1st October 1791), the power was no longer in the constitutional party (*Fevillans*), but in the republican doctrinaires (*Girondists*) ; and the latter conquered. The National Convention (21st September 1792) began with the republic ; but it was no more the republican doctrinaires, but the leaders of the unchained mob (*Robespierre, Murat, Danton*) who had the power. “The Girondists,” says Leo (*Universalgeschichte* V. S. 6), “had sprung from wealthy and educated families. They still entertained the foolish hopes of educated France before the revolution ; brotherly equality, by which the world was to be made happy ; a golden age, such as they had formerly dreamt of at their philosophical dinners,—these were still the cloudy gods whom they worshipped. In the meantime, uneducated France had risen, and shook her limbs like a mighty giant. In the first instance, the Girondists were expelled from the Convention, and most of them had a fearful end. The watchword now was, Rase it, Rase it (Ps. cxxxvii. 7). The king died on the scaffold ; the queen after him ; the dauphin pined away. The terrorists were of opinion that the republic could exist only if all men were virtuous, *i.e.*, of their principles ; but the



rascals, *i.e.*, those of different opinions, were for the guillotine. "The sound of the axe of the guillotine was, to a certain degree, the beating of the pulse of the republic; and the more feverish the life in the republic was, the more quickly did the pulse beat." What was now the use of a Church, of priests? *Gobet*, the archbishop of Paris, exchanged the mitre for a Jacobin cap, and declared that he knew nothing of Christianity. The churches were given up to the wantonness of the rude mob, who performed in them immoral dances, and made use of the sacred vessels for eating and drinking. The Christian era gave way to a republican, after an abstract principle; in place of the Christian festivals, came days consecrated to genius, to labour, to perfection, and other abstract things. What, finally, was now the use of a God? "Reason, the self-consciousness of man, is the only God," said one party, at the head of which stood *Kloots*. On the 10th of August 1793, a national feast was celebrated, at which a procession of members of the Convention and Jacobins worshipped nature—in a woman of gypsum from whose breasts water was flowing forth; and in a man of gypsum—the people-god (*le peuple-dieu*.) As they, however, soon discovered that statues of plaster of Paris did not correspond with the idea, they chose, as the living representatives of it, girls, such, of course, as corresponded with such a *public* purpose. Such, then, was the length to which they had come, that in the name of liberty, a bloody government was exercised, unexampled in all history,—that in the name of reason, strumpets were placed on the altar. The latter, however, even *Robespierre* found to be too bad (*les enragés*); he thought Atheism to be unpopular. It was at his instance that the Convention recognised the existence of a higher Being; and, at a national festival in His honour, *Robespierre* officiated as a priest

(8th July 1794). But this festival was too absurd, and the exasperation against *Robespierre*, already too great to allow of his gaining his object, which was less to make the Supreme Being popular than himself. From this time forward a reaction begins against the revolution. The terrorists fell; people began to long for tranquillity; the youth (*jeunesse dorée*) and the press became conservative, and, what was the main point, the national spirit threw itself upon the propaganda of the revolution by means of arms. During the reign of the Directory, the army represented the power of the people; and it was from the army also that the man proceeded who put an end to the revolution—*Napoleon*.

*Napoleon* knew that he could neither attain nor maintain the throne without the Church. He therefore restored a firm form to the Roman Catholic Church, by the *Concordat* of 1802, and, incidentally, to the Protestant Church also. Notwithstanding the serious injury which the Roman See had experienced from him, Pius VII. gave the consecration of the Church to the imperial crown of the *parvenu*. Like so many great men of his kind, *Napoleon* seems to have been a fatalist,—a belief which lay in the view of the world which that period entertained; and from this aspect also one may view *Schiller's Wallenstein* as a poetical prophecy of *Napoleon*. When *Napoleon*, after the battle of Jena, conversed with Goethe on the old tragedy, whether and how it was to be restored, and Goethe pointed to the difficulties connected with the idea of fate, he said that the State was the fate of the modern world. So, at least, it was at that time. It was in *Napoleon* that fate overtook the states in which Illuminism prevailed.

What was it, after all, which gave to the French army the victory over the armies of the Austrians and Prussians:

One can only answer : the republican enthusiasm. But this enthusiasm, as has been shown by the liberation-wars,<sup>1</sup> could be broken only by another enthusiasm ; that, however, did not exist. Illuminated Germany bore in her own heart that seed from which, in France, the armed men had grown up. The blunted, tame revolution, which prevailed in the states of *Frederick II.* and *Joseph II.* had neither right nor might in opposition to the consistent revolution. Since the world existed, victory has always been where there is consistency. Sooner or later the German Empire would have been obliged to dissolve ; but the old holy Roman Empire, the throne of the *Hohenstaufen*, should have fallen in a more worthy manner than by the resolution of the imperial Deputation (*Reichs-Deputations-Hauptschluss*.) Like laughing heirs, the German princes have buried the German Empire ; but the inheritance was not to prosper in their hands. At Jena, the splendour of Prussia's arms faded ; the house of Austria dissolved more and more ; the princes of the middle class joined the Rhine Confederation, in order to become satellites of the French Imperial Sun.

The dissolution of the political life was followed by the dissolution of the constitutional forms of the Church, from which the spirit had long ago fled. In 1808, Napoleon declared the donation of his ancestors, *Pipin* and *Charlemagne*, to be extinct. The pope, who protested, was led as a prisoner to Savona. At the same time (16th December 1808), not only the higher consistory, but also the provincial consistories, were dissolved in Prussia by a cabinet order ; and the supreme government of the Church was committed to a department in the ministry of the

<sup>1</sup> So, in German history, the continental wars, from 1813 to 1815, are called, which had the liberation of Germany from the French for their immediate issue.—TR.

interior, which, at the same time, managed educational and theatrical affairs.

After having considered the origin, character, and progress of *Illuminism*, we now cast a glance on the *inner life of Germany at the end of last century*.

The crisis in our belles lettres is marked by the controversy between the schools of *Bodmer* and *Godsched*, on the nature of poetry. The adherents of *Godsched*, imitating French models, viewed poetry as a matter of rule and understanding, while the adherents of *Bodmer*, imitating English models, placed poetry in parallelism with painting, and assigned to it the world of the imagination and the affections. This proceeding from theory characterizes the German mind; this going back to the natural foundation, the spirit of the eighteenth century. All able men joined *Bodmer*; and most diversified are the tendencies and dispositions which here meet us. One section (*Klopstock*, *Claudius*, *Lavater*, and others), puts poetry at the service of the Christian faith; another (*Haller*, *Gellert*, *Hagedorn*, and others), gives the useful, under the cover of beautiful, practical wisdom in the sense of the German middle classes; practical wisdom, on the other hand, in the sense of the Frenchified higher classes, seasoned with sensuality and frivolity, but yet graceful, is offered by *Wieland*. In opposition to him, the Göttingen party leaning to, and supported by *Klopstock*, render homage to an abstract youthful Germanism. More concrete is the Prussian enthusiasm which animates *Kleist*, *Gleim*, *Ramler*, and others. One is disposed to call *Lessing* the genius of *Illuminism*, in the sense in which the French call Pascal "*le genie de Port-royal*." He promoted *Illuminism* in so far as his original, pure, experimenting spirit broke through all traditionary bounds in seeking for the fundamental relations. He himself had the conviction



of his not being a creative genius on the field of the beautiful; but he gave clearness and depth to the dark and uncouth thoughts of the school of *Bodmer*. He purified the soil of literature from the rubbish of false tradition, unmercifully weeded out French unnaturalness, fixed exact limits to the various territories of poetry, pointed to the true models, demanded creative minds, and with great self-denial, rejoiced in those which he found. The territory of philosophy he influenced by his great critical and dialectic skill, by exciting the tendency to advancing, striving and seeking, by his setting an example of independence and freedom from prejudice. And, as in philosophy, so in theology also, *Lessing* sought to remove stagnation. In order to keep theology in motion, he published the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*. The motives which he, in his controversy with *Göze*, developed with unsurpassed skill, correspond entirely with the motives which he upheld on the territory of the beautiful, viz. a removal of the heterogeneous, and a going back to the original. One may indeed seek the motto of his life in his well known declaration, that he preferred the search after truth to the possession of it. His style also has the versatility, the dialectic charm, the bold touches of a man whose mastery consisted just in thinking aloud. *Lessing* is, in the history of German literature, the versatile Proteus—not himself a hero, but a voice of counsel and prophecy for the heroes of Troy. But how different are the spheres into which these heroes lead us! In *Herder* all the blossoms of Humanism are ripening; there at once the palms of the East, the olives of Greece, the oaks of the North are thriving; there are the shady walks of philosophy, the great perspectives of history, the serene temple-halls of a religion of Humanism. *Schiller* leads us into the realm of the *ideal*. Beyond this finite, vulgar world,



which is pervaded by a cold destructive fate, there are opening up to him, who has sense and faith for the beautiful, the prototypes of life, which on this earth cannot obtain any other reality than that of art, but may, perhaps, have their world in those spheres where every beautiful and faithful sentiment is realized. *Goethe* has shaped all the glimpses of light which the richest life threw into his soul, into a world of clear, distinct, and bright pictures of imagination, which are not, like *Schiller's* ideals in morose antagonism with the reality, but have the reality amidst and within themselves.

So diversified are these tendencies that it appears impossible to trace them back to one point of view. But whence these diversities? One can only answer: Because great individuals, not bound by the determining powers of life, have made their individuality the measure of their view of life. "In the chaos of the dissolved State, of the decaying Church, of the unsettled leading thoughts, there sprang up a numberless host of individualities who had only this in common, that the individual, with all his rights and whims, wished to impress his life upon the reality."<sup>1</sup>

This rich literature is a monument of the political and religious dissolution of the German nation. No one can come forward and plead: They have sung of Frederick the Great and of Germany's glory. Frederick was instrumental in dissolving the German empire, and *Klopstock's* Germanism had not much to do with the real Germany. And when at length the German empire was broken up, the Germans slept during its fall under æsthetic dreams. When every thing fell to pieces, Goethe, who was getting old, fled to the East: "Under loving, drinking, and singing, Chiser's Well shall renew my youth." From the

<sup>1</sup> Words of *Immermann*.

German courts, which, during the eighteenth century, had indeed been the seats of the moral decay, public opinion had long ago estranged itself. In the world of authors, a kind of interdict rested on every thing belonging to the higher regions; in a regular play or novel of that time, a courtier could not well appear to be any thing but a hypocrite and flatterer. The acts and deeds of the many petty princes, the corroded life in the free imperial cities, the pedantic narrow-minded dragging on of outlived forms, were inexhaustible subjects for *Jean Paul's* humour. Humanism and Sentimentalism undermined the differences of rank; the family was the only point which poetry surrounded with all its charms. In the dark background of the revolution Göthe drew his family-idyl, *Hermann and Dorothea*. *Schiller's* juvenile works announced the revolution. The *Robbers* represent the rupture with the civil order, *Cabal and Love*, with the social order, *Fiesco* with the legitimate princely power; *Don Carlos* is the poetry of liberalism. When the revolution itself came, and came differently from what it was in *Schiller's* ideals, then the *Bell*, the mouth of the Church, was to call to concord, to family-peace. The much read novels of *Lafontaine*, and others, move around the family; it was to the man of that time fatherland and Church. And yet it was not the true spirit of family, but the spirit of sentimentalism to which they paid homage.

*Sentimentalism* is, without doubt, one of the fundamental features, if not the fundamental feature of the poetry of the second half of last century; it is the dissolving of all objective spheres and modes of life into emotions,—a dissolving which rests on reflection. In nature, it is not thoughts of God, not the indications of life, not the groaning of the creature for the glorious liberty of the children of God, which it seeks, but that which affects the

emotions: in the moonshine, melancholy; in the stars, elevating presentiments; in the violets and roses, greetings of love, etc. Wherever men have led a human life, love and friendship have been acknowledged to be very great blessings; but the last century considered these alone as the sole agents and objects of life. The sentimental Ego chose, according to the attraction of the heart, another Ego for a friend or lover; this inclination appears to him to be the only one in life which has any title to exist; the attraction of the heart is the voice of fate. He stakes every thing which can bind man, yea, even eternal happiness, upon the possession of the beloved one. But every motive of life must become a caricature as soon as it becomes exclusive, absolute. And if we look at the friendships of that time a little more closely, we shall not only find them to be soft and sickly, but even the result of proud, conceited, whimsical egotism. We do no wrong to many an one who, at that time, made a trade of friendship, when we say that he did not love his friends but his friendship, *i. e.*, his self enjoyment in friendship. And this holds still more true of the love of that time. These *Siegwarts* and *Werthers*<sup>1</sup> loved indeed their love only; their love was subjective, not objective. Upon such extravagancies, disappointment only could follow. The author of *Siegwart*, and *Jean Paul*, are said to have been, in their family life, but too much like ordinary men. Of *Leuchsenring*, who proposed the foundation of an order of sentimentalism, we know that his marriage with his adored lady was as unhappy as can be imagined.<sup>2</sup> From such a sentimentalism, imagining to be in heaven, casting about with eternities, declaiming of virtue, there was only one step to

<sup>1</sup> Heroes of sentimental love novels.—TR.

<sup>2</sup> For particulars about *Leuchsenring*, see *Varnhagen von Ense, Denkwürdigkeiten*, iv. S. 170.

a frivolous dissolution of marriage, if other affinities were formed. Of Christian love this Sentimentalism had the appearance only. What to it was highest, viz., family-happiness, the Christian must be able to leave; he must be able, for Christ's sake, to leave father and mother, wife and child. But if Christ gives back a family to His disciples, they that have wives must be as though they had none (1 Cor. vii. 29). And yet those ties in which the Christian's heart is not to be altogether bound up, are indissoluble. They are not based on feelings which can come and go, but on the Lord, the heavenly medium in which husband and wife meet. In order fully to realize the difference, let us hear a voice from the Ancient Church.<sup>2</sup> "What a connection between two believers who have one hope, one order of life, one service. They are two in one body, and where there is one flesh, there is also one spirit. They pray together, they fast together; they teach, exhort, and bear with, one another! They are together in church, together at the Lord's Supper, together in distress and persecution. None has to conceal any thing from the other; one is not to be a burden to the other. Freely they visit the sick and relieve the poor. They vie with one another in psalms and spiritual hymns. Christ rejoices when He sees such, and gives them His peace. Where two are, there is He, and where He is, there the Evil One is not." But the Lord speaks to every age in its own language. One may well say, that in the age of Sentimentalism which found the chief good in the family, *Claudius* had received the mission to represent to it Christianity as the true family-spirit. He writes to his Andrew: "It has given me great delight to read in your letter, that your bride also is so much attached to the

<sup>1</sup> Tertullianus ad uxorem, ii. c. 9.

stars, and enters into your ideas, that both of you often, for hours, look at the glittering stars in the sky without being disturbed in your devotion by your love. She must indeed be a very fine person, and you are a good Andrew. I always rejoice in my heart when I hear of a man who, in any passion, always keeps his head uppermost, and can forget bride and bridegroom for something better. Good by, Mr Zoroaster." To the same Andrew, his *alter ego*, he writes : "I am glad to learn from *Jost's* invoice that you are intending to marry again. Well done, and much happiness, dear Andrew. Marrying appears to me like a sugar-drop, or a sugar-bean. At first, it has a sweet taste, and people imagine that it will continue so for ever. But you see that the little sugar is soon melted, and sucked up; and then, with most of them, there comes inside a piece of assafoetida or rhubarb, and then they make wry faces. With thee it shall not be so. When you are done with the sugar, you shall find a strengthening root of pleasant taste, which will do you good all your life time." To *Claudius*, the happiness of a truly Christian marriage was granted.

Hand in hand with Sentimentalism went that which they called *virtue*. What is virtue? A glance at history says : Something very different in different people. Of virtue, Socrates, the Stoics, the Romans, spoke. That which is common to Socrates', the Stoics', and the Romans' idea of virtue may be reduced to the formula : Giving up of the individual to the general. But this general was to Socrates the rational Ego, to the Stoics the abstraction from all finite motives, to the Romans the good of the commonwealth. The Christian, too, speaks of virtue; but the general to which he gives himself up is the will of God. But the will of God is not something subjectively formed, but an objective law, which, however,



is not arrayed against a Christian person as a rigid, killing power, but is written on the heart by the Holy Spirit. The Christian is to say with his Saviour: "My meat is to do the will of my Father." *Illuminism* declared virtue to be the only thing firm, absolutely necessary, and the highest in life, but left it to the single individual to determine the nature of virtue; and the greater part rested satisfied with the undetermined word.<sup>1</sup> Claudius makes a minister, a disciple of *Illuminism*, to write thus:—"I have altogether thrown myself into morals and human happiness, but keep *in abstracto*, and take every thing *à jour*, but now so, then so, and every time differently, partly in order that the sameness may not weary them, and partly in order that the fixed form may not by and by gain any prerogatives founded upon ancestry, and thus, reason itself be stereotyped into superstition." The most heterogeneous tendencies assumed to themselves the name of virtue: the flat utilitarian sense, the languid sensualism (*Steinbart, Bahrdt*), the latitudinarian Humanism, the sentimental good heart, the etherealized generosity, the scorn and conceit of self-righteousness (*Seume*, and others), yea, even *Robespierre's* Terrorism. The virtue of *Illuminism* was a thing infinitely abstract, elastic, and subjective.

It has been regarded as a good sign, that it was in the age of *Frederick* that the first great poet of the Germans celebrated the Messiah in an epic. This, one may admit, without concealing from oneself the fact that this epic is a failure. It is a historical subject only which has

<sup>1</sup> Concerning *Rousseau*, Schlosser, ii. S. 480, says: *Rousseau* made the matter easy to himself by connecting, by a rhetorical artifice, the Christian idea of virtue with that word which we, when it occurs with the ancients, are accustomed to translate thus, although the French *vertu* denotes something quite different from the same Latin word, and from the Greek word which we translate by "virtue."

been prepared for the poetical form by tradition,—such as the mythical time of the Trojan war, the fabulous land of the *Niebelungen*, the legendary world of the Crusades, which is appropriate to the epic. Upon materials thus softened by the poetical spirit of the people, the poet may impress figures in which the spirit of the present age is to be found again. But what does Holy Writ, this miraculous world of truth, leave for the poet to shape? *Klopstock* gives us poetical paraphrases of evangelical words, inexhaustible lyrical effusions, puts in motion the world of good and bad angels, etc. But these paraphrases only excite hunger and thirst for the simple text; the stream of Sentimentalism, which carries everything, is infinitely tiresome, and the poetical auxiliary figures so artificial, that they have no power to fascinate any one. If, in general, we consider the piety of *Klopstock*, and of those men of congenial minds, such as *Bodmer*, *Haller*, *Gellert*, *Cramer*, and others, we must, indeed, acknowledge, that it has still its roots in the soil of the Church's faith; but we must, at the same time, confess, that it is not the specific Christian, but the general religious element, which comes most out in it. And this piety exists in them as one disposition by the side of others,—by the side of patriotism, friendship, practical wisdom, without being properly reconciled with, and penetrated by, each other. One might be disposed to call them the poets of *Supernaturalism*, in which the faith of the Church is likewise, in a similar manner, mixed up with *Illuminism*, Criticism, etc.; and *Haller* and *Klopstock* have indeed had great influence upon the development of *Reinhard*, the most important of the Supernaturalists. In the character of *Klopstock* there appears considerable self-possession. “His presence,” says *Goethe*, “had something of that of a diplomatist. Such a man undertakes the difficult task

of at once upholding his own dignity, and that of one higher, to whom he has to give an account. And thus *Klopstock* also seemed to conduct himself as a man of consequence, and as the representative of higher things,—of religion, morality, liberty.” This feature, which is apparently secondary, leads us deeper. It is just the peculiarity of the whole period which we are reviewing, that when men have religion, it is they who just *have* religion, but *religion has not the men*. Life is a garden for use. If the roses of love, the everlasting flowers of friendship, the oranges of religion are thriving in it, so much the better and more beautiful; but they are, after all, ornamental plants only. Hence the self-sufficiency of the men who have these in addition. If thus the individual felt himself entitled to have or let religion alone, he might also venture to determine, by his own power, what his religion should consist of. In the poetical worlds of *Schiller* and *Goethe*, religion has scarcely a side-place. We have, on a former occasion, pointed out the vital richness of *Herder*; but this richness wants inner unity: the magical garden of *Herder* is a labyrinth. If anywhere, this appears in his religious views. All schools of theology find sympathy and support with *Herder*; that is generally known; but it is not known to all that *Herder*’s idea of God is pantheistic.<sup>1</sup> *Jean Paul*’s religion was a chaotic fermenting of the mind, out of which now Deism, then Christianity, then a new religion seems to come forth. The prevailing religious view was a *Sentimental Deism*. God is the

<sup>1</sup> *Erdmann, Die Entwicklung der Deutschen Speculation seit Kant*, i. S. 315, says: It is clear that *Herder* here shows himself as a pantheist; it is, however, a Pantheism which is not, as he himself believes that of *Spinoza*, but rather shows an analogy with the Italian Philosophy of Nature—with *Vanini*, *Campagna*, *Giordano Bruno*.

highest Being above the stars which, in a manner, not known it is true, combines with fate to settle the destiny of human life. Forbearing with the faults of men, just as it becomes the laws of Humanism, the highest Being looks only to, and most richly rewards, the virtues of men. But inasmuch as that fate, the tendency of which is pre-eminently hostile, denies to virtue its reward in this world, the settlement of this disproportion between virtue and happiness will take place in a better world. The future world has been adorned with its brightest colours by the religion of Sentimentalism. One needs only to read in our cemeteries the tombstones of that period, in order to obtain some idea of what they there expected. He who is the resurrection and the life is not spoken of, but the reward of the noble ones, dried tears, and, above all, meeting again. The ideal of a country minister, a disciple of *Illuminism*, *Voss* has drawn in his *Louise*: good nature and kindly feelings, along with substantial meals; sentimental contemplation of nature, along with the proper agricultural use of nature; enthusiasm for Homer, Plato, and Christ, along with indefatigable onslaughts upon the darkness-loving generation of superstition. In this picture, *Voss* has given a faithful representation of himself. He possessed the character of a peasant of Lower Saxony, with all the strength, moral purity, and good nature, but also with all the coarseness, stubbornness, and self-righteousness of this class of men. *Voss* could not say what he would without expressing himself against some one as to what he would not. He was always in controversy, now with *Heyne*, then with *Creuzer*, now with *Stolberg*, then with the Romantics, etc. Most characteristic is that which *Perthes* writes of a visit to *Voss*:—"At first, *Voss* spoke with the patriarchal simplicity which appears in his *Louise*, of God's beautiful

nature, of olden times, and simple men; but when *Fouqué's* name was mentioned, suddenly a spirit of hatred entered into the old man, so that I became terrified. "This *Fouqué* also," so he cried, "those villains of priests and aristocratic sycophants have seduced, and will make him a Roman Catholic, just as they have done *Stolberg*. After dinner, Voss went with me alone into the garden. In rapid succession he spoke of a number of men, and called them, one after another, sneaks, malicious, deceivers, rascals. I rose and fled. Believe me that, notwithstanding all the appearance of family-life and spirit, notwithstanding all joy in flowers, there prevails in this house a hatred which has deeply moved and agitated me."

This period of literature, however, is not deficient in witnesses of a living faith in God through Jesus Christ, although they do not meet us on the high road of life. First, there is *Hamann*, the Magus of the north. A consuming restlessness pervades his life. Unbounded desire of study drove him from book to book, from one department of study to another, without his finding satisfaction. It is almost incredible what departments of knowledge he has wandered through. After years of irregular study, he threw himself, adventurer-like, into the floods of life, until, in London, the Word of God found him. The thirst for salvation with which he read the Scriptures, made him find, as their centre, the salvation of the sinner through Jesus Christ. He had now found the firm foundation; but the wildly-burning fire of his mind was not extinguished. And this volcanic man was tied to friends who did not comprehend him, to a female servant whom he called his wife! He was for a long time a clerk in an office, then a custom-house officer; and yet all these circumstances could not extinguish his fire,—they only drove it inwards; and it appears that he warmed himself by



this inwardly-burning flame. For when, in the evening of his life, he entered into circles such as his boldest imagination could only dream of; when he lived in the house of a noble youth, who called him his father, at *Pempelfort*, in *Jacobi's*, in the circle of the Princess *Gallitzin*, life was to him too smooth and even, to allow of his feeling at ease. But there he found eternal rest. The word which the Princess *Gallitzin* put on his tombstone: *Judaeis quidem scandalum, gentibus autem stultitiam* (1 Cor. i. 23-25), is the best characteristic and vindication of the aim of his life. He was a knotty "wonder-oak" (*Wundereiche*), from which the winds of the spirit of the time elicited oracles. What he wrote are flying leaves which he cast into his time, and yet he wrote as if he were writing for himself alone. Upon the powerful thoughts which he threw into his time, he impressed in hieroglyphics the vital spirit through which they had grown in him. The strange and confused mixture of his style is a representation of the union of all powers of life, which he considered as the stand-point of truth. A *Pan* ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ ), as *Jacobi* called him, he saw the life in the unity of all opposites (*coincidentia oppositorum*.) For this reason, he denounced, with destructive irony, the age of abstractions in which he lived. His age smiled at that strange form, without having the least perception of the divine in its interior; he and his cause were foolishness to it. The point of the unity of the opposites, which had their residence in this powerful individual, the hypostasis of his existence, was faith.—While in *Hamann*, the thoughts which he brought to light, wrapped up in all the filthy coverings of birth, are the most important thing; in *Stilling*, it is the wonderful course of life which Providence led him. At a time when most of his writings will be long forgotten, his life will still be read. It was a

wanderer's life, in which the most beautiful point is the father's house from which it proceeded, and the father's house, which, in his pilgrimage, he sought: *Blessed are they who are home-sick, for they shall come home.* Thousands have already been comforted and strengthened by the miraculous manner in which he was led. A wandering life, indeed, it was in this sense also, that our wanderer allowed himself to be much determined from without; and in the change of the professions which he adopted, he never felt himself entirely at ease. The restlessness which was burning in *Hamann's* soul, appears, in *Stilling*, to be more external; the wanderer was often, in a sickly manner, longing for rest, and in an artificial way sought the traces of the future life in that which now is; he liked to have intercourse with the world of spirits, like his elder cotemporary, *Swedenborg*.—*Lavater's* life, too, had much of an outward bent. That which *Stilling* was never able fully to become, he was, viz., the missionary of faith in an age of general unbelief. Many things in him remind us of *Zinzendorf*. In him, too, faith was almost a natural feature, almost a passion; he, too, was of a never-tiring energy; he, too, possessed a wonderful power over minds. His faith was almost innate. It is from this circumstance that we can understand that faith could be to him a magic power, which every man carries within himself as a relic of the original glory. And Jesus Christ, also, without whom, he firmly believed, no one has the Father, —in whom not to believe was to him Atheism,—Jesus Christ, also, was to him not God manifest, in the sense of the doctrine of the Church, but the man in whom all the divine powers of humanity were concentrated. In this, his tendency to humanize faith, we recognise the age of Humanism. And with this, that other circumstance is surely connected, that, to the astonishment of his friends,

and to the offence of his enemies, he could declare every one to be called, and bound, and able to believe. "He could preach," says *Jacobi* of him, "like one who drives a nail into a brick." But that which induced him to offer his faith to every one, was a burning love to win souls to the Lord. And it is wonderful that he, a man who was disposed to think most favourably of every one who came in contact with him; who, with a constant enthusiasm, spoke of men who held the very opposite of his views and sentiments, as, for example, *Wieland*,—that he should have had an appreciation so acute and deep for the peculiarities of men. That such, however, was the case, is proved beyond all doubt, by his *Physiognomik*, in which *Lavater* paid his tribute to his time; for it is only in a time in which that which is personal had acquired such prominence, that such a study of the *personal*, even to its most accidental peculiarities, was possible.<sup>1</sup> With him, however, this study was altogether subservient to that love which led him to seek the winning of souls to Christ. His vocation was to preach Christ to his congregation; but the love of Christ constrained him to preach Christ wherever he, the well-known man, appeared, in season and out of season. And every thing in him, his whole person, was preaching; this beautiful soul, breathing in Christ, was in a beautiful body. And it was from within that there was formed his social appearance also, which attracted all, even those who most stood without; he gained, without words, by his walk and conversation.

<sup>1</sup> *Herbst, Bibliothek Christlicher Denker*, ii. S. 151, says: "The tendency to Physiognomy quickly spread through all Germany, so that it appeared as if *Lavater* had touched the key-note of the time." This was true, also, in so far as, just at that time, the sense for individuality became more lively; and this sense was, as *Goethe* also acknowledges, still more awakened and nourished by the work of *Lavater*.

When a youth, his mouth was shut;<sup>1</sup> when he became a minister, his mouth sent forth wonderful words; faith and love had opened it. As the thoughts rose within him by an inexhaustible productive power, so flowed his words. Of course a fixed form must as little be sought in his words, as a system in his thoughts; he was too rich to be consistent. What he has been enabled to do, in word and deed, is really astonishing. Indefatigable in prayer, he could work as only few are able. Even the letters which he wrote, would, to many an one, appear as the work of a whole life. There were at one time five hundred letters lying unanswered on his writing-table: to such an extent did his age lay claims upon him. He always carried paper with him, in order immediately to write down every thought. Such activity had, no doubt, the character of restlessness,—hence here, also, restlessness, the restlessness of deed. Whatever *Lavater* did, he remained, in that period, the voice of a preacher in the wilderness. While *Stilling*, in the restlessness of homesickness, sought to withdraw into the world of spirits, *Lavater* was seeking the presence of divine powers in the world. With the conviction, that in faith there is something magical, a hidden power to remove mountains, he sought for miracles, thus bringing disgrace upon this age of Illuminism. He was acquainted with *Cagliostro*; he zealously inquired into the facts and merits of *Gassner's* miraculous cures, and in an open letter asked *Semler* to give his opinion; he hailed with joy the appearance of Mesmerism merging up towards the close of the century. That was, to many, a stone of offence, or, at least, a means of getting rid of the impression which the wonderful man had made upon them. In his death *Lavater* proved that

<sup>1</sup> When a youth, he was shy, unteachable, stupid, dreamy,—TR.

his faith did not rest merely on transient and unsteady feelings; for, in a hostile bullet, he carried a painful death within himself for more than three months;<sup>1</sup> but even for that he praised God; even then he laboured with untiring zeal; and these words of the man who already stood with one foot in the other world,—these words from eternity, as he himself called them,—had the greatest effect. He died during the first days of the new century, which, it is much to be desired, should not forget him.

The last in this circle whom we have to mention is *Claudius*. He, too, does not belie his age. He has every thing which was dear to it, love, friendship, domestic retirement and peace, Germanism; all these he has, and has in a manner more true, genuine, and natural, than any one else. But the harmony of all this beautiful music of his life is Christ. He speaks of himself as unworthy even to be named by the side of those celebrated men of his time; to admire them was his delight,—a natural defect, as he jokingly said,—and yet his unassuming words have out-lastcd the trumpet-sounds of *Klopstock*, and the brilliant world of *Herder*. He judges of his time more strikingly and deeply than any other; he utters the profoundest thoughts in words easily written down, and in his child-like irony he always hits the nail on the head. No one among the popular writers of our time has attained to his popular tone. He *was* what they *make*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> At the capture of Zurich, on the 26th September 1799, a grenadier shot him in the side, while he was employed in the street in assisting some unfortunate people.—TR.

<sup>2</sup> *Grundtvig Welchronik*, S. 457, says, "*Claudius* was a true son of Martin Luther, not in strength and zeal, it is true, but in child-like sense, in simple-hearted cheerfulness, in the cordial appropriation of the Divine word in its wonderful unction and sweetness. His writings are, no doubt, the last German ones



These living witnesses for Christ stood too isolated in their time not to have personally discovered one another. A centre of union formed the circle at Münster, the soul of which was the *Princess Gallitzin*, who, by the word of Scripture, had been led from Plato to Christ. In intimate communion with her lived *Fürstenberg*, *Overberg*, *Katerkamp*, whom afterwards *Stolberg* joined. There were Roman Catholics who did not feed upon opposition to Protestantism, who did not seek in the Roman Church that which was Roman, but that which was Christian. It was Christianity which, in the age of the Revolution and Rationalism, *Frederick Stolberg* sought in the bosom of the Romish Church. That even a man like *Lavater* understood, as he has expressed it in that excellent letter to him. *Stolberg* did not save himself from Protestantism in order to give over to destruction, by a push with his foot, the tossed vessel from which he leaped, as so many modern perverts are wont to do. "The Reformation," so

of which one is entitled to say that Luther's spirit was breathing in them; and it is with indignation or pity that one must perceive the misplaced condescension with which the beggarly Kings of Parnassus reached him their hand to kiss it, as if he were their court-jester, while he was surely elevated high above their petty greatness, which he did not make them feel, only because he was a child-like angel. Just as he had, as it were, come into a strange world by mistake only, so he would fain endeavour to get out of it by smiling. But that would not do. When he became older, he got angry, as the world said; and indeed, he gave it a bad character in his old age. But as history has so unmistakeably confirmed his opinion, we need not ask what it says of the opinion of the world regarding it. At the time of Terrorism, even on the lips of a Christian, smiling could not but vanish; at the storms which threatened the Church, even her most peaceful children were obliged to take up arms. So Claudius, too, was obliged to ask, at a time when the fiery balls were flying around the sanctuary of truth, whether he should quietly, and cold as an icicle, hang on the roof of the temple of toleration.

he writes to his sound Protestant publisher, Perthes, "originally proceeded from a pure intention; and although, I am assured, that Luther took much more from them who joined him than men can give, yet I acknowledge the numerous and great advantages which have arisen from the conflict of the two churches, for those who remained Catholics. Never shall I lift up a stone against the person of Luther, in whom I admire not only one of the greatest spirits that ever lived, but also great piety which never forsook him." With the greatest freedom these Catholics carried on their intercourse with the Protestants. The *Princess Gallitzin* was the sponsor of one of *Claudius'* children; she received *Hamann* in his old age as a man of God; and when she buried him at a particular place, the clergy of Munster asked her to bear witness to them that they would willingly have buried him in the Catholic church-yard.<sup>1</sup> *Sailer* also felt at home in this communion in Jesus of true Catholics and true Protestants.<sup>2</sup>

In taking, then, a summary review of the character of all these Christian individuals, we find in all of them a certain restlessness. Even *Claudius*, who in his family had built a tabernacle, in which it was good to be, had a great longing to depart. This restlessness is very easily accounted for from their standing alone in a world alien-

<sup>1</sup> *Jacobi's Briefe* I. S. 482.

<sup>2</sup> All that our author says, in reference to these Roman Catholics, only proves that they were good men, and better Christians than Catholics, and that they, too, were affected by that subjectivism which, a few lines further down, he points out as the characteristic feature of this period. Having, however, to write a history of Protestantism, and not of Roman Catholicism, he is satisfied with having stated the fact. Roman Catholicism is, in general, in Germany, looked at from a point of view different from what it is in this country, and especially by men of the high Lutheran school, to which our author belongs.—TR.

ated from God; yea, it would often appear as though they gave up their cause for lost; but their comfort then was that they, at least, would remain faithful to what they had experienced. And Christianity, resting altogether upon these persons, has an altogether personal character. The peculiar style of *Hamann*, the conviction which *Jung Stilling* has of his mission, the unrestricted activity in which *Lavater's* faith indulged, the artless manner in which *Claudius* has drawn himself in his descriptions of peaceful retirement, can be accounted for only from the isolated position which these men occupied in these times.

We thus see that this period follows *subjective interests* in its humanistic efforts, as well as in literature and religion; yea, that even the men who were almost alone in their profession of adherence to the old doctrines, did not deny the subjective spirit. We may thus, then, simply affirm, that Subjectivism was the spirit of the eighteenth century.<sup>1</sup>

That this result is, in the main, correct, is proved by the course which German philosophy has taken since *Kant*.

Although we cannot adopt the opinion of the speculative School, according to which, philosophy is the self-consciousness of our age, yet so much is certain, that *Kant's* philosophy would not have exerted such an influence, if it had not given expression to that which the age was seeking. Descartes had proceeded from doubt; but being set at rest by the idea of God, he had returned to the territory of objective truth, with the conviction of having, in *clearness*, the measure of truth. This conviction *Kant* declared to be an improper supposition, dog-

<sup>1</sup> *Rosenkranz* (*Geschichte der Kantschen Philosophie*, S. 67 ff.) arrives at the same result, although he proceeds from a different point of view.

matism. On the other hand, Hume denied universality and necessity to ideas. Between that dogmatism and this scepticism, *criticism* placed itself as the medium of truth. "Before we can attain to the knowledge of truth," says *Kant*, "we must first examine whether the medium of truth, viz., our mind, is able to know truth." This inquiry Kant carries on in the *Critick of pure reason*. He distinguishes three faculties of knowledge : Perception, Understanding, Reason. Perception has to do with single objects ; Understanding with notions ; Reason with ideas. Perception views all its objects in time and space. Time and space are not in the things without, but they are forms which our perception brings to the things, the frame, so to speak, into which it puts all its images. Understanding thinks, judges, infers according to categories, which do not belong to the things in themselves, but to our mind only. Reason has the ideas : universe, soul, God ; but the existence of these ideas cannot be proved. Kant refuted the ordinary arguments for the existence of God. The result of this criticism thus is : the human mind has, in its *a priori* medium, forms to which universality and necessity belong (in opposition to scepticism), but only a subjective one ; but it cannot claim to know objective being,—the thing in itself (in opposition to dogmatism). If, then, our theoretical reason must allow the things external to it not to be cognizable, practical reason has a firm, immoveable ground. It demands, with absolute necessity (*categorical imperative*) : act as a general being, *i.e.*, as a member of the universe, as a rational being. But man has within himself desires, the common aim and object of which is the gratification of self. While practical reason says, Act as a general rational being, the desires say, Act as a particular being, in an arbitrary way. He only is virtuous who, in his actions, is not determined

by desires, but by reason. But virtue would be without a sphere, unless objects of action were brought to it by the desires. The territory of virtue, and that of desires mutually require one another. Now, it is here that the idea of God, which was given up on the territory of pure reason, obtains its right as a postulate of practical reason. The domain of virtue, and that of desires, are heterogeneous worlds, but yet ordained for one another. Hence there must be a power which has harmonized both of these domains, and that power is God. As virtue does not reach the highest good in this world, which highest good consists in the unity of that which reason and the desires seek after, *i.e.*, worthiness and happiness, this ideal must needs be realised in another life after death. The theological results of his criticism, Kant has developed in his "Religion within the limits of reason." He rejects any stand-point which places itself in opposition to the positive in Christianity (*naturalism*), but is in favour of a rational faith (*rationalism*) connecting itself with it. This connection he gained by changing, by means of an allegorical exposition, the doctrine of the Scriptures and the Church into moral religion.

The philosophy of *Kant* stood in opposition to that of *Illuminism*; *i.e.*, the Popular Philosophy; it declared the universe to be something not cognizable, while the Popular Philosophy imagined to have it thoroughly cleared up by means of common sense. *Feder*, *Garve*, *Mendelssohn*, *Eberhard*, and others, therefore, protested, more or less decidedly, against *Kant*. But, from this it by no means follows that *Kant* was a phenomenon heterogeneous to the age of *Illuminism*. How strange soever it may sound, it is nevertheless true, that those philosophers who make so loud professions of intellectual liberty, and would put no limit to progress, are commonly so much shut up within



their circle of ideas, that they offer the most violent opposition to true progress. We saw above, that *Wolff* and the Popular Philosophers imagined that they had the substance of the things in those *clear* notions which were to be got at so cheap a rate. From this mechanical mode of solving the problems of the universe, there was only one step to the stand-point of *Kant*, who declared that it was not Being in itself, but only our own notions of it of which we can be cognisant. We recognised, as the peculiarity of *Illuminism*, the endeavour of the subjective understanding to resolve life into abstractions. But this endeavour found its consistent expression in a philosophy which ascribed, as the only thing true, *a priori* forms to theoretical reason, and *a priori* postulates to practical reason, and hence enveloped man altogether in abstractions. The autonomy of morals, and reducing all religion to postulates of morals, were entirely in the spirit of *Illuminism*. And hence it happened also, as we shall see hereafter, that the theology of *Illuminism* unhesitatingly proceeded to Kant, without giving up anything essential. It is not likely that Kant would, by his writings alone, have exerted so powerful an influence upon his age. But a large circle of pupils gathered around him, who, by extracts, dictionaries, letters, etc., made Kant's abstract doctrines palatable to the educated public. The influence of Kant's philosophy upon general scientific circles was produced chiefly through the medium of the *Jenaische Literaturzeitung* (Jena Literary Gazette), edited by *Schütz*, which was a decided organ of this school. Those spheres which were not reached by this organ, were, by *Schiller*, *Tiedge*, and others, impregnated with Kantian doctrines. And to still lower strata were Kant's thoughts brought down by the theologians. What were all the churches compelled at that time to hear, of time and space, of the harmony between virtue

and happiness! If we consider a little more minutely the most influential disciples of Kant, the relation of Kant to Illuminism becomes still more obvious. It is especially *Reinhold*, who, by his letters on Kant's philosophy, has contributed to an appreciation of Kant. *Reinhold* was brought up under the influence of *Illuminism* in Vienna, but soon sought in philosophy the universal prop of *Illuminism*. But it appears clearly enough, from *Reinhold's* development, how little was the support which philosophy could afford to it. He soon went beyond *Kant*, and then agreed with *Fichte*, in order to turn from him to *Bardili*. *Kiesewetter's* efforts to transplant the Kantian philosophy into the convictions of the educated, bear throughout the character of *Illuminism*. And by what other term can we designate the attempts of *Krug*?<sup>1</sup>

Philosophy could not stand still at the results brought about by Kant. Over against the cognising subject stands

<sup>1</sup> *Rosenkranz*, l. c. S. 305, says: "If any one is able to represent the *literary* industry of Leipzig, it is *Krug*. He can write in every form—compendiums, systems, dictionaries, treatises, tales, speeches, reviews, circular letters, with and without name, serious and satirical. All these he writes with equal ease. He has, in the highest degree, an Encyclopædic head; he has even published an Encyclopædia of Military Science. An inextinguishable agility, which defies old age; an ardent desire to give his vote on every thing, to leave no turn, no event of literature without the baptism of his popular water, force from him pamphlets upon pamphlets. He is a self-thinker, like *Nicolai*, who is at rest only when he has given the world the benefit of his opinion. But *Krug* is in reality a thoroughly honest man. He is most sincere in his efforts on behalf of *Illuminism*, in his clamour for light and improvement, in his enthusiasm for common sense, and wishes only to be just, as he has most gloriously proved on many occasions. One would be as much mistaken in considering *Krug* as a great philosopher, as one would be wrong in not acknowledging his great merits in spreading abroad an interest for philosophy, for the advancement of a rational, political, and ecclesiastical liberalism, as well as his sterling honesty."

an object which cannot in itself be known ; the dualism demands a reconciliation. In the subject, faculties of thinking, willing, and feeling, were distinguished, without any one's knowing in what relation they stand, and which is their higher unity. In a critico-analytical way, *Kant* had stated results ; it was natural that now an attempt should be made to reduce, synthetically, these results to a unity. Now, when disciples, such as *Reinhold* and *Beck*, whom *Kant* had once joyfully welcomed as expounders of his philosophy, were, from the ground occupied by *Kant*, striving for that unity, the old sage shook his head doubtfully. A young theologian had sought to commend himself to him by a critique on all revelation, which he had composed in a few days. The "Jena Literary Gazette" reviewed it as a composition by *Kant* ; but it was by *Fichte*. And hence it happened that the young and highly promising philosopher was called to Jena in the room of *Reinhold*. *Kant* had expected of him that he would make use of his skilful mode of representation for spreading the critical philosophy ; but he proceeded on the way on which *Reinhold* and *Beck* had entered. "I think"—he writes in one of his first publications—"I have discovered the way on which philosophy must raise itself to the rank of an evident science." This way *Fichte* called *Wissenschaftslehre* (doctrine of knowledge or science.) While the individual sciences employ themselves with individual subjects, such as religion, law, nature, etc., the *Wissenschaftslehre* considers that which all individual sciences presuppose, the foundation and essence of knowledge. The point on which the *Wissenschaftslehre* hinges is self-consciousness,—the Ego. This Ego, as *Fichte* has often protested, is not an individuality, but rather the generalized, absolutely viewed Ego,—if one wills (and *Fichte* sometimes so expresses it)—God. In this Ego three facts are implied :

Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis. It is from this principle that *Fichte* endeavours to deduce all facts of consciousness, and that with mathematical evidence. The method proceeds thus:—that out of the thesis an antithesis is brought forth, which forces to a synthesis, until out of this synthesis a new antithesis is produced, until all antitheses are produced, until all antitheses are exhausted. This is not, of course, the place for bringing out in detail the results of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. Like *Kant*, *Fichte* distinguished between theoretical and practical reason. In the theoretical reason, the Ego affirms itself to be determined by the Non-Ego; in the practical reason, the Non-Ego is itself affirmed and determined by the Ego. The Ego affirms the Non-Ego opposed to it, in order to prove itself to be the absolute deed which again removes the limit which itself had put. Theory has thus its foundation in practice. The absolute Ego has a logical existence only; it exists only in a multitude of finite Egos, the aim and end of which is to raise themselves legally and morally into a universal Ego. This universal Ego is humanity. The history of humanity is pervaded by a progress, in which the Ego more and more proves itself to be the absolute power. This moral progress *Fichte* called “God.”

At first *Kant* had assumed the same position towards this system of his disciple as he had done to *Reinhold*, *Beck*, *Maimon*, and others. In a letter to *Fichte*, he warned him to beware of subtleties, scholasticisms, etc. The bold advance of *Fichte*, however, put him so much out of humour, that he publicly, and in very strong expressions—he spoke of blockheads—denounced and declared against the *Wissenschaftslehre*. At that time *Fichte* wrote to his pupil *Schelling* remarkable words, which, in proof of an assertion previously made, we shall here quote:—“It is quite natural, and a matter of course, dear



*Schelling*, that while the defenders of the pre-Kantian metaphysics have not yet ceased to tell *Kant* that he deals in fruitless subtleties, *Kant* should now say the same ;— it is quite natural, and a matter of course, that while these individuals, in opposition to *Kant*, give the assurance that their metaphysics still stand uninjured, unimproveable, and unchangeable, for time eternal, *Kant* should now give the same assurance regarding his metaphysics in opposition to us. Who knows where, even now, the young and ardent head is at work, which shall go beyond the principles of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, and will endeavour to prove that it is erroneous and defective.” *Fichte* had no conception that he to whom he wrote was to be that very ardent head.

No doubt *Fichte*’s system is the consequence of *Kant*’s critique, and in this consequence, the consequence of *Illuminism* too appeared. As from *Illuminism*, which resolved everything into abstractions, there was only one step to *Kant*, who allowed the universe to stand as an unknown quantity, and declared the moral consciousness to be the only thing absolutely necessary and stable ; so there was only one step from *Kant* to that stand-point which declared the Ego to be the absolute. Self-consciousness, which, in *Descartes*, had viewed itself as that which is absolutely certain, makes, in *Fichte*, all objective being to evaporate in itself. Subjectivism, the innermost moving agency of *Illuminism* thus reaches in *Fichte* its boldest height.

“*Fichte*,” as has been said by *Schelling*, “is the philosophical blossom of the old time, and, in so far, its limit. It is scientifically expressed in his system, which, in this respect, will remain an eternal and enduring monument. *If his age hated him, it was because it had not the courage to view, in the light of his doctrine, its own image, which he drew with power and freedom.*”



## CHAPTER II.

### THE THEOLOGY OF ILLUMINISM.

THE development of Protestantism repeats in a peculiar manner the course of the Church previous to it. As, in the first four centuries, the productive spirit of the Church proposed to itself the view of Christianity as a whole, so also is the time from the beginning of the Reformation to the Augsburg Confession one pre-eminently creative, and which lays the foundation of the Lutheran Church, as regards its Confession of Faith.<sup>1</sup> With the endeavour pervading the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, more distinctly to work out the single doctrines, corresponds the work of the Lutheran Church up to the time of the *Formula Concordiae*, by which the various differences of doctrines are settled. As the Church of the Middle Ages had handed down to it, as a firm foundation, the doctrinal matter produced by the Fathers, and sanctioned by the Church, which Scholasticism then undertook

<sup>1</sup> Our Author speaks of the Lutheran Church as being *the* Protestant Church of Germany. He himself is a zealous Lutheran, and may therefore be expected to take this view of her. But, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that the Protestant Church of Germany is pre-eminently Lutheran; that the Reformed Church is not only in the minority, but divided into Zwinglians, Calvinists; that it not only never exerted any influence upon the religious development of Germany, but, on the contrary, was always and everywhere more or less influenced by the Lutheran Church, so that it never worked out its peculiar principles, never attained to a vigorous life. In most cases we might, without doing violence to the author or his meaning, put "Evangelical," instead of "Lutheran."—TR.

to work out and digest in a systematic manner, so there arose in the seventeenth century—the Protestant Middle Ages—a Scholasticism which put into a regular form the Lutheran Confession of Faith embodied in the *Formula Concordiae*. As, in the Middle Ages, Mysticism stands side by side with Scholasticism, so we meet, in the seventeenth century, by the side of the strict representatives of Scholasticism, the Protestant mystics *Jacob Böhme*, *Arndt*, and others. This mystical tendency acquired an immense importance about the end of the seventeenth, and the beginning of the eighteenth century. A parallel betwixt this period and that of the fourteenth century is obvious. In the fourteenth century, the romantic spirit had become extinct; Scholasticism had outdone itself; from France there flowed out over Europe a worldly spirit; the Roman See had decayed; everything was in dissolution. Then, from the reaction against the externalized Scholasticism and secularized life, there broke forth, on all hands, and in the most varied forms, mysticism, which had in itself a reformatory feature. In like manner, after the Thirty Years' War, the blossom of Germany had withered; the religious spirit, which, since the period of the Reformation, had been the first power in Germany, had stepped into the background; while, on the other hand, the secular spirit had been let loose, along with a powerful retinue of immorality, especially by the preponderance of France under Louis XIV. In the Roman, as well as in the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, there rose, against the prevailing secularization of life, the externalization of ecclesiastical forms, and the ossification of the doctrine of the Church, a mystico-pietistic spirit. In France, Jansenism developed more and more its mystic feature; the restless Madame *Guyon* proclaimed a mysterious peace in God; the noble *Fenelon*

represented the power of a self-sacrificing love to God. In Italy, *Molinos*, in his *Spiritual Guide*, praised as the highest a silence in God, dissolving all the emotions of the mind. In Germany, *Angelus Silesius* sought in Roman Catholicism a rich pasturage for his mystical longing after union with God. In the Reformed Church there arose, from opposition to the externalized Church of England, the *Quakers* and *Methodists*. The seers of the *Camisards* remind us of the times of Montanism. The *Labadists* urge the position, that the Spirit goes beyond the written word. It was at this time that *Spener* appeared. What he found fault with in the Protestant Church of his time was dead faith, knowledge without life, forms without spirit, worldliness under the cloak of orthodoxy. What he demanded was—Life. *Spener* was a man of a nature so quiet, well-regulated, cautious, exemplary in all the relations of life, that the inferences which his orthodox opponents to his views drew, rebounded from his person; and yet all these inferences were not far-fetched. It was by this mystico-pietistic feature of the time that *Angels' brethren* (*Engelsbrüder*), Chiliastic dreamers, visionaries, prophets, who claimed equality not only with the ancient prophets, but with Christ himself, were brought forth and supported. To charge against *Spener* and his disciples all the issues of Pietism, would be as un-historical as it would be to express an opinion on Pietism without considering it in connection with all these phenomena of mystic subjectivism. *Godfried Arnold*, the Church historian of Pietism, has pointed to the subjective tendencies of all centuries as the witnesses for Pietism. We have now, for a considerable time, been able to look at the origin, character, and influence of Pietism, and yet our present age is still very unsettled in its opinion about this phenomenon. Whatever may be

one's position, so much must be granted, that Pietism has been called forth by the externalization of doctrine and the secularization of life, and that it has exercised a blessed influence upon the renovation of the Church and the spiritualization of life. But all this one may grant, and yet consider Pietism as an apostacy from the faith of the Fathers, as many of *Spener's* orthodox contemporaries did. But the modern middle-school theology—*Dorner* may in this instance be mentioned as its representative—finds, on the other hand, in Pietism a necessary stage in the development of Protestantism, a supplement of the Reformation, and an essential element in the religious consciousness of the Present.<sup>1</sup> But to those who, like ourselves, are standing on the ground of the Lutheran Confession, the opinion on Pietism depends upon the question—Has Pietism gone beyond the foundation of our confessions? History obliges us to answer, Yes. We apply to the doctrine of justification through faith the words of the Smalcaldic articles:—"Of this article nothing can be yielded or conceded, although heaven and earth, and whatever will not stand, should fall. And it is on this article that everything rests which we teach in opposition to the pope, the devil, and the world." Now, it is just this article which Pietism has not, indeed, directly assailed, but yet has removed from its centre, and neutralized. The Lutheran Church had always taught that the faith which lays hold of Christ's merits must be a living faith; but that which justifies man is not the life in this faith, but the object of which it lays hold—the merit of Christ. Pietism, however, measured life by this subjective quality of life. And this life in faith it could not separate from the life which faith works, from the fruits of faith. It

<sup>1</sup> *Ueber den Pietismus und sein Verhältniss zur Kirche. (Theol. Studien u. Krit., 1840, H. I., S. 137, ff.)*

was not justification, but repentance, awakening, assurance which were the watchwords of Pietism. Sanguine natures, such as *Zinzendorf*, might thus easily ascribe to the Holy Spirit the flickering feeling of joyfulness, while, on the other hand, melancholy natures, such as *Semler's* brother, might torment themselves to death. One may well say, that the Pietists made the awakening their material principle. And so likewise, the formal principle of our church came into a different position. "What," so it may be objected, "does not the merit of Pietism consist in its having led back from dead doctrinal notions to the word of Scripture?" Scripture was to Pietism something different from what it was to the Reformers. It was just because Pietism, in its view of faith, looked chiefly to the subject, rather than to the object of faith, that Scripture was to it, not so much the fountain of truth, as a divine book of devotion and edification. We cannot apply to the Pietists what we find written regarding the Christians in Berea, "that they searched the Scriptures daily whether these things were so." *Oetinger*, a man to whom an organ for Pietism was given, says: "I have seen in Count *Zinzendorf*, that he made Scripture a collection of texts only, and arranged them in such a manner that he might easily, and all at once, have access to, and success with, souls. He would not hear of the connection and context of Scripture, because he thought that the apostles had not spoken according to it. He brought forward two articles only: (1) That we are, and must feel ourselves to be, sinners; and (2) That we must feel the blood of Christ in us; and these articles he taught disconnected from Christ's priestly office." Since Pietism, in the matter of faith, looked to the subjective, and not at all to the objective element, it was implied in this very circumstance, that they were indifferent as to the objects



of knowledge, the confession of the church, and theological science. One cannot deny that there is great poverty of thought in the writings of *Spener*, *Francke*, and others. This is especially obvious in their sermons. That which *Francke*, *Anton*, *Breithaupt*, *Lange*, and others, who were professors of theology in universities, have accomplished in the domain of theological science, is of no great moment. While we stand with admiration before the works on systematic theology of the seventeenth century, even a historical interest is scarcely able to engage us in the works of the Pietistic divines. This scientific weakness is especially visible in the Pietists of the second generation, the younger *Francke*, *Callenberg*, and others. In this indifference to doctrine was, of course, implied an indifference to the distinguishing doctrines of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. Pietism had, from the very outset, a tendency towards *Union*; and that was not one of the weakest reasons why it was so much favoured by the princes of *Brandenburg*, especially by Frederick William I. While in *Brandenburg* it was prohibited to attend the University of *Wittenberg*, it was compulsory that every Lutheran divine should study at least two years in *Halle*. And, in like manner, as Pietism was indifferent to the confession of the church, it was indifferent to its constitution and worship also. It was from the lap of Pietism that the congregational system came forth. The importance of public worship Pietism lowered by the value which it ascribed to its conventicles. It is in this indifference to confession, constitution, and public worship—these objective bonds of Christian communion—that the fundamental error of Pietism came out: disregard of the Church and her ordinances. For, two things are essential to the Church:<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> According to the Lutheran doctrine.—TR.

As the bearer of word and sacraments she is the mother of faith, and she is communion of faith, which must find an expression in confession, constitution, and worship. But both of these aspects of the Church Pietism neutralized by the exclusive stress which it laid on the conversion of the single individual. The orthodox theologians were right in seeing a Donatistic element in Pietism; and, in general, he only who gives up the foundations of our Church can dispute to the orthodox theologian the right of opposition. It is a matter of course that we do not mean to identify ourselves with the coarse vehemence of men such as *Mayer*, *Schelwig*, *Neumeister*, *Deutschmann*, and others; but it must not be forgotten that Pietism soon enough manifested a rather strong feeling of overbearing superiority to orthodoxy. The discussions of *Francke* with *Lösher*, a man by far superior to the Pietists in learning, and surely not destitute of practical Christianity, have, even upon *Tholuck*,<sup>1</sup> made the impression that *Francke* had acted with a feeling of superiority, and without understanding the difficulties of his opponent. By this opposition to the representatives of the doctrine of the church, Pietism prepared the way for *Illuminism*. The watchword of Pietism was—Practical Christianity. And it has displayed an extraordinary energy and activity. We would acknowledge, as it is due, the thousands of theologians who came forth from *Halle*, the Orphan's Asylum (*Waisenhaus*) at Halle, with all the good influences exerted by it, and all the good effects proceeding from it; the voices of men such as *Bogatzky*, *Schmolke*, *Woltersdorf*, the missionaries to the heathen; but we would, on the other hand, not overlook the fact, that this resolving of all that is objective into practical efforts has contributed

<sup>1</sup> *Der Geist der Lutherischen Theologen Wittenbergs*, S. 308 ff.

to usher in the utilitarian and moral tendencies of *Illuminism*.

The middle part of the eighteenth century (from about 1730 to 1770), is occupied with views *which bear the character of transition*. Let us first consider them in detail, before we endeavour to determine their character as a whole. Although the orthodox theology of Pietism is, as early as in the second generation, broken, yet the impulses of Pietism pervade the whole century, and even go beyond it. By these, one school especially has been affected, the home, although not the exclusive seat of which is *Württemberg*, and the representatives of which are *Bengel*, *Crusius*, *Oetinger*, *Roos*, etc. This school knows that it is related to the heads of Pietism; like it, they wish for living, practical Christianity; they receive thoughts advanced by Pietism (*e.g.*, Chiliasm); and yet they would not embrace the principle of Pietism. *Bengel*, who in his youth had, with a warm heart, considered the seed of Pietism in the north of Germany, says of the Pietists of the second generation: "It is true that the Halle generation has got rather too narrow for the spirit of our present time; the dignity and seriousness of *Spener* does no more exist, and yet there is nothing to make up for it. Therefore the good men of that school should allow themselves to be stirred up a little, and accommodate themselves to the requirements of the present age." *Zinzendorf* also disavowed the Halle Pietists, "those miserable Christians whom no one calls Pietists, except themselves." He disliked the tormenting method by which they divided into different stages that which they called regeneration, among which repentance held a prominent place. What *Zinzendorf* wished was a joyful laying hold of the blood of Christ, for the communion of love with Him.<sup>1</sup> Yet this

<sup>1</sup> See the proofs in *Schaaf, Die evangel. Brüdergemeinde*, S. 221, ff.

is not the fundamental idea of Moravianism. *Zinzendorf's* "special plan," as he himself calls it, was not to awaken, but to gather those who were awakened, into a communion, in which the single souls might find careful attendance and pasture, and thus to realise *Spener's* idea of an *ecclesia in ecclesia*. This idea was based upon the conviction that the Evangelical Churches of the individual countries were given up to dissolution; and yet *Zinzendorf* was anxious to vindicate, for the community of his elect ones, the authority and privileges of those very churches of which he had so low an opinion. The established church of *Wurtemberg* which, from the very beginning, had been less strict in her forms, and the heads of which, at that time, were affected with Pietism, gave to *Zinzendorf* ministerial ordination, and thereby a kind of sanction to his cause. To *Bengel*, *Zinzendorf* appeared at that time as the prophet of his age.<sup>1</sup> The prophet was, no doubt, a witness against the corruption which was coming in upon the Church; but, nevertheless, *Bengel* could not approve of *Zinzendorf's* attempting a reconstruction so hastily. "I have," says he, "long ago said, that the separatists have combed asunder all the hair, and now Count *Zinzendorf* is beginning to plait pigtails. I think it is still rather premature. Lime and stone must first be prepared; and it is only *then* that we may begin to build." He disapproved of the cavalier-like mode in which *Zinzendorf* dealt with the doctrine of the church. "It is not good that he introduces so novel a language, as if the systems and symbols of our Church were insufficient and unsuitable." Towards the end of his life, *Bengel*, in a special publication,<sup>2</sup> pointed out the deviation of Moravianism from

<sup>1</sup> *Burk, D. A. Bengels Leben und Wirken*, S. 379.

<sup>2</sup> *Abriß der sogenannten Brüdergemeinde*, 1751.

Scripture and the symbolical books of the church. But how faithfully soever he adhered to the faith of his fathers, his relation to the symbolical books of the church was different from that of the orthodox divines of the seventeenth century. While with the latter their relation to Scripture had been brought about by the medium of the symbolical books of the Church, Bengel's relation to the symbolical books had been brought about through the medium of Scripture. With the former, agreement with the symbolical books of the Church was the beginning,—with him, the result; *and it is this direct proceeding from Scripture which characterises the class of theologians of which we are speaking.* That which Bengel brought with him to Scripture was a disposition which was from the first faithful, and which had not gone through opposite opinions, although it had passed through doubts and trials,—a disposition earnest, conscientious, and yet devout and affectionate. We might indeed call conscientiousness the fundamental virtue of *Bengel*. Whatever he utters, be it in science, be it in life, is more mature, more well weighed, more pithy, more consecrated, than most of what his verbose age has uttered. In the great he saw the little, in the little, the great.

The theologians of the seventeenth century had not been disturbed in their strict views of inspiration by the different readings; in full belief they relied upon the *textus receptus*. But after the investigations of *Walton*, *Fell*, *Mill*, *Bentley*, and *Wetstein*, the fact could no longer be denied, that the authority of this *textus receptus* was accidental. While, to a man like *Wetstein*, this uncertainty of the text afforded a welcome and longed-for proof of his looser views on the Canon, it was to *Bengel* the cause of heavy trials. His endeavour was to remove, by a sure text, all objections; and to this effect his critical studies



were devoted and made subservient. The principles which he followed in his criticism, have, as is well-known, introduced a new era in this territory. The exposition of the New Testament which he gave in his *Gnomon*, is thus characterised by himself:—"I shall add to the original revised text exegetical remarks, in which I shall act neither as a sytematiser, nor as a controversialist, nor as an ascetic, etc., and yet, in a certain sense, I shall combine all these. Every single passage I shall explain according to its peculiar requirements; in the first instance, according to the words of the text themselves, and the connexion of the periods, or of the whole book, or of even the whole New Testament." In conformity with these principles, he listens to the text with philological impartiality, and, with wonderful skill, hears, not the fundamental key-note only, but also the collateral tones, and, by his significant precision, stimulates to farther thinking. It was by his situation, as preceptor in the Monastic school (*Klosterschule*) at *Denkendorf*, that Bengel found himself induced to undertake those critical, as well as exegetical labours. They are, just as his edition of Cicero's Letters *ad familiares*, and of Chrysostom's book on the priestly office, fruits and memorials of his official conscientiousness. Bengel's disposition for precise investigation of details carried him to chronology. Assisted by his chronological eye, he now imagined that he had attained to an understanding of the Revelation of John. Out of those mysterious pictures he composed the history of the kingdom of God with the assurance of an historian. History has refuted him. The 18th of June 1836, on which the Lord was to come (Rev. xix. 11-21), has passed; but although time has refuted his apocalyptic calculation, it has confirmed many of his glances into the future, and will yet, in all probability, confirm many

more. Agreeing with Pietism, Bengel asserted the reality of the millennial kingdom, in opposition to the dislike with which orthodox theology had, from the very outset, viewed this point; and from this position he transferred into the exposition of the prophetical portion of Scripture a realism which looked to a more literal fulfilment than the ordinary exposition admitted.—The school which *Crusius* in Leipzig represented, may well be designated by the name of a Philosophico-Biblical Realism. Notwithstanding all his originality, *Crusius* never denied the school of *Bengel*. Like Bengel, he was a Bible-theologian, and yet strongly addicted to the doctrine of the Church. Like Bengel, he brought to the study of Scripture a living, humble faith, an earnest desire after holiness; and he was of opinion, that, to such a disposition only, an understanding of Scripture would be opened up. But, while in Bengel a philological talent manifests itself, in *Crusius* it is a philosophical one. As a philosopher, *Crusius* maintained, in opposition to the idealism and mechanism of the Leibnitz-Wolffian Philosophy, a realism which brought spirit and body into an organic unity; while, as a Bible theologian, he maintained, in opposition to the spiritualism and mechanism of the exposition, the right of the letter and body, in the connexion of a history of salvation of the Old and New Dispensation organically developing itself.<sup>1</sup> While in *Crusius* the speculative element has the character of the rational, it has, in *Oetinger*, that of the Theosophical. It is only in modern times that this theologian, too, has been brought before us, especially

<sup>1</sup> The image of this theologian had become dim to the present age. Delitzsch, in his book: *Die biblisch-prophetische Theologie, ihre Fortbildung durch Chr. Crusius*, etc., Leipzig, 1845, has acquired the merit of having him again, in due time, placed before us.

through the merit of *Hamberger* and *Auberlen*. It is a mixed impression, indeed, which the image of his life, drawn by himself, makes upon us.<sup>1</sup> His development, a retreat from the snowy regions of Wolffianism, leads through the misty lands of the intuition of *Jacob Böhme*, of central visionaries, of the alchymists, of *Swedenborg*. And then, after all, we are again attracted to this *Magus* of the South, by the wonderful life in prayer, by the mysterious intercourse with a higher world, by his thoughtful living and moving in the mystery of Scripture. As the fundamental error of his tendency, there appears the disposition to seek in Scripture proofs for views which he had found out without Scripture. Like *Crusius*, he assumed in every man an organ for truth, the *sensus communis*,—that which his age called common sense. When this proceeds from what exists, all being will represent itself to it as life; but the *sensus communis* is not cognizant of the divine life. The divine life, the revelation of which is laid down in Scripture, opens up to the spiritual sense only. This spiritual sense is, in some elect ones, raised into an organ for higher, for new revelations. This mixture of practical philosophy, Christian speculation, and ghost-seeing, was then to be defended by Scripture! As long as we shall take in Scripture the words as they stand, we shall be obliged to confess, with the whole visible Church, the eternity of the punishments of hell; but theosophy could not agree with this thought. The school-rector *Schill*, Oetinger's godfather, a ghost-seer, had in vain endeavoured to convince prelate *Oechsli* of the restoration of all things. "The condemned shall go away into everlasting punishment" was too strong a text for him. But he had to suffer for it severely after

<sup>1</sup> *Oetinger's Selbstbiographie*, edited by *Dr J. Hamberger*. Stuttg., 1845.

death. *Schill* was just going out of the door of the room when he heard, in a half whisper, the voice of *Oechslein*, who addressed him by the word "Brother," and told him that, after death, he had come into a darkness in which he did not know what would befall him. Anguish and fear, therefore, fell upon him, because his conviction of the eternity of hell-torments was following him. He reproached *Schill* for not having, with the utmost pertinacity, endeavoured to reason him out of his opinion. He had passed a long time in his despair, until God had at length heard his prayer, and had made light to arise upon him, when he saw his error, and said,—“ Oh, you theologians, how blind are you in the narrow sphere of your theses!”<sup>1</sup> *Swedenborg* saw even more than *Schill*. He perceived Luther and Melancthon in the condition of a kind of purgatory. Luther was teaching in a place which looked like *Wittenberg*, and Melancthon was writing; the former was teaching, and the latter was writing, “Justification by Faith.” And yet the former is told that this doctrine was thoroughly false, and what the latter wrote is extinguished; they are in purgatory on account of this doctrine, and refuse to acknowledge this. An angel, however, opens up to *Swedenborg* the prospect, that Luther would come right in the end. Who does not see, that the spirits which these enthusiasts saw were their own spirits, which would not submit to the word of Scripture? Up to this day, Wurtemberg has remained the country of a living, but subjective piety. Bengel's spirit continues to live in those who, with a Christian conscientiousness, bring out of the Word of God doctrines which, although not agreeing with the systematical books of the Church, yet come very near them. (*Beck* may be viewed

<sup>1</sup> *Selbstbiographie*, S. 80 ff.

as the representative of this class in the present; while the great number of theosophists, ghost-seers, apocalyptic, prophets, etc., have their leader in Oetinger.)

A second school of this transition period is the *Wolffian*. *Wolff*, consecrated, even before his birth, by his pious father, to the service of the Lord, devoted himself to mathematical and philosophical studies, in the belief that he would be able, by means of them, victoriously to demonstrate the truth of Christianity. "Having been devoted to the study of theology by a vow, I also had chosen it for myself; and my intention has all along been to serve God in the ministry, even when I was already Professor at Halle, until at length, against my will, I was led away from it, God having arranged circumstances in such a manner, that I could not carry out this intention. But having lived in my native place, Breslau, among the Catholics, and having perceived, from my very childhood, the zeal of the Lutherans and Roman Catholics against one another, the idea was always agitating my mind, whether it would not be possible so distinctly to show the truth in theology, as that it would not admit of any contradiction. When, afterwards, I learned that the *Mathematici* were so sure of their ground, that every one must acknowledge it to be true, I was anxious to study mathematics, *methodi gratia*, in order to give diligence to reduce theology to incontrovertible certainty."<sup>1</sup> If we consider, that in the last period of Protestant Scholasticism, the method of proceeding by definitions and demonstrations was very much in use (*Scherzer, Hollaz*); if we consider, that in the bosom of Pietism, which had arisen in opposition to Scholasticism, the mathematical method was made

<sup>1</sup> *Wuttke, Christian Wolff's eigne Lebensbeschreibung* (1840), S. 120.



use of by a man who afterwards took the lead in opposition to Wolff, viz., *Lange*; <sup>1</sup> we shall not, in this intention discover any unheard-of innovation. In Leipzig, where Wolff began his academical career, he now and then preached according to his method. "My sermons," he says, "were liked, for this reason, that I endeavoured to explain the things by clear definitions, and always deduced one from the other, drawing from the exposition of the text, first, *conclusiones theoreticas*, and afterwards from them, *practicæ*; and in doing so, I always paid attention to the *motiva*, *media*, *impedimenta*, and *remedia*, and led the proof, not only from *dicta Scripturæ*, but also from the definition of the matters." In Halle, Wolff at first taught mathematics, and afterwards physics, and philosophy also. His lectures obtained the greatest applause; whilst the Pietistic professors, who, in general, had never been very powerful in the chair, found great reason to complain of decreasing interest. From natural theology, which was a discipline of his rational philosophy, Wolff approached theology proper. Natural theology either infers from the world to God (cosmological argument), or it proceeds from the idea of God (ontological argument). God is the Being absolutely necessary, *i. e.*, having His cause in Himself only (*ens a se*), in whom the world has its cause. He is the cause of the world as a

<sup>1</sup> In the same year in which *Lange* outwardly conquered Wolff, there appeared his *Causa Dei et religionis naturalis adversus Atheismum* (1723), in which he proceeds throughout mathematically, although, in the Preface, he assures us that the method is more logical than mathematical. "I have chosen a demonstrative method similar to the geometrical method of demonstration; but it is determined, not so much by the laws of geometry, as by those of sound logic; it is, therefore, not forced or affected, but a little more free, and rather flowing from the matter itself, than any imitation of geometry." The method is, indeed, as stiff and absurd as in any Wolffian.

willing Being. The will of God is determined according to the two principles of possibility (*principium contradictionis*), and reality (*principium rationis sufficientis*). Among innumerable worlds which were possible, God has produced that for which He had the best reason, *i.e.*, the best world.<sup>1</sup> In the universe, God wills, *in the first instance*, what corresponds to His perfection, and to that of the universe; *secondly*, that which is in accordance with the connexion of the universe or with the laws of nature. But for all that, he does not deny the truth of the revelation on which Christianity rests; only, that it must be possible to bring forward, from reason, criteria of revelation. As regards the matter of revelation, it must, at least upon the whole, not exist in the natural consciousness,—must not contradict the nature of God,—must be in accordance with the necessary truths of reason,—must not command or forbid anything which is in contradiction to natural law. As regards the *form* of revelation, it must be such as does not admit of a natural explanation,—it must, as much as possible, retain the powers of nature,—it must be communicated by intelligible signs.<sup>2</sup> “A specimen may be seen here,” says Wolff, ironically,<sup>3</sup> “of how dangerous my fundamental doctrines must be, because the very same doctrines follow from them which the pure doctrine of the Christian Church maintains.” Wolff continues, that he acknowledged revelation, supernatural grace, miracles, etc., only, that the representation of these points was the business of the *theologia revelata*,

<sup>1</sup> *Vernünfftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele*—Reasonable Thoughts of God, the Universe, and Soul—(Halle, 1747), S. 604.

<sup>2</sup> *L. c.*, S. 623, ff.

<sup>3</sup> In the *Anmerkungen zu den vernünftigen Gedanken*, etc. (Frankf., 1740), S. 614.

and not of philosophy, which could not go any farther than it was possible to explain from reason. "I have always desired," he says, "that theology and philosophy should not be mixed up with one another, although I am of opinion, that when one meets the truth in both of them, the one cannot contradict the other. For if theology would say nothing else than what Scripture teaches, and would not add that which Scripture does not say,—and if, on the other hand, philosophy would content itself with what can be proved from reason, the difference between natural and supernatural truth would more plainly appear,—the necessity of revealed religion, and its superiority to natural religion would be more easily seen, and much controversy, arising from philosophy being improperly introduced into theology, would be removed." In his life, too, Wolff showed a regard to the ordinances of the Church, which will not so readily be found in all so-called Christian philosophers of the present age. On an academical circular, which contained the resolution of an academical solemnity, Wolff wrote:—" *Vidi, consentio*. Yet as I have purposed to partake, on the same day, of the Lord's Supper, I do not know whether I shall be able to be present, inasmuch as I should not like to change my intention; yet I will consider the matter with my minister. Chr. Wolff (1717.)"<sup>1</sup> The more the authority of Wolff increased in Halle, the more afraid did *Francke* and *Lange* become; they saw Atheism and corruption of manners springing up from Wolff's school. It is true, that they had no other proofs, except tales brought to them by students who adhered to them, and notes of lectures; but who can say that those fears were groundless? They were not mistaken when they saw in Wolff a spirit rising—the spirit of *Illuminism*—which must endanger not only Pietism,

<sup>1</sup> *Wutthe*, S. 12.

but Christianity in general. But it is a different question as to whether the representatives of that theology, which was anything but strict in reference to the authorities of the Lutheran Church, which had not despised an alliance with the Illuminist *Thomasius*, as long as it was aimed at orthodoxy,—whether they were in the right against a philosopher who professed to believe in revelation. The enmity, for a considerable time, showed itself only in petty academical conflicts, until a speech of Wolff, delivered on the occasion of his resigning the rectorship, and the subject of which was the excellence of Confucius' moral, induced Francke, who was at that time dean of the theological faculty, to ask from Wolff the manuscript of the speech. In a cutting letter, Wolff refused to give it up. The academical youth, by rather coarse demonstrations, declared against *Lange*. But the Pietists turned against Wolff a means, of which Wolff, it is true, had once availed himself in behalf of his own cause: they appealed to, and influenced the Court. Frederick William I. issued a decree (of the 8th of November 1723) by which Wolff was deposed from his professorship, because *he was said to teach doctrines in opposition to the Word of God*; and by which he was ordered to leave, within forty-eight hours, the Prussian territories, on pain of the gallows. Such a victory was, of course, a defeat to Pietism. *Lange* lived long enough to see that Wolff returned triumphantly to Halle (1740). Wolff's time too, was, however, gone; whilst he, who called himself *Professor universi humani generis*, continued, by writings, to influence the world, he yet could not obtain any real weight in his nearest sphere. We have seen (see p. 28 f.) what influence he had upon the general development; here, we are concerned about the movement which he called forth in the field of theology.

Like Wolff, the first considerable theologians of this school (*Canz, Carpov, Ribov, Reusch, Baumgarten, Schubert, Reinbeck*, and others), take also their stand on the ground of the symbolical books of the Church. In several of them we find serious Christianity; only, that it was not, as in the case of that Wurtemberg school, the Christian sense, which strove to bring itself into harmony with the faith of the Church, but the understanding; they believed that they were able to support the mysteries of faith by arguments of the understanding. *Carpov* proved the necessity of the three persons in the Godhead, with mathematical certainty. It is true, that the belief in the force of their argument was not of any duration. *Darjes*, who once had demonstrated the Trinity in the same manner as *Carpov*, publicly recalled his book. *Baumgarten*, the most distinguished among the theologians of this circle, was already cautious and moderate in the use of this method. He appears as a thoroughly mechanical head, in which piety, philosophy, and an immense amount of historical knowledge lay beside each other, as in strata. When, now and then, from among the learned dross, the silver metal of his individuality appeared, his affinity to *Illuminism* came to light. His protégé was *Semler*, and it is he who tells us<sup>1</sup> that *Baumgarten*, when he was in good humour, could very zealously defend a Theist, and throw ridicule upon the whole theology of his time. With those theologians who had gone through Wolff's school, such as *Töllner, Heilmann, J. P. Miller*, and others, Wolff's method was lowered into a mere motive. But it is not the method only, but also the matter of the faith of the Church which has been lowered in these Semi-Wolffians. Wolff had demonstrated what man, by the light of nature, knows of God. This conces-

<sup>1</sup> *Lebensbeschreibung*, Th. I. S. 108.



sion, that our reason has an amount of religious truth within itself, theologians and philosophers, believing in a revelation, imagined that they were able to make, since they expressly declared that this natural light was not sufficient for salvation. "Should"—so Töllner now asks—"should this natural light, which enlightens every man, not be sufficient for salvation?" He answers, in two works,<sup>1</sup> courageously in the affirmative,—'But then, surely revelation in nature supersedes the revelation of Scripture?' "The revelation in Scripture," Töllner answers, "is a greater and more perfect means of salvation. Both the natural light, and revelation lead the man who follows them to salvation, Scripture only *more so*." If Töllner had thus, on one hand, raised, as much as possible, natural religion to revelation, he, on the other hand, lowered Scripture to the level of natural light. According to orthodox doctrinal theology, Scripture is the word of God, not as modern theologians interpret, because Scripture contains the word of God, but because God is the real author (*auctor primarius*) of Scripture. The Spirit of God has written Scripture by the inspired holy writers. As soon as they are no longer viewed as the mere organs of God, but co-operate independently, and add of their own, the proposition, "God is the author of Scripture," can no longer be maintained. However, even those theologians who, in other points, in opposition to the inroads of Theism, adhered with absolute submission to the word of Scripture, had felt the difficulties of the old doctrine of inspiration. Bengel distinguished degrees of inspiration. Crusius

<sup>1</sup> "Wahre Gründe warum Gott die Offenbarung nicht mit augenscheinlichen Beweisen versehen hat" (True reasons why God has not furnished revelation with evident proofs, 1764); and "Beweis, dass Gott die Menschen bereits durch seine Offenbarung in der Natur zur Seligkeit führe" (Proof that God leads men to salvation, even by His revelation in nature—1776).

supposed an independent co-operation of the holy writers; *Pfaff* would not even have excluded every error.<sup>1</sup> As free was the position of the Wolffian theologians to the doctrine of inspiration. *Carpov* would have it applied only to the objects of faith, not to human affairs mentioned in Scripture. *Baumgarten* reduced it to an influence which God exercises on the mental faculties of the holy writers. In the doctrine of Inspiration, the main stress, which once was laid on God, had thus fallen on the writers. According to the former view, man had a subordinate position only; according to the latter, God. This result, Töllner, without the slightest hesitation, expressed in his work *Die göttliche Eingebung* (1771): "God"—so he says—"has in no way, either inwardly or outwardly, dictated the sacred books. The writers were the real authors, and, by applying their natural mental faculties, they produced the thoughts and words which they wrote. God was employed in it directly (?), but it is impossible for us to determine where, and how far He was employed in it." We easily conceive that, in opposition to a theology so thoroughly infected by Illuminism, the popular philosophers of Wolff's school could consider themselves as the only rightful heirs of the master.

A third school may be comprehended under the designation of the *historical school*. After the zeal for confessions had been extinguished, and the impulse for doctrinal formation dried up, in the second half of the seventeenth century, it was natural that the position towards the matter of theology should become more historical. The precise, comprehensive, calm representation, which we meet with in *Hollaz*, can be accounted for only by the circumstance,

<sup>1</sup> *Bengel*: *Burk*, S. 242, ff; *Crusius*: *Delitzsch*, S. 69; *Pfaff*, *De Præjudicatis opinionibus in Religione dijudicanda fugiendis*, Hag. l. 1716.

that he was less of a contributor than an editor. The more that the tendency of the period was towards subjective piety, the more does the historical point of view commend itself for all the objective formations of faith. In the doctrinal writings of *Buddeus* and *Pfaff*, the historical material drowns the already weakened thetical contents. The study of Church History was zealously cultivated by *Ittig*, *Deyling*, *Korthold*, *Löscher*, *Weismann*, and others, although very much with a regard to the matter. Who does not think of the historical masses which *Walch*, in his industry, has collected? It was *Mosheim's* task to give shape and form to this chaos of matter. In him, the former Helmstadt divine, the spirit of the great Helmstadtian *Calixt* was revived. Having emancipated and enlarged his mind by classical studies, philosophy, and a knowledge of the world, Mosheim, as a historian, displayed an unprejudiced sympathy with facts, a refined and ingeniously combining pragmatism, and an elegant, able, and classical style. The dark side of this talent—as regards the style—was a certain elegant superficiality. He has a very superficial view of the nature of the Church; she is, according to him, a kind of State, whose development must therefore be represented like the history of a State.<sup>1</sup> His pragmatism gives the impression of the elegance of a man of the world, rather than of a statement of motives out of the depths of Christian experience. How mechanically, in his ethics, are the Christian and humanistic elements connected with one another! His impartiality, his enlarged views, his liberalism, were, no doubt, connected with his views on the symbolical books of the Church, which he began already to regard in the light of a tradition.

<sup>1</sup> *Baur, Die Epochen der Kirchlichen Geschichtsschreibung*, S. 126: "The general defect of *Mosheim's* historiography is the externalization and secularization, or the generalization of the idea of the Church."

What *Mosheim* was as a church historian, *Ernesti* became as an expositor of the New Testament. He was already a mature philologist when he was called to be a teacher of theology. In this, his theological character is expressed; he was a theological philologist; and hence *Ernesti*'s importance is expressed in the principle that Scripture must be explained purely philologically. This principle was not announced by *Ernesti* for the first time; *Wetstein* had advanced it much more distinctly, and carried it out with much greater power. *Wetstein*'s New Testament—that storehouse so incredibly drawn upon—was to prove, not only the formal, but also the material likeness of Scripture and profane literature. But from *Ernesti*, who held so elegant a middle ground between orthodoxy and neology, the age would rather receive the principles of the so-called grammatico-historical exposition, than from the Arminian, who, according to the average measure of that time, went rather too far. *Crusius* and *Ernesti* were now teaching together in Leipzig; they could not fail to come in contact with each other, and between this opposition their hearers could not but divide themselves. Against *Crusius*' exposition, deep indeed, but yet mixed up with his own thoughts, *Ernesti* maintained the right of objectivity, while *Crusius* was not wrong in viewing this objectivity in connection with humanistic superficiality. "This conflict of learned opinions," says *Teller*, in his work "On *Ernesti*'s Merits (S. 13)," "has certainly some advantage, were it not that the sparks flying about too easily kindle the fire of human passions. *Crusius* groaned with a touching earnestness, or mocked with a cutting smile, quite peculiar to him, over the profanity and deistical evils. *Ernesti* scolded in a contemptuous manner, and mocked with bitter humour, over ignorance and visionary tendencies. Thus both of them poured upon

their numerous hearers the spirit of discord and sectarian zeal." Ernesti was animated by the spirit of the age, which was rapidly tending towards *Illuminism*; but *Illuminism* soon went beyond him. When he died (1781), his school, too, was dissolved. "The school of *Crusius*, writes *Jean Paul*, who at that time studied at Leipzig, "has almost died with its founder. People are, in 1781, too much imbued with the spirit of *Illuminism* to be able to be out and out *Crusites*; at least they are too wise to tell it. Not altogether, but nearly the same, is the case with Ernesti's school. Ernesti spoke Ciceronian Latin, but wanted Cicero's eloquence. He had good Latin words, but not very bright thoughts. With poor faculties of mind, he was astonishingly learned; but he owed his glory more to his industry than to his genius, more to his memory than to his depth. He was a great philologist, but not a great philosopher. The information which you want me to give you about the holy orthodoxy of Leipzig, will be very short. Most, almost all, the students, incline towards the side of *Heterodoxy*. *Morus* is evidently not orthodox; he has already suffered many persecutions (?); and it is just this which makes him cautious. Wherever he can explain away a miracle, the devil, etc., or can change an allegory from the Old Testament into an accommodation, he does so. In his systematic theology, on which he lectures exceedingly well, he brings the disputed points, the opinions of opposite parties, in such a manner before his hearers, that he leaves the decision to them; and who would, from the strength of his arguments on the one side, not infer which is his real opinion?" Those principles of a grammatico-historical interpretation, which Ernesti represented on the New Testament territory, were in a more thorough going manner applied to the Old Testament territory by *J. D. Michaelis*. Being the son



of an orthodox theologian, he allowed much of the belief of the Church to stand. He held the necessity of a revelation; found it in Scripture; admitted miracles and prophecies; acknowledged the divinity of Christ, a kind of original sin, and satisfaction for our sins. But all these stood, so to speak, as some old gates and walls in razed fortresses. Revelation is to him, after all, substantially a confirmation of natural religion; the authority of Scripture he proved by miracles, prophecies and arguments for their genuineness and authenticity. As is well known, *Michaelis* confessed openly that of the testimony of the Holy Spirit, and in general of supernatural grace, he had never felt any thing. It cannot, according to him, be in any way supposed that the Gentiles, who, without their fault, could not have heard any thing of faith, should not be saved. One must read this chapter in his book itself,<sup>1</sup> in order to get some notion of the spiritless and thoroughly coarse manner in which *Michaelis* set aside such mysteries. In the same way he treats the Mosaic legislation also, in his principal work. He thinks that he can throw a very clear light over Moses, by making him, according to the policy of his time, so far as it was within the reach of a Göttingen professor, a very clever statesman, whose chief skill consisted in rendering matters of utility acceptable by religious motives. If Moses, in the name of God, forbids to seeth a kid in his mother's milk, he has only availed himself of a pious artifice to care for the palate of the Jews; for the kids of goats taste better when boiled in olive oil than in butter.<sup>2</sup> The completion of this historical school, which forms the transition to Illuminism, is *Semler*. Many a parallel presents itself between him

<sup>1</sup> *J. D. Michaelis, Dogmatik*, S. 420, ff, (2d edition.)

<sup>2</sup> For particulars, comp. *Hengstenberg, Authenticity of the Pentateuch*, I. p. xiii. seq.

and Michaelis, although in life they rather repulsed each other. Both had gone through the school of pietism; both had sober, unimaginative natures; both possessed extensive historical knowledge; and both were as historical as possible as regards the faith of the Church. Of *Pietism*, which, according to his own confession, he had adopted from external considerations, Semler retained not only a certain personal piety (the same may be said of *Michaelis* also), but also the characteristic distinction between private religion and public religion, or the doctrine of the Church. Religion is essentially the business of the individual; and since individuals are so different, private religion also will assume very different forms. But religion is also the business of the community; and without a distinct doctrine no religious community can be imagined. That is public religion. Now, as the religious community, at different times, and under different circumstances, is very different, the form of public religion will always be very different too. This public religion stands to private religion in a relation more or less external. Satisfied with that in which he found his private religion, he looked with purely historical eyes on the different forms of religious life. Since these forms stand in so external a relation to private religion, all liberty of criticism may prevail in their historical examination. The grammatico-historical examination of *Ernesti*, to whom *Semler* was attached with great veneration, yet allowed many things to stand with which *Semler's* private religion could not agree. Here, then, his historical stand-point assisted him. From the substance of Christianity must be stripped off every thing which is local and temporary; but as such Semler viewed all the specific doctrines of Christianity, even the idea of the kingdom of God. The difficulty offered by the question: How was it that Christ, that the Apostles, could

lay such stress on subordinate matters?—this difficulty he removed on the principle of accommodation, of which he made the most extensive use. After Semler had thus cleared the territory of the canons, he did all that he could, in order to remove the halo which rested on the first centuries. With an incredible boldness, he declared books, the genuineness of which no one had hitherto doubted, not to be genuine, or, at least, to be highly doubtful. Under his pragmatistical touches the halo of the martyrs faded; upon the heads of esteemed teachers of the Church, such as Augustine, he discharged destructive strokes. And thus the history of the kingdom of God became, under his hands, a world of atoms, which crossed each other as chaotically as the masses of notices which lay heaped up in the memory of Semler.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Tholuck*, in his Treatise, *Abriss einer Geschichte der Umwälzung, welche seit 1750 auf dem Gebiete der Theologie in Deutschland stattgefunden hat*—Sketch of a History of the revolution, which, since 1750, has taken place on the territory of Theology in Germany.—(*Verm. Schriften*, II. S. 39, ff) has given a good contribution to the characteristics of *Semler*. Many points, however, are, as it appears to me, not rightly viewed. If *Tholuck* finds the fundamental feature of *Semler's* character in his sanguine disposition, an occasional expression of Semler, in his autobiography, appears to me to be a very precarious proof. "Semler's studies were sanguine, because he took up first this, and then that," says *Tholuck*. To me, however, the variety of Semler's studies seems to have arisen from the external manner with which he received within himself the objects of knowledge. He who aims at the knowledge of the objects as such, can, for that very reason, throw himself into territories the most diverse. I do not believe that a man of a sanguine temperament would have been able so thoroughly to study the sources as *Semler* has done. No man of a sanguine temper will have sufficient perseverance ever anew to engage in the same studies, as Semler has done, *e.g.*, in his investigation of the first centuries. "A man of a sanguine temper is pre-eminently vain. Semler, also, with all the energy of his nature, is only bent upon succeeding, as a youth, with ladies; as a man, with the public,"—*Tholuck* goes on

If we take a summary review of all the schools described, it is on the one hand obvious, that by a certain attachment to the doctrines and ordinances of the Church, they differ from Pietism; but, on the other hand, that this attachment to the doctrine of the Church is no more that of the age of orthodoxy. They seek to compromise, in reference to the doctrine of the Church, the authority of which is already broken. While that Wurtemberg school reconciles it with a faithful and speculative interpretation of Scripture, and the school of Wolff with their demonstration, the Historical School supports it by historical arguments. But these props soon prove insufficient to bear the burden imposed upon them; if these supports are to stand and hold, the doctrine of the Church must be made lighter. But, when demolition once began, it was difficult to say where and when it should stop. Thus, then, at last, the old firm citadel had become a little airy villa which could scarcely serve for show. And should such a little villa have been able to hold out before an enemy who already occupied the whole land? Against little advanced posts—such as *Dippel*, *Edelmann*, and others—they had held their ground; with *Bahrddt*, whose artillery was too light, they had succeeded in a creditable way; the assault of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments* was, it is true, repelled, but it left wide breaches behind. When now Illuminism marched on in well-disciplined troops, *i.e.*, as *Rationalism*, no farther resistance was to be thought of; it entered with flying colours.

to say. Unless Tholuck have had official sources of information regarding the first point, besides Semler's autobiography, I must confess that in it I could find nothing of it. And, as regards vanity with the public, I am disposed to think that this fault is not to be found with sanguine men only. People say that it is by no means rare among authors.

In isolated and strange forms, *Illuminism* announced itself on the field of theology.

In 1674, ten tracts were found in the Parochial Church of Jena, by the side of the professorial pews ; the *first* a colloquy between an innkeeper and three guests, of different religions ; the *second*, a conversation between a military chaplain, called *Dr Henry Brummer*, and a Latin Clerk ; a *third* was sent into the house of the librarian *Neuenhaus*, along with the following letter :—" Honoured Sir, we hereby inform you that there are at Jena certain people, 700 in number, partly citizens, partly students, who are addicted to the doctrine of which the inclosed colloquy (the first of the tracts mentioned) treats. We desire you to insert this colloquy in the newspaper as soon as possible (*Neuenhaus* was editor of a newspaper), else to speak in your own language, inasmuch as death is a sleep, we shall lull you asleep in the open street, by means of an air-gun. Farewell, and retain in your regard him who warns you, *John Frederick of Reason*." This strange circumstance caused sensation. No trace of the 700, however, was found at Jena ; and thus there was every reason to doubt the existence of the numberless adherents of those views in the capitals of Europe, of whom these tracts boastingly spoke. After some time, that strange man once more made his appearance in Jena, in order afterwards to appear for ever. He was the wandering preacher, *Matthew Knuzen*, from Holstein, who sometimes assumed the title of M.A., sometimes of a licentiate of Theology ; but wheresoever he was asked for the documents of these dignities, he always pretended that he had lost them by some unlucky accident. What he taught was an apotheosis of conscience. "There is no God, no devil, no life after death ; not Scripture, but conscience alone is the rule of truth ; the



Bible is a confused, dull, and stupid book. Since such is the case, no one can call it wrong that I and my numberless adherents at Paris, Amsterdam, etc., consider the whole Bible to be nothing but a fable, to which those blockheads, the Christians, please to surrender their reason, in order thus, with reason, to be unreasonable and foolish. What satisfies us *conscientiarii* is not that which one knows, but that which many know, the common knowing (*conscientia conjunctim accepta*). Thus we walk safely, and certainly. This conscience, which our kind mother has equally implanted in all, is *our* Bible, and takes with us the place of the secular government, and of the clergy. This conscience, when we do evil, is to us more than a thousand tormenters; and when we do good, it is our heaven. This conscience is born with our birth, and dies with our death. These are principles co-existent with us; he who rejects them rejects himself." *Knutzen's* life still falls into the period of orthodoxy, and one of its noblest representatives, *Musaeus*, in Jena, opposed these views.<sup>1</sup>

Into the age of Pietism falls *John Conrad Dippel* (born 1673, died 1734). He belongs to those chaotic natures that delight in an eternal struggle with the external world, because they have not the power of controlling themselves. He throws himself from one science into another; here he is a theologian; there he appears as a physician; to-day he is an alchymist; to-morrow a philosopher. From one university he proceeds to another; from prison he passes to high dignities, in order to step back from them to prison. He is in an eternal warfare. The pietistic tendency of his time had seized him, too; but instead of being in earnest, and attending to his inner

<sup>1</sup> See *Studien und Kritiken*, 1844, ff IV. S. 969 ff.

man, he now imagines that he is entitled to wage war with orthodoxy.<sup>1</sup> Under the name *Christianus Democritus*, he attacks not only the orthodox theologians of his time, but also the doctrine of the Church. We saw above, (p.99 ff.), that Pietism differed in principle from the doctrine of the Church; that it changed the word of Scripture into devotion; Christ *for* us, into Christ *in* us. It is in this path that *Dippel* boldly advanced. The word of God is something altogether different from the word of Scripture. It is not by the dead letter, but directly, that the Spirit of God speaks to the spirit of man; and it is not the outward merit of Christ which saves man, but that which the Christ *in* us works. The word of Scripture, Christ's work of salvation, are thus resolved into the subjective spirit. In this subjective spirituality, *Dippel* divests of all their significance and importance, the Sacraments, the ministerial office, the visible Church and its orders, the Confession, and theological science. But although *Dippel* imparted into Christianity a circle of gnostic and theosophic ideas, yet he pretended to be a Christian; which *Edelmann* did not.

He has himself described to us part of his life.<sup>2</sup> He was the son of pious parents, enjoyed in theology the instructions of *Buddeus* in Jena, and led a blameless life

<sup>1</sup> *Klose, J. K. Dippel* (*Niedner's Zeitschrift*, 1851, S. 467 ff.) characterizes him thus: "Dippel was learned, eloquent, cheerful; his satire was sharp, and he knew well how to find out what was wrong in the Church; but he was full of conceit, and forward in his judgments. The enlightenment of the understanding, and the pulling down of prejudices, he had far more at heart than religion, and, for this reason, it was a destructive influence only which he exercised upon the Church.

<sup>2</sup> *Joh. Chr. Edelmann's* autobiography, written 1752, edited by *Dr K. R. W. Klose*, Hamb. 1851. For the doctrines and life of Edelmann is still of importance: *Pratje, Historische Nachrichten von Edelmann's Leben*, etc. Hamburg, 1755.

during the time in which he was tutor in families in Austria and Saxony. Whatever may have been the repulsive power which, on one hand, was exercised upon him by dead orthodoxy, and, on the other hand, by the sickly, and partly impure working of Pietism in Herrenhut and Wetteravia,—whatever it may have been, and however high we may estimate it, we cannot account by it for the wicked height of opposition, not only against the Lutheran Church, but against Christianity in general, to which he soon proceeded. Of some influence upon him was *Dippel* (his relation to him he states in the eighth colloquy, in his *Unschuldige Wahrheiten* and *Knuzen*), whose attacks upon Scripture he made use of almost word for word. After many restless wanderings, he at length found a settled abode at Berlin. He, too, was benefitted by the toleration of Frederick II. The king is affirmed to have said: People should not wonder at his tolerating *Edelmann* in his territories, inasmuch as he was obliged to tolerate many other fools. Where men like *Voltaire*, *d'Argens*, *de la Mettrie*, were gathering together, there were carcasses for this bird of prey also. It is true that him, at least, Frederick did not admire; he had the boldness, but not the grace of the Berlin Frenchmen; yet he did not want admirers, and, supported by them, he lived till 1767. What *Edelmann* wished was nothing new; after the manner of all adherents of *Illuminism*, he wished to reduce all positive religions to natural religion. The positive heathenish religions stand, to him, on a level with Judaism and Christianity. He is more just towards Heathenism than towards Judaism, and more just towards Judaism than towards Christianity. Every thing positive in religion is, as such, superstition. Christ was a mere man, whose chief merit consists in the struggle against superstition. What He taught, and what he was anxious

for, no one, however, may attempt to learn from the New Testament writings, inasmuch as these were forged so late as the time of Constantine. All that which the Church teaches of His divinity, of His merits, of the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, is absurd. There is no other rule of truth but reason, and it manifests its truths directly by a peculiar sense. Whatever this sense says is true.<sup>1</sup> It is this sense which perceives the world. The reality of every thing which exists, is God. In the proper sense there can, therefore, not exist any atheists, because every one who admits the reality of the world, admits also the reality of God. God is not a person,—least of all are there three persons in God. If God be the substance in all the phenomena, then it follows of itself that God cannot be thought of without the world, and hence that the world has no more had an origin than it will have an end. One may call the world the body of God, the shadow of God, the Son of God. The Spirit of God is in all which exists. It is ridiculous to ascribe inspiration to special persons only; every one ought to be a Christ, a prophet, an inspired man. The human spirit, being a breath of God, does not perish; our spirit, separated from its body by death, enters into a connection with some other body. Thus *Edelmann* taught a kind of metempsychosis. What he taught had been more thoroughly and ingeniously said in France and England; but from a German theologian, and that with such eloquent coarseness, with such a mastery in expatiating in blasphemy, such things were unheard of. But, as yet, the faith of the Church was a power in Germany. While few voices only declared publicly for *Edelmann*, there arose a whole literature of

<sup>1</sup> Pratje is certainly right, if, in this, he perceives the formal principle of *Edelmann's* doctrine S. 142.

refutations ;<sup>1</sup> and in Hamburg, and Frankfort, the executioner interposed, against his writings, with fire, in the name of a Christian magistrate.

If the teachers of the Church are to be known by their fruits, he who is able to form an impartial opinion, will be compelled to admit that the life of these adventurers does not speak for their cause. There is not much of reason in these knight-errants of reason; the confusion in their views, however, is essentially connected with the condition of the world in their time. A remarkable barometer of the change of the time is presented by the life of a similar adventurer, the notorious *Charles Frederick Bahrdt* (born 1741, died 1792). Like *Edelmann*, he has himself described his life, and he has done so partly by being, like him, urged to speak of his person, partly in order to vindicate himself, and partly from anxiety for the opinion of posterity,<sup>2</sup> for all these enlighteners imagined themselves to be men of the future.

*Bahrdt* was a most fertile writer; he enumerated 126 publications in his autobiography. The most important of these, however, have found their way into, and exerted their influence upon, the circles of the educated in general, rather than those of theology. In the theological territory, he has not produced anything either new or important,

<sup>1</sup> One may see the list of refutations, got up long before *Edelmann's* death, in *Pratje*, S. 205, ff.

<sup>2</sup> The idea which *Edelmann* entertained of his importance in after times, is quite incredible. In his biography, he writes that he would be remembered as long as there existed a leaf of modern Church History. *Bahrdt*, in the History of his Life, Opinions, and Fortunes (4 volumes, Berlin, 1791), has the following words printed below his likeness :—

Hic ego qui adauxi rationis luce coaevos,  
Centenis carus, denis a millibus ictus :  
Heu ! seriora dabunt negatas saecula grates.



and it is not so much his theory, as his life, which is characteristic of his time. His life is the tragical result of two agents; of a condition of the world which had more the appearance than the reality of the old faith, and of a character into which *Illuminism* fell as a spark of fire into powder. In the house of his father, who was Superintendent and Professor of Theology in the University of Leipzig, as well as in the College of Pforta, and in the University of Leipzig, the old Lutheran faith still prevailed. But the old discipline, at least, did no more exist in his father's house. Pforta was the seat of a low, fagging system, and of secret sins; and at Leipzig, in the lectures of his father, Bahrdt did not get acquainted with the faith of the Church in its old vigour.<sup>1</sup>

At that time the Leipzig Theological Faculty was divided by the conflict between *Crusius* and *Ernesti*, of which we have spoken on a previous occasion. *Bahrdt*, a youth of fifteen years, took up in the lectures just what pleased his fancy. In his rash way, he surrendered himself without reserve, to the views of Dr *Crusius*. The boy could not understand the philosophy, far less the theology of the man. To the former he was attracted by the clearness, to the latter by the touch of enthusiasm which is so alluring to sanguine tempers; for *Bahrdt*

<sup>1</sup> A pretty clear light is thrown upon the character, and the theological sentiments of *Bahrdt's* father, by his letters to his son (edited by Pott), Th. I., S. 275, ff. He tells plain truth to his son, but throws greater blame upon his moral, than upon his theological defects. He inculcates upon him circumspection and caution. "With all the reform in the system of doctrines, we must always look with cautious prudence to the peace and safety of the Church, and our own preservation" (S. 296). In the doctrine of Justification (S. 298), of the Lord's Supper (S. 300), he deviates from the doctrine of the Church. The manner in which he judges of *Ernesti* (S. 284), and of *Crusius* (S. 304), does not make a favourable impression.

was thoroughly sanguine. Vanity and a violent temper were, as he himself confesses, peculiar to him from his youth; and these are well-known symptoms of sanguine natures. He himself adduces a horrible instance of his violence. When his father had, upon one occasion, reproved him in severe terms, he put loaded pistols on his table with the intention of injuring him. Whatever he undertook, he brought into connection with his vanity; to the streets he offered a sight of his elegance; in disputations he showed off his fluent, though by no means elegant Latin; and the pulpit was to him an arena for rhetorical exhibitions, in which, as it appears, his parents too rejoiced more than was right. While scarcely a youth, at all events still, according to his own confession, an ignoramus, *Bahrtdt* occupied the academical chair. It was a triumph to the vain man to see his former college-fellows from Pforta sitting at his feet. While the son was declaiming, the father was listening at the door, in order, at the close, to bring to the teacher a classified list of the blunders against grammar, exegesis, and systematic theology. With violence and vanity, love of material pleasures early connected itself. *Bahrtdt* not only formed one *liaison* after another, but was by the flesh soon led to worthless women; and that came out in a very offensive manner. What a disgrace to the parents, who had hitherto been dreaming only of their son's victorious progress! According to the well-known proverb, the dissolute *Klotz*, who had hitherto only ridiculed the academic boy, associated with *Bahrtdt*, and, by his mediation, he got a call to *Erfurt*. This university, in whose beautiful arrangements her greatest son, Luther, had once rejoiced, had at that time become, by those very arrangements, a caricature. The Elector of Mayence, an enlightened ecclesiastical prince, was anxious to raise it by celebrated

names (*Wieland*), and by the infusion of young and fresh abilities. If Bahrdt had repented, he might, by the help of God, have obtained an honourable position in the new sphere. He was not deficient in talent; he was of quick perception, of great adroitness in his mode of representation, of a sharp and penetrating eye. He could easily take up and enter into everything. But the spirit of levity, which accompanied him from Leipzig to Erfurt, made him take up his office, not according to the mind of God, whose hand he recognised in this call, but according to the mind of the man through whose influence he had obtained it, viz., *Klotz*. Following his directions, he formed connections with men and circles who could not fail to drag him down still more deeply. Professor *Riedel*, who held up as genius and wit the unrestrained boldness with which he broke through all social forms, once introduced him with the words: "Here you have the rake-hell," into a circle of which *Bahrdt* himself must confess that it was unequalled in impudence and licentiousness. Of even a noble nature the spirit of frivolous lust may take hold in an evil hour, but *Bahrdt* was of a low nature. He was unfit for any true idea, for any enthusiasm, for any self-denying sacrifice—a worthy representative of the utilitarian principle of his time. "Never," says he of himself, "have I loved with passion." In his marriage projects, he was always guided by the desire of obtaining a large fortune. But as it happens to many who are anxious to get rich, so it happened to him also; he did not find what he was seeking; but here also God made good what *Bahrdt* had made evil. He gave to Bahrdt what he had not sought, viz., a virtuous woman. To obtain money was the main impulse in every book which he wrote; and this he declares as openly, as if it were nothing but a matter of course. Such motives

even lay at the foundation of the dedications of his writings. After he had given up this means of making money (so he himself tells us), because it never had the wished-for success, he at length succeeded in obtaining for the dedication of his "*Neueste Offenbarungen*" (Newest Revelations) a chest of old *Steinwein*<sup>1</sup> from the Prince-Bishop of Wurzburg, whom, through some mediator, he had persuaded that he was considering some important steps, by which the prelate could only understand his joining the Roman Church. A man so thoroughly frivolous, low, and superficial, could, in a former age, have dragged on the doctrine of the Church, just as many an orthodox had done; but in the age of *Illuminism* it was not only permitted, but considered a matter of honour to allow one's own heart and understanding to give their opinion.

From *Crusius*, Bahrdt went over to *Ernesti*. A new light, so he confesses himself, rose upon him, viz., the conviction that Scripture must be explained differently from what hitherto theology had done. But this conviction does not as yet lead him to a rupture with the doctrine of the Church. He, at that time, only thought that the doctrine of the Church must be placed on a different foundation. "From that very hour I dismissed my *Crusius*. I no longer cared about his warnings against the *letter* (so he called philology). I now studied with indefatigable industry, history and languages. And although I continued to hold by the fundamental articles of our system, yet there was now laid within me the immoveable foundation of unbelief, and my conversion was accomplished. For, a man who has once resolved to test the theology of the Church, and to bring it to the touch-

<sup>1</sup> A superior Franconian wine.

stone of reason and philology, *can* no longer continue in that creed.”<sup>1</sup> In Erfurt it was soon known that the young philosopher expressed in his lectures free opinions on Scripture, the symbolical books, the doctrine of original sin, etc. The ministry consulted the theological faculties of Wittenberg and Göttingen about *Bahrds* mode of teaching. But in a formal point of view he was right; and considering what was already at that time going on in the Church, not much could be said against the position which he took up. His position at that time was the same as that of those theologians of transition, of whom we have spoken *supra*, of *Töllner*, *Heilmann*, *Miller*, *Michaelis*, *Seiler*, and others. It was in the sense of this mongrel school, about the tenableness of which he afterwards judged very correctly, that he began his “Biblical system of doctrine,” 1768. Notwithstanding this conviction, he might have continued to teach without obstruction, if, by his bold, provoking, and scoffing manner, the stricter school had not been driven into opposition. He had to consider it as a very fortunate circumstance, that a call to a Professorship of Theology in Giessen delivered him from the conflict in Erfurt. The reputation of being a dangerous Neologist had gone before him; but, by a cleverly calculated pulpit eloquence he knew how to dissipate it. “Dr Bechtold,” so he tells us (*Leben* ii., S. 146) “had given me to understand that my orthodoxy was rather suspected by the congregation. This induced me to give to the sermon such an aspect as would destroy this suspicion. And it is well known what is required for such a purpose. You need only to use very frequently, *à la Lavater*, the name of Jesus, and the great mass will be convinced that you teach sound Christianity.” In

<sup>1</sup> *Leben*, I. S. 279.



Giessen, *Bahrđt* became more and more an epicurean man of the world, who, without being intellectually idle, yet, with tobacco, wine, gambling, merry parties, equipages, a splendid house, etc., made life as charming to himself as possible ; but the more he became at home in the world, the more he became a stranger to the doctrine of the Church. " I came to Giessen," he says (*Leben*, II., S. 199) as yet very orthodox. My belief in the divinity of the Scriptures, in the direct mission of Jesus, in His miraculous history, in the Trinity, in the gifts of grace, in natural corruption, in justification of the sinner by laying hold of the merit of Christ, and especially in the whole theory of satisfaction, seemed to be immoveable. It was only the manner in which three persons were to be in one God, which had engaged my reason. I had only explained to myself a little better the work of the Holy Spirit, so as not to exclude man's activity. I had limited a little the idea of original sin ; and in the doctrine of the atonement and justification, I had endeavoured to uphold the value of virtue, and had cleared myself from the error that God, in His grace, should not pay any regard at all to human virtuous zeal. That in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper I was more Reformed than Lutheran, will be supposed as a matter of course." The first doctrine which *Bahrđt* gave up was the doctrine of the Trinity ; Christ became to him a God-inspired man, and the Holy Spirit a mere power. He clung for a long time to the doctrine of the atonement ; there was too much in Scripture which seemed to him to favour it. He greatly rejoiced, however, at the discovery that that which the Church taught regarding the merit of Christ, the laying hold of it, His vicarious sufferings, imputation, etc., was not biblical. But then a naturalistic theologian, who passed through Giessen, pointed out to him that the sacrificial death of

Christ did not give any comfort which could not be afforded equally by confidence in an all-loving God, and thus succeeded in destroying *Bahrds* belief in the satisfaction of Christ. One is quite astonished that, upon such superficial argumentation (see *Leben*, II., S. 210, ff.), *Bahrds* gave up the doctrine. With this conclusion of his, Scripture must, of course, agree, whether it would or not; and now *Bahrds* most urgent business was to proclaim to the world this great discovery. Yet fear of his enemies prevented him from publishing the book. From a desire to make Scripture of no avail to orthodoxy (as *Bahrds* expresses himself), proceeded his translation of the New Testament.<sup>1</sup> This translation called forth Göthe's well known satire. But it was even more than a sin against good taste. *Göze*, in a special pamphlet, declared it to be blasphemy. This charge was eagerly laid hold of by the orthodox opponents of *Bahrds* in Giessen, at the head of which was *Benner*, the senior of the Theological Faculty. Already a storm was gathering against him, when *Herr von Salis-Marschlinz* of the canton of the Grison, asked whether he would not undertake the direction of the newly established Philanthropinum in Marschlinz. *Bahrds* declared his readiness. Freed from the ecclesiastical barriers with which the universities were still surrounded, he now entered upon the new soil of *Illuminism*. *Basedow*, the originator and master of these institutions, gave him the preliminary consecration for this new vocation. With the spirit of Utilitarianism which prevailed in these Philanthropina, it was only too much in harmony that the leaders of them did not lose sight of their own advantage. *Basedow* has already been

<sup>1</sup> " *Die neusten Offenbarungen Gottes in Briefen und Erzählungen* " (The Newest Revelations of God in Letters and Tales) 1772.

brought before us in this point of view ; *Herr von Salis* was a refined money speculator ; and *Bahrdt* never lost sight of his own advantage. In the advertisements and prospectuses, humanism, etc., was much spoken of, but in deed and in truth, little found. The philanthropinum of *Marschlinz* was a comedy, or rather a tragedy, at which actors and public were equally ill off ; and the undertaker and director only wished to earn. For, to see that such humbug could not maintain its existence, the wise man was not wise enough. *Bahrdt* saved himself in sufficient time before its fall ; he received a call as Superintendent to Dürkheim, on the Hardt. That was one of the numerous miniature principalities into which the holy Roman empire had been dissolved previous to its fall ; at its head were a well-meaning but weak prince (*Leiningen-Dachsburg*), mistresses, an intriguer in the back ground, etc., in short, everything just as a novel of the last century demanded. *Bahrdt* had now, from the educational sphere, to fall back upon theology ; and for that he did not lack either energy or versatility. But the question was, what was he to preach ? To bring his neological thoughts, as they were lying in his mind, before the people, was a step for which he did not think them sufficiently prepared—and, what in his case will say more, neither did he think his own position to be sufficiently secure. It appeared to him to be most advisable to give utterance to principles, which, of themselves, must lead to the overthrow of the faith of the Church, but to abstain from direct attacks. He preached moral sermons, and found an abundant supply of thoughts in the motives of our actions. Then, on the part of the prince, the thought was suggested to him to establish a Philanthropinum in the princely Castle of Heidesheim. Rash and inconsiderate as he was, he entertained the thought with all

ardour. In vain was the experience which he had acquired at Marschlinz. The practical talents which lay dormant in him (he had, at school, been an adept at hair-dressing; in Erfurt a renowned cook) urged him on; money and renown allured him. An inexhaustible schemer, and clever in single things, Bahrdt was yet, upon the whole, a most unpractical man. "You have," writes one of his favourites, "all the dispositions for a scholar, but none for a worldly wise man. God grant that you may not again fall upon some new scheme; all which you have hitherto planned have failed." (*Briefe*, iii. S. 6). After the advertisement was issued, not a few teachers came forward, to the great joy of Bahrdt; and just as they offered themselves, our practical man took them, and afterwards wondered that almost none of them were efficient. We shall believe, that, with the greatest expenditure of strength, he took into his hands the whole, as well as the minutest details; but that which these Philanthropina intended to impart to mankind, viz., morals and order, was not to be imparted to this Philanthropinum; and, owing to his many occupations, it never occurred to *Bahrdt* to ask himself whether they were in him. In order to put an end to his pecuniary embarrassments, Bahrdt adopted the strange idea of undertaking a journey to England and Holland in order to obtain pupils. With not fully three florins in his pocket, he set out, trusting, as he said, in Providence. He, of course, came into great difficulties; was upon one occasion distressed by hunger, but gained his object. When he joyfully hastened home, he learned that the Imperial Aulic Council had issued a sentence which deposed him from his offices, and imposed upon him the obligation of either retracting his errors, or of submitting to banishment from the German Empire. (*Briefe*, ii. S. 37, ff.)

By the advice of a false friend, he abandoned his Philanthropinum and office of Superintendent, and fled, with the greatest haste, to Prussia, the land of *Illuminism* (1779). Considering the state in which Bahrdr's affairs were at Heidesheim, he must have regarded it as a very fortunate event that the Emperor expelled him. To the runaway, his most faithful friend *Heres*, wrote: "Seek to get rid of a habit which with you has certainly become a vice; because, irrespective of Christianity, you have, as a husband, bound yourself to another line of conduct (these words allow us to think only of adultery). And this very thing would have ruined you, even if the Emperor had let you alone." (*Briefe* III., S. 7.) In agreement with *Teller*, Bahrdr resolved upon going to *Halle*. The intelligence that Bahrdr had arrived, was a great event for Halle. But, contrary to all expectation, Bahrdr was very coolly received by the learned men of that place. The popular philosopher, *Eberhard*, handed to him from time to time relief, which proceeded from the Berlin Illuminists, but behaved like a patron of high rank. None of the members of the theological faculty returned his visits. Bahrdr had come to Halle in the expectation of finding there a sphere of labour as a teacher of theology, or, at all events of philosophy, and the minister, *Zedlitz* was by no means unfavourable to his views.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Most characteristic of *Zedlitz* and *Bahrdr* is the letter of the former (*Briefe*, ii. S. 67), "Believe me," he writes among other things, "that I recognise and value liberty of conscience, but have at the same time too high an esteem for it, even to allow restlessness and mere combativeness to escape under its name. Your own good understanding now surely tells you much more than any request can, that at present you must be most cautious in your walk, in order that people may not be induced to believe that your free mode of thinking has originated more from the desires of your heart, than from the conviction of your understanding."



But the theological faculty, with *Semler* at its head, entered a most violent protest. "Our vocation," the faculty declared, "demands not only that we should prevent the dissemination of directly irreligious opinions, but also that we should watch over the doctrines which are contained in Holy Scripture, and, in conformity with it, in the Augsburg Confession of Faith."<sup>1</sup> Thus spoke a faculty at the head of which *Semler* stood. Here, that which we have designated above as the one great agent of the life of Bahr<sup>h</sup>dt, reaches its highest point,—that point in which the tragical feature of this life lies. Every where, in Erfurt, in Giessen, in Dürkheim, in Halle, Bahr<sup>h</sup>dt had to yield to the power of the traditional. In *Knuzen's* age, that would have been a well-merited fate; but at present, even the representatives of the traditional had too much of Bahr<sup>h</sup>dt in them to have been entitled to interfere against Bahr<sup>h</sup>dt. In Erfurt and Giessen, the faith of the Church had been more or less the pretext for personal opposition. Under the Emperor of *Illuminism*, that sentence of the Imperial Aulic Council could not make any impression upon Bahr<sup>h</sup>dt. And now, to crown the whole, *Semler's* opposition:

*Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?*

Bahr<sup>h</sup>dt was fully entitled to write against *Semler*, whose productions had contributed to destroy in him the last remnant of the faith of the Church: "A man like *Semler*, the first of the authors of *Illuminism* in Germany, should have been the last man to have told, in the face of enlightened Zedlitz, the absurdity that he was called to watch over the doctrines of the Augsburg Confession" (*Leben*, IV. S. 61). Bahr<sup>h</sup>dt, however, delivered lectures on philosophy, philology, ethics, and rhetoric, a

<sup>1</sup> *Semler's Leben*, I. S. 12.

part of which obtained great applause. He was not slack in his solicitations for offices. Minister *Zedlitz* writes to him: "The manner in which you torment me, passes all conception. I believe I must rid myself of you by sincerely telling you my mind. For, from the equery up to the professor ordinarius matheseos, or professor of anatomy, scarcely a place can be vacant without your asking it."<sup>1</sup> Even for the sake of his daily bread he was obliged to write. His clear, fluent, insinuating style, fitted him for a popular writer on the side of *Illuminism*. For all that he had hitherto cleared away in the doctrine of the Church, he had adduced arguments from Scripture, in the belief that the contents of Scripture were divine truth. As yet he considered Christ to be a divine prophet. Then *Eberhard*, the apologist of Socrates, raised in him the idea that Christ might have learned and composed "His excellent system and doctrines from the writings of the wise men of Greece." And, when once the educationist *Trapp*, loudly laughing, asked him: "Aye, aye, the reasonable *Bahrđtus* still believes in revelation?" "I felt," says Bahrđt, "ashamed; the death-hour of my faith had struck" (*Leben*, iv. S. 114). It was *Semler's* critical writings that brought him to the knowledge that Scripture was a purely human book. "I now," he says (*Leben*, iv. S. 119) "considered revelation as a common and natural event of Providence. I regarded Moses and Jesus just as I did Confucius, Luther, Semler, and myself, as instruments of Providence. I was convinced that these and similar men had drawn from the source of reason only." It was in this sense that he treated the evangelical history in his "*Briefe*

<sup>1</sup> *Briefe*, iii. S. 54. On the other hand Bahrđt (*Geschichte meiner Gefangenschaft*, S. 21), gives to himself the testimony: "Soliciting was never my business."

*über die Bibel im Volkstone*" (1782) and "*Ausführung des Plans und Zweckes Jesu in Briefen*" (1784). The evangelical history is in his hands changed into a sentimental novel, in which, at first, the freshness of style, and the bold strokes at history engage the attention, but which, at last, since the same motives ever return, disappears in sand. Bahrdt has thus become a complete disciple of Naturalism; and, so he called himself. "The basis of all religion," so he declared in his much read book, *System der moralischen Religion* (1787) is morals." Strange! that a man should offer himself to humanity as a teacher of morality who, in his walk, more and more denied its principles. That defect which, to speak with Semler, was notorious in him, was levity. He had been so often told that, that he was not only obliged to confess it to himself, but could not even well omit mentioning it in his characteristics of himself.

"As levity is with me a disease of which I am, and have been for many years conscious, I am certainly best enabled to describe the disease as to its phenomena and causes, such, at least, as it is in me. My levity is an idiosyncrasy, a quickness of my spirit, which has its foundation in my individual constitution, and in consequence of which I take up the first light in which any object appears to my mind, and continue to consider it in the same light." Even this confession bears witness to his levity. It is closely connected with Bahrdt's natural disposition, that he is anxious to trace back the phenomena of intellectual and spiritual life to physical causes. Just as he derived the pietistic tendency of his friend *Pallmann* from his (Pallmann's) thick blood (*Leben*, I. S. 313); so, as regards himself, he finds the cause of his levity in an unhealthy state of his constitution. We need not, therefore, wonder that he was tormented with fatalism. Bahrdt

got older ; but his levity increased. His mental energy decreased ; bodily suffering came on in addition ; and yet the whole strength of a man was required for maintaining his outward position. Thus, he who frequently visited the drinking houses in and around Halle, was struck with the idea of establishing an inn in a vineyard near Halle. This rash project only contributed, of course, to the increase of his levity. His relation to a servant girl who attended to the inn, gave general offence, just as his unhappy wife was the object of general sympathy. The deeper he sank, the bolder were the schemes which he hatched ; and wealth and honour were the objects of all of them. It was at the time of Wöllner's religious edict, (see p. 60). Calculating upon the movement called forth by this reactionary attempt in the circles of *Illuminism*, Bahrdt, an old free-mason (and, as it appears, in connection with the Leipzig bookseller *Degenhard Pott*) formed the scheme of the so-called German Union (see p. 61), whose aim it was "to carry out the great object of the sublime founder of Christianity, viz. the enlightenment of mankind, and the dethroning of superstition and fanaticism." If we review the plan of this "Union," the documents of which are fully before us, there cannot be any doubt that the whole was a net of speculations and mystifications by Bahrdt ; and in this net a great many notable Germans were caught by their blind desire for light. Two pamphlets, expressing the opinions of this propaganda of opposition, appeared : "A Commentary upon the Religious Edict," and "The Religious Edict, a Comedy in five Acts" (1787). The rumours which were spreading about the dangerous tendencies of the German Union, and the strong suspicion that Bahrdt was the author of these pamphlets, caused a judicial inquiry to be made. The proceedings of the Prussian authorities,

especially the sentence of the *Kammergericht*<sup>1</sup> with its sharp, thorough, and, withal, liberal argumentation, make a most beneficial impression, especially when compared with the sentence of the Imperial Aulic Council, formerly mentioned. The sentence of the *Kammergericht*, which inflicted upon him a two years' imprisonment in a fortress, was mitigated by the king to a twelvemonth's imprisonment. There Bahrdt suffered any thing but want; the state of his health improved. But even here, Bahrdt did not find time for repentance. He returned to Halle altogether unchanged; but his hour was soon to come. He died of a bad disease, which marked his body with its disgusting signs (1792).

In thus more minutely reviewing the life of this man, we do not think that we have lost sight of our intention of picturing that period in outline. In order to understand an age, it is necessary to consider it from one point; and Bahrdt's life which lies before us, so exposed as to all its innermost motives, is, better than any other, fitted for that purpose. While in Bahrdt, Illuminism in its French form appeared on the territory of Theology, a blow, in the direction of the strongest English Theism, was struck in the eighth decade of that century. From 1774 to 1778, *Lessing* published seven fragments from a larger work, which defended the right of Theism, attacked the Church's doctrine of inspiration, and subjected the biblical history to a bold criticism. It is proven that the author of this work is the Hamburg Professor *Samuel Hermann Reimarus*, (died 1768), and the manuscript of it, under the title: "Vindication of the rational worshippers of God,"<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The higher judicial court of Prussia.

<sup>2</sup> *Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes.* It is from this manuscript that *Dr Klose* got the work reprinted in *Niedner's Journal* for 1850.



is kept in the Hamburg Town library. The tendency of this work is to resolve Scripture and the doctrine of the Church into theistic rationalism. The manner in which he arrived at such conclusions, *Reimarus* himself states in the introduction to the work. By his parents he had been faithfully instructed in Christianity, yea, had been destined to be a theologian. But then the thought had impressed itself upon his mind, that Scripture after all spoke so very indistinctly and loosely of what, in the symbolical books of the Church, and in the systems of divinity, was so minutely defined and fixed. If these symbolical books and systems were of such consequence, why had God not expressed Himself more distinctly in Scripture? And many things in these symbols and systems—especially the Trinity—had become more and more unintelligible to him. But he could not stop with the omission of the Trinity from his views. Very soon he became unable to persuade himself that God could abandon to destruction ninety-nine parts of mankind who, without any fault of theirs, did not know any thing of Jesus Christ. After having thus estranged himself from the doctrine of the Church, he had been disgusted with a large portion of the history of the Old and New Testaments. It had been impossible for him to devote himself to Theology with such doubts; and, involved in other studies, he had therefore let these questions alone. But he could not remain for any length of time in this undecided state. He had been thinking, writing, etc., until the materials had become a whole, which he offered in this book. But he would not publish his work; for that, the time was not yet prepared; but it would come. *Lessing's* opinion of these fragments is, in the main, correct: "They are written with the utmost frankness, but, at the same time, with the utmost earnestness. The

author never forgets his dignity; levity does not seem to have been a fault of his; and nowhere does he allow himself to rail or joke. He is a true, deliberate German in his style, as well as in his views. He tells his opinion in a straight-forward manner, and despises all those little resources for taking by surprise the applause of his readers." Acute understanding, moral earnestness, a thorough-going treatment cannot be denied to the author of these fragments, and characterize the German. The thought which forms the foundation of the whole investigation, and which he advances in ever new variety, is this: that the Christian's conviction of the truth of his religion is of no greater value than the convictions of the Mahometan and Jew, unless it be the result of an unprejudiced examination by reason. The ways in which Christianity in its present form acquires a conviction of its truth are altogether objectionable: "That is not the right way; first, to baptize the children while yet in the cradle, *par force* to be Christians, and in doing so to suppose in them Christian faith, and a desire after baptism; *then*, before reason can be exercised, to educate them, without any reasonable religion, into a blind belief in the Bible and its doctrines, and deeply to impress such belief upon their tender minds by means of fear and hope, heaven and hell; but, *finally*, when the years of discretion, and for the examination of faith have come, carefully to warn them against the use of their blind and corrupt reason, and to demand of them that, first of all, they should bring their reason under captivity to the obedience of that faith which had been instilled into them by childish prejudice merely;—that indeed is choking all reason, and reasonable religion in man" (see *Niedner's Journal*, 1850, S. 575). Every child should first be instructed in the general truths of reason; it may afterwards decide for itself. By

“reason,” the Fragmentist understands nothing else than the principle of *clearness*, as it had been worked out by the schools of Leibnitz and Wolff. He says: “I think that the fundamental principles of reason can be expressed in the two propositions; every thing is that which it is; a thing cannot, at the same time, be, and not be;—hence in the *principia identitatis et contradictionis*” (l. c. S. 579). It may be that reason comes to a territory which goes beyond its reach—to revelations and mysteries—but nothing which is to be received into the conviction must be against reason (l. c. S. 583). At all events, however, reason alone must decide as to what religion one is to adopt. According to its principle, that that which contradicts itself cannot be true, reason must give the verdict that Christianity does not rest on a revelation; for all the facts of the Old and New Testament which are brought forward in proof of it, are historically impossible. The Fragmentist especially, and with great ingenuity, lays open the contradictions in the accounts of Christ’s resurrection. Christ declared Himself to be the Messiah. In so doing, He intended nothing else but the restitution of the Jewish State. Whatever in the gospels does not harmonize with this plan, has been inserted into His life by the disciples, from their later convictions. Christ was far from wishing to abolish the Jewish law; He denounced the external view of it only. With this plan of Christ, John the Baptist agreed; and both, according to agreement, worked into each other’s hands. The execution of His plans was by Christ fixed for the high festival. Triumphantly He entered Jerusalem, excited the masses by bold speeches against their superiors, and exercised authority in the temple. But instead of a throne, He found the cross, and repented in dying, by declaring Himself to be forsaken of God. His disciples

now understood, in a spiritual sense, the doctrine of the kingdom, and represented the life and doctrine of their Master accordingly. Now, from these results, one would indeed imagine that the Fragmentist knows only a negative relation of his Rationalism to Christianity ; but he, nevertheless, again represents Christ as a hero of reason, and speaks with approbation of the apostles and the oldest fathers ; he by no means wishes to secede from the Church with those who share in his opinions. “ Yes, yes,” so people will say, “ from that nothing but pure Theism will result—the evil of all evils for Christianity—upon which our modern free thinkers are bent with all their might, and which just amounts to doing away with Christianity altogether. I confess that *Theism is a great evil for Christianity* ; and although I put it last, I by no means consider it to be the least. The question, however, only is : whether such mischief is not mainly called forth and increased by the suppression of the reasonable religion. If our theologians were to soften down their hard doctrines, and would gradually steer towards common sense, the Christian religion could well consist with natural religion ; and no one would so easily have any cause for denying his faith, and embracing Theism. They then could and must yield, because Christ Himself, as their Master, when we regard Him as a teacher of all men, has taught nothing but intelligible, practical truths, and has placed in them the essence of religion ; and because the apostles cannot be acquitted of human errors and intentions, in as much as, after the death of their Master, and with a view to His worship and apotheosis, they constructed a system of doctrines which is arranged according to Jewish notions of the Messiah. Let us then, in the first instance, give up the hard doctrine of the Theopneustia of the apostles in all their discourses, writings,



and actions ; and let us take out of their system that which is good, which applies to all men, and will serve for the improvement of their intellect and will ; for it is quite impossible that all the nations of the human race should be brought to a conviction and belief in the apostolic semi-Judaic system. Man is not made for a religion which is based on facts, and these, such as are said to have happened in a corner of the earth, and imply a great knowledge of languages, criticism, history, antiquities, and logic. If, with the view of making Christianity a general religion for all mankind, the theologians would, as well as possible, interpret and guide the apostolic system, not many Theists would remain ; for it cannot be denied, that not only Christ's doctrines, but also those of the apostles, contain very much that is good. The effect of such mitigated, rational Christianity, we have before us in the Anglican Church, where, notwithstanding the great liberty in thinking and writing, Theism does, nevertheless, not increase and prevail, or supersede Christianity and the Episcopal Church, because as much scope is granted to reason as it has a right to demand" (l. c. S. 628, ff). The meaning of this rather long and characteristic effusion, is shortly this: The rationalists will remain Christians, if the Christians will become rationalists.

The *Fragments* effected what, according to the intention of their editor, they were expected to do. They put in motion the theology of the age. From the general opposition which they called forth, it was to be seen that the theology of the age did not wish for a rationalism which would radically do away with Scripture and the doctrine of the Church ; but it was at the same time evident, that the old stand-point of the Church was no more in strength. The most important voices which



were raised against the Fragmentist (*Döderlein, Semler, Less, Jerusalem*), belonged to that mediating theology, which made concessions, greater or less, to Illuminism. Such was, as Lessing himself says, the prevailing tendency. "The pulpits now resound with nothing but the intimate union between reason and faith. Faith has become reason confirmed by signs and miracles, and reason has become reasoning faith. The whole of revealed religion is now nothing else than a renewed sanction of the religion of reason. Mysteries either do not exist at all, or, if they do, it is quite the same whether the Christian connects them with this or that notion, or with none at all." In this mediating theology, Lessing did not see any consistency; in this Christianity of reason, he saw neither reason nor Christianity. He was not in favour of orthodoxy; yet it inspired him with greater respect than that modern theology. "What," so he says, "what else is this modern theology when compared with orthodoxy, than dung water with clear water? With orthodoxy we had, thanks to God, pretty much settled; between it and philosophy, a barrier had been erected, behind which each of these could walk in its own way without molesting the other. But what is it that they are now doing? They pull down this barrier, and under the pretext of making us rational Christians, they make us most irrational philosophers. In this we agree, that our old religious system is false, but I should not like to say with you (Lessing writes to his brother), that it is a patch-work, got up by bunglers and semi-philosophers. I do not know of anything in the world in which human ingenuity had more shown and exercised itself, than in it. A patch-work by bunglers and semi-philosophers is that religious system which they would put in the place of the old one, and, in doing so, would pre-

tend to far more rational philosophy than the old one claims."

But what was it that Lessing desired? We have already become acquainted with him as a man who was anxious not so much for established truth, as for striving after truth,—as a man who did not like to think *δογματικῶς*, but *γυμναστικῶς*. When he edited the *Fragments*, it was the agitation called forth by them which was his object. He by no means held the stand-point of the *Fragments*. In the notes with which he accompanied them, he often declared against their conclusions. But he thought himself called upon, in a most impressive manner, to direct the attention of the theologians of his time, to the weakness, inconsistencies, and defects of their evidences of, and apologies for, Christianity. It was by this position that the theologians were offended. *Semler* compared it to the conduct of an Englishman who set on fire the house of his neighbour in order to make him cautious, and keep the fire-engines of the town in practice. But it was especially *Göze* who could not pardon Lessing for having published attacks on Christianity, which could not fail to endanger many souls, and who declared the position occupied by him to be most perilous. For, Lessing maintained from the very outset that, even supposing the *Fragmentist* to be right, Christianity was not thereby endangered. "The letter," he said, "is not the spirit, and the Bible is not religion. Consequently objections against the letter as well as against the Bible are not precisely objections against the spirit and religion. For the Bible evidently contains more than belongs to religion; and it is a mere supposition that in this additional matter which it contains, it must be equally infallible. Moreover, religion existed before there was a Bible. Christianity existed before evangelists and apostles had

written. How much soever, therefore, may depend upon those Scriptures, it is not possible that the whole truth of the Christian religion should depend upon them. Since there existed a period in which it was already so far spread, in which it had already taken hold of so many souls, and in which, nevertheless, not one letter was written of that which has come down to us; it must be possible also that everything which evangelists and apostles have written might be lost again, and yet the religion taught by them stand. The Christian religion is not true because evangelists and apostles taught it; but they taught it because it is true. It is from their internal truth that all written documents must be explained, and all the written documents cannot give it internal truth when it has none" (*Lessing's works*, edited by *Lachmann*, X. S. 10). These propositions were based upon the conviction that the religion of Christ—which he distinguished from the Christian religion as that religion which Christ had taught—was a life immediately implanted and maintained in our heart, which manifested itself in love, and in its happiness was its own guarantee, and which would neither stand nor fall with the facts of the gospel. "Although I may not have the slightest objection to the facts of the gospel, this is not of the slightest consequence for my religious convictions. Although, historically, I may have nothing to object to Christ's having even risen from the dead, must I for that reason accept it as true that this very risen Christ was the Son of God?" (l. c. S. 36.) Truths of religion have nothing to do with facts of history. If, then, such be the relation of religion to evangelical history, it follows that it is not bound to the scriptural testimony of evangelical history.—Scripture stands in the same relation to the Church, as the plan of a large building to the building itself.

It would be ridiculous if, at a conflagration, people were first of all to save the *plan*; but just as ridiculous is it to fear any danger to Christianity from an attack upon Scripture. That Christianity does not depend upon Scripture follows from the circumstance, that Christianity existed long before any Scripture could be thought of, and that the Church of the first four centuries did not see in Scripture the fountain of Christian faith, but in the rule of faith. Those Scriptures which arose occasionally only, and were collected into a canon only at a late period, contain very many things which do not belong to faith. "What other, even good Lutheran divines, have asserted of whole books of the Bible, I surely may as well assert of single facts in this or that book. At least one must be a Rabbin or a Homilist in order to discover a possibility, or a play upon words, by which the Hajemim of Ana, the Crethi and Plethi of David, the cloak which Paul left behind in Troas, and a hundred other things of that kind, can be brought into any relation to religion." (See l. c. S. 137.) The orthodox doctrine of inspiration is untenable, even if this be granted, but still more irreconcilable is it with the undeniable fact, that Scripture contradicts itself in essential points. In his "Duplik" *Lessing* proved, in reference to the history of the resurrection, that it contains irreconcilable contradictions; but it does not follow from this circumstance that the resurrection is unhistorical. "Who has ever ventured to draw the same inference in profane history? If Livy, Polybius, Dionysius, and Tacitus relate the very same event, it may be the very same battle, the very same siege, each one differing so much in the details, that those of the one completely give the lie to those of the other, has any one, for that reason, ever denied the event itself in which they agree?" (See l. c. S. 51.)



As he proved in an essay among his posthumous works (see *Lachmann's* edition of *Lessing's* works, XI. S. 495), Lessing considered the synoptical gospels to be revisions of an Hebrew original gospel.

Such are the thoughts which Lessing in his theological polemical writings, especially against *Göze*, has either advanced, or (as we learn from his posthumous works) was to advance against others, such as *Walch*, *Semler*, *Silberschlag*. That the *Fragments* would meet with opposition, Lessing not only foresaw, but intended even for his own satisfaction. More unexpected by him seems to have been the opposition which his own views raised. Certain it is that Lessing advanced views with which the theology of that period had not yet grappled. But the distinction which he made between the internal religion, and the facts of salvation, his lowering the faith *in* Jesus into the faith *of* Jesus, was the extinction of Christianity, and with the authority of which he divested the word of Scripture, the foundation of Protestantism fell. To grant Lessing's propositions, was virtually to give up Christianity and Protestantism; and that he could not expect of the theologians of his time. Very few indeed of those who admire Lessing's polemics, have had the external and internal means of being able impartially to estimate *Göze's* stand-point. He was a learned and ingenious man, earnestly standing in the faith of the Church, who, it is true, had a zeal, but not according to knowledge, and who had not the ability of putting himself into, and sympathizing with, the views of his adversary. One must consider that the language of him who has much to lose is different from that of him who is proceeding to make conquests by his dialectics. Lessing had in his favour the superiority of his genius, the versatility of his style, the charm which destruction holds out, the spirit of the



time, yea, even a certain appearance of martyrdom with which he surrounded himself. Rich means for striving after truth were given to him; but Christianity is not a striving after truth, but possession of the truth, and that firm position Lessing refused to occupy. He was not in earnest with tradition, to which he appealed; nor with the idea of inspiration, to which he allowed a place in his education of mankind. We shall not find too much fault with him that he had a low opinion of theology; but this bad opinion was connected with a low opinion of every thing positive. When he was about to represent naturalism from his old pulpit (as he calls the stage) in his "Nathan," he wrote to his brother: "I should not like indeed that the real subject of my play to be published, were to be known too early; but yet if you wish to know it, see the *Decameron of Boccacio* (I. 3, *Melchizedick Giudeo*). I think I have invented a very interesting episode for it, so that all shall read very well, and I shall certainly thereby serve a worse trick to the theologians than I could do by ten Fragments." (*Lachm.* ed. XII. S. 510.) "Nathan" was the triumph of the men of *Illuminism*, especially of *Moses Mendelssohn* who had very special reasons for thinking that he was represented in the wise Jew. Mendelssohn looked up to Lessing as the genius of *Illuminism*, and the manner in which Mendelssohn treated the place in his house where Lessing's bust was standing, may almost be called a worship. Then the old Popular Philosopher learned from the daughter of the Fragmentist, *Elise Reimarus*, that Lessing, at the close of his life, had been an adherent of Spinoza. This intelligence was from *Jacobi*. That was surprising to *Mendelssohn*. "If Lessing was able absolutely, and without all further limitation, to declare for the system of any man, he was at that time no more with

himself, or he was in a strange humour to make a paradoxical assertion which, in a serious hour, he himself again rejected. But if Lessing, perhaps, said, ‘Dear brother, Spinoza who has been decried so much, may in many points have seen farther than all those criers who have become heroes by him; in his Ethics especially, excellent things are contained—better things perhaps than in many an orthodox system of morals; his system is not so absurd as people believe,’—well, then, Mendelssohn will be satisfied.” (Jacobi’s works, IV. 1, S. 44.) But according to Jacobi’s testimony, Lessing had not spoken thus. Jacobi had visited Lessing in Wolfenbüttel in the summer of 1780. Engaged in writing letters, Jacobi handed to him, when he entered, his portfolio to amuse himself in the meanwhile; and when Lessing desired to read still more, he gave him a paper containing *Goethe’s Prometheus*. “You have,” said Jacobi, “given so much offence; so you may now take one for once.” “I have,” answered Lessing, after having read the poem, “not taken any offence. I had that long ago from the first hand.” ‘You know the poem?’ “The poem I never read, but I find it good.” ‘In its way, I too, else I should not have shewn it to you.’ “That’s not what I am speaking of; I mean the point of view from which the poem is conceived, that is my own point of view. . . . The orthodox notions about the Deity are no more for me; I cannot relish them. “Εν καὶ πᾶν. I don’t know anything else. That is also the drift of the poem, and, I must confess, I like it much.” ‘Then you would be pretty much at one with Spinoza.’ “If I am to name myself after any one, I don’t know any other.” ‘Spinoza is good enough for me, but yet it is a poor salvation which we find in his name.’ “Yes, you are right . . . and yet . . .

Do you know any thing better?" The conversation was continued next day: "I have come," began Lessing, "to speak to you about my *Εν καὶ πᾶσι*; you got alarmed yesterday." 'You surprised me, and I felt my confusion; yet it was not terror. It was indeed contrary to my expectation to find in you a Spinozist or Pantheist, and still more was I surprised that you declared it to me in a manner so sudden and off-hand. I had come chiefly with the intention of obtaining aid from you against Spinoza.' "You thus know him then?" 'I believe I know him as only few can have done.' "Then there is no help for you; rather become his friend altogether. There is no other philosophy than that of Spinoza." 'That may be true; for the determinist, to be consistent, must become a fatalist; all the rest then follows of itself.' "I perceive that we understand one another; but I am the more anxious to hear from you what you consider to be the *spirit* of Spinozism—I mean that spirit which had taken possession of Spinoza himself." Jacobi now enters more particularly into the centre of the system. "As regards our *credo*," so Lessing winds up, "we shall thus not quarrel." 'That we shall not do at any rate; but my *credo* does not stand in Spinoza. I believe in a *rational personal cause of the world*.' "So much the better," replied Lessing, "I shall thus hear something altogether new." 'Don't rejoice too much in the prospect. I get myself by a *salto mortale* out of this difficulty, and you did not use to find much pleasure in this 'head over heels.' ' Jacobi then set forth how personal life was not consistent with Spinoza's system. "I understand," replied Lessing, "you would like to have your will free." 'I don't desire any free will, and in general I am not in the least frightened by what you were just saying.' Jacobi now showed that

Spinoza's substance had no personal life, without the things, no personality. Lessing: "Very well; but according to what notions do you then conceive of your personal extra-mundane deity? According to the notions of *Leibnitz*, perhaps? I fear that he himself was, at heart at least, a Spinozist." "Do you speak in earnest?" "Are you in earnest in doubting of it?" Lessing referred to a passage in *Leibnitz*, but soon confessed that he had said somewhat too much; while, on the other hand, *Jacobi* granted to him that there existed a great affinity between Spinoza and *Leibnitz*. "I do not give you any rest; you must come out with this parallelism. . . . Surely people always speak of Spinoza as of a dead dog." "They will continue to speak of him in this way. To understand Spinoza requires a too lengthened and persevering effort of the mind. Such a calmness, such a heaven in the understanding, few men may have tasted." "And you are not a Spinozist, *Jacobi*?" "No, upon my honour." "Upon my honour then, with your philosophy you must turn your back upon all philosophy." "Why turn my back upon all philosophy?" "Well, then, you are a complete sceptic." "On the contrary, I withdraw from a philosophy which renders complete scepticism necessary." "And whither withdraw, then?" "To the light, of which Spinoza says, that it enlightens itself, and also the darkness." "One must," continues *Jacobi*, "learn from Spinoza, that certain things cannot be demonstrated. In order to prove his propositions, he has lost himself in sophisms. And it was this which I maintained, that even the greatest head must come to nonsense, if he pretends absolutely to demonstrate everything, to arrange everything according to clear notions, and refuse to acknowledge anything else." "And what with him who does not pretend to demonstrate?" "Of



him who does not pretend to demonstrate what is imcomprehensible, but only wishes to know the boundary line where it begins, and only to know that it exists—of him, I believe that he gains the greatest scope for true human wisdom.’ “Nothing but words, dear Jacobi, nothing but words. The boundary line which you wish to fix, cannot be fixed; and, on the other hand, you give free open scope to fancies, nonsense, and blindness.” ‘I believe that that boundary line could be determined. I myself would fix none, but only find and acknowledge that which is already fixed. And as regards fancies, nonsense, blindness, . . .’ “They are to be found everywhere, where confused notions prevail.” ‘But still more where fictitious notions prevail. Even the blindest, most nonsensical belief, although not the most stupid, has there its high throne. For he who has once become enamoured of certain demonstrations, blindly receives every inference which is drawn from them according to every syllogism which he cannot invalidate, were it even that he was walking on his head. . . . According to my opinion, it is the greatest merit of the inquirer to disclose, as well as to manifest, *existence*. . . . Demonstration is to him a means, a way to the goal, but never the ultimate object. His ultimate object is that which cannot be demonstrated, the indissoluble, absolute, simple. . . . Unbounded desire of demonstrating everything makes us so ardently seek that which we have in common, that we thereby overlook that in which we differ; we always seek to connect only, that which, with far greater advantage, we should keep distinct. . . . Moreover, when we put together and connect that which can be demonstrated in the things, there arises a certain light in the soul which darkens more than it enlightens. We then sacrifice what Spinoza profoundly and sublimely calls the know-



ledge of the highest kind, to the knowledge of the lower kind; we close the eye of the soul, wherewith it recognises God and itself, in order to contemplate, more undisturbedly, with the eyes of the body only.' "Good, very good; I also can use all that, but I cannot apply it in the same manner. In general, I do not at all dislike your *Salto mortale*, and I understand how a man of intellect can in this way make head and heels in order to get on. If possible, take me also with you." 'If you would only step on the elastic place which swings me forward, then you would get on involuntarily.' "Even for that a swing is required, which I can no more expect from my old legs and heavy head."

This conversation (see Jacobi's Works, IV. 1. S. 51, ff.) Jacobi was induced to communicate to *Mendelssohn*, at a time when the latter was thinking of a work for the glorification of *Lessing*, the editor of the *Fragments*, the author of *Nathan*, the great and admired defender of Theism and Rationalism. He at once desisted from the project in order to prepare a work on Pantheism. Jacobi made to him communications on *Spinoza's* doctrine, of the most important kind. In return, *Mendelssohn*, who had soon convinced himself that he had to deal with an uncommon thinker, with a man uncommonly well acquainted with *Spinoza*, and revered by *Lessing*, promised to communicate to him the manuscript of his work. But he did not keep this promise; he could not refrain from ill humour towards Jacobi. Unable to impugn the trustworthiness of Jacobi, yea, at one time ready to acknowledge in that conversation a remarkable example of intellectual aberration for the correction of others, he returned in his *Morgenstunden* to the old idea of *Spinoza*, to the old notion of *Lessing*, and to his old conviction of the irreconcilableness of the two. "What!" he writes, "Lessing a

defender of Pantheism! To whom could the truths of the religion of reason be more inviolable than to him, the protector of the Fragmentist, the author of *Nathan*? Germany does not know any philosopher who set forth the religion of reason with such purity, who taught it so entirely free from any admixture of error and prejudice, and who so convincingly brought it before sound common sense, as the Fragmentist. In undertaking the defence of the Fragmentist, Lessing seems also to have received his opinions. After his acquaintance with the Fragmentist, we remark, in all his writings, the same calm conviction which was so peculiar to the Fragmentist, the same plain proceeding of sound, common, intellectual sense. Look to his *Nathan*! Especially as regards the doctrine of the providence and government of God, I do not know any author who has impressed these great truths on the heart of the reader with the same purity, with the same power of convincing, with the same interest" (*Morgenstunden*, Berlin, 1786, S. 258). Mendelssohn refuted Spinozism in the sense in which he understood it. He showed, however, that a purified Spinozism could be unhesitatingly admitted. As it appears from a fragment among his posthumous papers, "The Christianity of Reason," Lessing had been favourably disposed towards such a purified Pantheism.<sup>1</sup> After these declarations of Mendelssohn, Jacobi thought himself entitled to publish his transactions with Mendelssohn. As Mendelssohn had not referred to anything personal, this step was not required, and cannot be accounted for from merely objective interest, but we must ascribe it also to the irritable nature of Jacobi, from his delight in such personal quarrels. How much soever the children of the

<sup>1</sup> *Lessing's Werke* (ed. Lachmann), XI. S. 604. Comp. Schwarz, *Lessing als Theologe* (Halle, 1854), S. 68, ff.

Fragmentist felt offended at the indiscretion of this step ; yet it was quite according to the taste of that period, which took pleasure in such sad displays. Mendelssohn's part in it was, it is true, very tragical. The circumstance that Lessing, the great defender of natural religion, should have stepped beyond the bounds of common intellectual sense, and turned to Spinoza, deeply affected him. Under great distress he wrote a pamphlet, "To the Friends of Lessing" (1786), in which he endeavours to render it probable that Lessing permitted himself to joke with Jacobi, of whom he knew that he scented Spinozism everywhere, in order to cure it with his faith. "Our friend who may have very soon found out the honest intention of M. Jacobi, was roguish enough to strengthen him in the opinion which he had conceived of him. He therefore played the part of the attentive pupil, never contradicted, consented to everything, and only endeavoured, by some witty remark, to set the conversation a-going again, when it was likely to flag. Hence the forced whims, and coarse expressions, the pleasure in bad verses (*Goethe's* Prometheus !) which, to a man like Lessing, was so unnatural." It could not be very difficult for Jacobi to prove the futility of this evasion. He did so,<sup>1</sup> after Mendelssohn was no more. His vital power had been long before broken, and that pamphlet against Jacobi had been written with his heart's blood. When going to deliver the manuscript to the publisher, he caught a cold which accelerated his death. And we may well say, that that conversation hastened the death of the Popular Philosophy also. Since Mendelssohn could not doubt that Jacobi could and would say the truth—a matter which even the most recent apologist of Lessing could not

<sup>1</sup> *Wider Mendelssohn's Beschuldigungen* (against Mendelssohn's charges), 1786.

deny;<sup>1</sup> since Mendelssohn's expedient is untenable;—and since the sophistical argument of a purified Spinozism is irreconcilable with this conversation, it only remains for us to suppose that Lessing, with that profession of Spinozism, was at that time in earnest, *at that time*, and so far as a head so dialectic as that of Lessing, could be in earnest at all. At all events, the fact that Lessing, the genius of *Illuminism*, entered upon a speculative faith, which common intellectual sense could not follow at all, was a blow to the Popular Philosophy. That which Jacobi says against Mendelssohn is perfectly correct: "The cry of those men in praise and protection of reason may, to a great extent, be quite innocent; they indeed believe that their opinion is reason, and reason their opinion. What is true in this fearful error is this, that a truth which floats before their minds subjectively only, is by them imagined to be one objectively known, and is even confounded by them with reason. By means of such a hypostatized truth, one's own adopted system is raised beyond all that is right; and self-conceit utters oracles which venture to find fault with everything, without allowing any one to find fault with them, and put the intellect into fetters, and mislead or seduce the conscience." (*Wider Mendelssohn's Beschuldigungen*, 1786. *Werke*, IV. 2, S. 169, ff.) Lessing's conversation called forth a whole literature,<sup>2</sup> and there were, indeed, eagles among them, that were gathering together around this carcase. And yet, it was the simple *Wandsbecker Bote* (*Claudius*), which spoke the most striking word: "If anything was here at all to be gained or lost, the question

<sup>1</sup> *Schwarz*, l. c. S. 87, ff. The expedient which is here brought forward amounts substantially to that which Mendelssohn already gave in the "Morgenstunden," viz., the purified Spinozism.

<sup>2</sup> It is very carefully characterized by *Mirbt*, in *Kant and seine Nachfolger*, S. 287, ff.

would still be, Whether Lessing gains or loses by this publication. I judge by the impression which I have of it, and . . . I do not at all miss in it Lessing, and the splendid flashes of lightning to which we are accustomed in him; so that in this aspect he has gained. And as regards religion, he had nothing to lose with me. For in order to speak in the words of Lessing's own parable, the question whether all light comes in through the side windows, or whether some light may also come in from above,—this question divides the adherents of religion into two classes, which are substantially different from each other. All the rest gives only shades of more or less, and the so-called religion of reason which endeavours to mend and restore the broken pot with the sherds, may indeed differ *in decoro*, but little in the result, from that which does not mend at all, but allows the sherds to lie just as they do. I also have known Lessing. I will not say that he was my friend, but I was his; and although I cannot adopt his *credo*, I have yet a high opinion of his head. I had not the privilege of becoming acquainted with M. Mendelssohn, but, in common with many others, I have esteemed him as a clear inquiring man, and for him, as a Jew, I have, as people say, a *tendre*, for the sake of his great fathers, and my own religion. One is buried at Brunswick, the other at Berlin;—*Molliter ossa cubent!*”

To two of the men who raised their voices in this controversy, the immediate future belonged, viz., to *Jacobi* and *Kant*. However different were the two philosophers, yet, in their relation to the Popular Philosophy, they were at one in declaring that it was futile to suppose, as this philosophy did, that by means of clear notions, we are able to lay hold of the truth. Both of these men taught to distrust the assertions of the theoretical reason; both sought for some firm point beyond it. This firm point



*Kant* found in morality; *Jacobi*, in an immediate organ for the *divine*, in faith. *Jacobi* was not a philosopher in the strict sense of the word, and has not formed a system; but he was a man in the full sense, and as a complete man he philosophized. He was, so to speak, an amateur philosopher, but of an impartiality and purity of inquiry, of a chasteness and beauty of style, such as only a few of those who are philosophers by profession have had. Instinctively, as it were, he always correctly found out the one-sidedness of the philosophical systems of his time, and told it with regardless openness to the masters. But he was unable to demolish those systems by his own power. In opposition to the manifold forms which, in conformity with their speculations, these philosophers gave to the religious spirit, he always upheld and represented the right of the immediate religious life, the root of which lay, to him, in faith. He did not himself venture to call himself a Christian in the full sense of the word; but we may certainly count him as among those to whom the Lord has said: "Thou art not far from the kingdom of God." We have already given a sketch of *Kant's* philosophy. If we compare him with his countrymen and friends, *Hamann* and *Herder*, we may well say of him that he had a contracted nature. Of the outward and inward tempests which had shaken *Hamann*, the Königsberg philosopher knew only from his friends or books; for he had never got out from his native place beyond a few miles, and had equably and uniformly spun out his scholar's life with the tenacity of a phlegmatic, and the pedantry of an old bachelor. The fulness of vital spirits which were rushing through the soul of *Herder*—that wonderful *Æolian* harp, was not granted to him. But it was just in this one-sidedness that his power lay; to the master of the philosophy of criticism, a life of

stillness and concentration was becoming. That which this intellect, working in concealment like the subterranean spirits of the fable, has brought to light, has been more lasting than *Hamann's* oracles, and than the music of *Herder's* mind. From his very youth, a strict sense of right was peculiar to Kant. Whatever he once perceived to be right, he carried through with immoveable firmness. In a party, he could put before his servant the question, whether for thirty years he had once risen after five o'clock. It is only from a life thus regulated, that we can understand the energy with which he brought forward the Categorical Imperative: "Act always as a rational being." With *Herder's* nature, and with *Hamann's* agitated life, Kant's practical philosophy would surely have turned out differently. Kant has been called the Christian Philosopher of modern times. A man who knew Kant very intimately, but who also knew Jesus Christ, *Borowsky*, has judged differently.<sup>1</sup>

In the position in which theology was at that time, it could not withdraw itself from the overwhelming influence of the Kantian philosophy. Although Kant divested *illuminative* theology of its theoretical self-confidence, yet he agreed with it in acknowledging the supremacy of reason, and the results of the religion of reason. As, to him, religion was only secondary to morality, so, in the Christian religion, that only was of importance to him which could be brought into connection with moral religion. What he wished was not a naturalism placing itself in opposition to positive Christianity, but a rationalism uniting itself with the faith of the Church. But this union, when viewed more closely, had, it is true, the character of condescension, of accommodation. It is only

<sup>1</sup> *Darstellung des Lebens u. Characters Immanuel Kants* (1840), S. 197.

by transforming them, through means of an allegorical interpretation, into moral ideas, that he declared the essential doctrines of Christianity to be tenable. A large circle of theologians (among them *Stäudlein*, *Schmidt*, *Ammon*), treated the principal doctrines of theology according to Kantian principles.<sup>1</sup> To characterize their proceedings, can the less fall within the scope of these sketches, as that which was specifically Kantian, very soon yielded to the general rational.

The result of this whole movement of theology, which outlasted the age of Illuminism, is *Rationalism*. In general, Rationalism is that tendency which, in matters of faith, makes reason the measure and rule of truth. In this general signification, Rationalism is met with in the history of all positive religions, and in the most varied forms. All the great philosophers were rationalists. In the Christian Church it existed long before the Illuminative theology of the eighteenth century (one need only think, in the Ancient Church, of the Monarchites, Gnostics, etc.; in the middle age, of Scotus; at the time of the Reformation, of Socinus, etc.); and continues even after *Illuminism* has disappeared—only under different names, and in a different form. Much confusion has arisen, from the

<sup>1</sup> What *Flügge* wrote (*Versuch einer historisch-kritischen Darstellung des Einflusses der Kantischen Philosophie auf alle Zweige der wissenschaftlichen u. praktischen Theologie*, (i. e. attempt at a historico-critical representation of the influence which the Kantian philosophy has hitherto exercised upon all the branches of scientific and practical theology) can scarcely be used as a collection of materials. *Stäudlin*, in his history of Rationalism and Supernaturalism (S. 138, ff), treats this point a little more thoroughly than others. *Hermann*, in his *Geschichte der Protest. Dogmatik* (S. 115, ff), gives a collection of the results of the Kantian school in systematic theology. Excellent glances into the whole are given by *Rosenkranz* in his *Geschichte der Kantischen Philosophie*, S. 250, ff, S. 323, ff.

wide sense of the word Rationalism.<sup>1</sup> By the prevailing *usus loquendi*, that theological tendency is called Rationalism, to which the religious convictions of the age of *Illuminism*, were the rule of Christian truth. If we are to speak less abstractly, we thereby understand that tendency which, in the territory of systematic theology, has been represented chiefly by *Wegscheider*, on that of Exegesis, specially by *Paulus*, on that of practice, chiefly by *Röhr*. It is distinguished from Theism or Naturalism chiefly by connecting its own rationalistic belief with the faith and doctrine of the Church, and by the opinion that, in so doing, they have laid hold of the substance of it. Its relation to the doctrine of the Church, may simply be defined thus: While the symbolical works of the Church declare Scripture to be the Word of God, the rule of all truth (*formal principle*), Rationalism makes reason to be so; while the confession of the Church makes justification by faith in Jesus Christ the fundamental doctrine (*material principle*), Rationalism makes virtue to be so. Let us consider a little more closely the formal principle from which Rationalism draws its name. It is reason which, in matters of faith, decides what is true, and what false. Now, he who reviews the most varied results which, in the development of mankind, reason has brought forward as regards God and divine things;—he who considers the diversity of the doctrines of philosophy regarding God, since *Descartes*;—he who considers that *Mendelssohn*, who held that it was possible by clear notions to find the truth, and *Kant*, who held the very opposite, are equally great authorities with this school;—

<sup>1</sup> A fundamental error—though not the only one—in the critical history of Rationalism, by Amand Saintes, is the looseness and vagueness in his definition of the essence of Rationalism.



he will, above all, demand an answer to the questions: What reason? Which are the principles, the laws, the results of reason in matters of faith? But, concerning all these questions, great silence is observed in the principal doctrinal works of Rationalism. And this silence, so inconceivable at first sight, is only too conceivable on a closer examination. That which Rationalism calls reason is nothing else than the principle of *Illuminism*: Clearness is the measure of truth. But that which was clear to Rationalism, was just the sum of the convictions which the age of *Illuminism* entertained; and what it was which this age held in matters of faith, we have already seen. The one thing which is sure, and established, and necessary, is virtue.<sup>1</sup> It is on the foundation of this that God and immortality are taken for granted—whether in consequence of a proof, or as an axiom, amounts to the same thing. The sum of truths which, in England, France, and Germany, were declared to be the natural and original religion, was by Rationalism assumed as certain truths, without entering upon the proof how they were connected with the substance of reason. One understands how it was that Rationalism could be the prevailing tendency of the age. He who makes the reason of his age the highest rule of truth, is of course borne on the height of his age. Now, the rationalists brought the principle regarding the use of reason into harmony with the views of the Church regarding Scripture, by asserting that Rationalism was the substance of

<sup>1</sup> That this proposition is correct, needs no proof in reference to the earlier Rationalism; but that, even in its later development, morality was, to Rationalism, the foundation and rule of all religion, Röhr has very distinctly expressed in his treatise: Doctrinal theology before the judgment-seat of morality (*Die Dogmatik vor dem Richterstuhle der Moral*, in *Kleine theol. Schriften* 1841, spec. S. 7, ff).



Scripture. According to the doctrine of the Church, the Scripture is the Word of God, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit revealed it to the sacred writers; but Rationalism rejected the idea of an immediate divine influence in general, and of a supernatural communication of divine truth in particular.<sup>1</sup> That which the doctrine of the Church calls Holy Spirit is nothing else than religious enthusiasm, which is an altogether natural product of our spirit. It is only in this sense that an inspiration of the sacred writers can be spoken of. The writings of the Old and New Testament are purely human productions, which are to be viewed and explained like every other literature. The manner in which Rationalism, according to this view, explained Scripture, will be most clearly seen from the picture of Dr *Paulus*, a man who, with special consistency, carried out the rationalistic mode of viewing Scripture.<sup>2</sup>

The father of *Paulus* was a clergyman in Wurtemberg, who was, at first, given up to a weak orthodoxy, and afterwards to an eccentric mysticism. From the home of his father, Paulus brought with him to the Gymnasium, besides a good philological foundation, skill in judging of human relations, and a distrust of everything miraculous. The latter could, indeed, be easily accounted for. His father, who could not tear himself away from the corpse of his wife, saw—so he affirmed—the dead person raising herself up. From that moment he gave himself up to the belief of an intercourse with the world of spirits, to a degree which soon incapacitated him for his office. That

<sup>1</sup> This conviction is brought forward as the fundamental principle of Rationalism in *Röhr's* letters on Rationalism, S. 45, ff.

<sup>2</sup> We follow, in this sketch, the biography of *Reichlin—Meldegg*: H. E. G. *Paulus und seine Zeit* (Stuttgart, 1853; 2 vols.), a careful collection of materials, exact even to pedantry, but clumsily written.

self-deception—yea, that deceit was here practised, the boy was shrewd enough to see, and he himself sought to gladden his father by invented visions. In the *Klosterschule*, and in the University of *Tübingen*, the doctrines of the Church met him everywhere in a powerless form, while the theology and philosophy of Illuminism exhibited a vigorous appearance. Destitute of imagination, all the allurements of Romanticism passed over him powerless, while the philosophy of *Wolff*, mathematics, and psychological historiography, fascinated him. “Although his faith, when measured by the prevailing catechism, had been very weak during the time he spent in his parental home and the *Klosterschule*, yet he was never satisfied with merely doubting, but was always anxious to procure to himself a true conviction of that which was credible and tenable in religion,—to separate, in everything, the original doctrines of Christianity and of the Church, from the later additions by the later symbolical mode of viewing it. That only which he could understand and prove by his reason was to him a belief worth retaining; and he became more and more convinced that, in theology, ethics was the thing essential, and that doctrinal theology existed for the sake of ethics, not ethics for the sake of doctrinal theology. A doctrine seemed to him to possess any value, only in the measure in which it contributed to make men wiser, and, for that very reason, better. When it contributed to stupify common intellectual sense, by being incomprehensible and self-contradictory, it had no existence for him, because he was able to receive that only which he learned to comprehend by means of arguments” (see l. c. I., S. 45, f.). According to these principles, it soon, while he was yet in the university, became manifest to him, that the doctrine of justification through faith rested on a false interpretation of passages

from St Paul. Righteousness is uprightness of heart, and faith fidelity of conviction. Whatever he did immediately after leaving the university,—studying, teaching, preaching, travelling, all was done in the service of *Illuminism*. Even in his betrothment he proceeded rationally. His strict father refused his consent to his betrothment to a near relative, and obstinately persevered in this refusal to the time of his death. But the son contradicted him from reason. It is impossible to read anything more rational than the instructive letter of the betrothed young man to his brothers and sisters (l. c. S., 153). In 1789 Paulus accepted a call to Jena, as Professor of Oriental Languages. In that capacity, he devoted his special attention to the Old Testament. By his entering, in 1793, upon a professorship of theology, he was induced to apply, to the New Testament also, the position which he occupied towards the Old. On entering upon his office he had to swear by the symbolical books; this oath he justified by a definition of the nature of orthodoxy, according to which he made it to signify, “upright conduct in inquiring after truth.” What could resist such an exegesis? neither the prophecies of the Old, nor the miracles of the New Testament. To prophesy—(*weissagen*)—so Paulus set it forth in his “Philosophical Clavis on Isaiah” (1793), is just tantamount to saying something wise (*weises sagen*.) The prophet uttered, from the ardour of his conviction, what, for the benefit of his people, he thought worthy of being uttered. Many things which are regarded as a foretelling of the future are just the very opposite, viz., a description of the past. The New Testament miracles—so Paulus proved in his celebrated philologico-critical commentary on the New Testament (1800)—disappear before a truly critical, grammatical, and especially psychological explanation. It was a holy

delusion that Mary should have conceived by the Holy Ghost; and the angels at the birth of Christ may have been phosphorescent nocturnal phenomena, which are not uncommon in pastoral countries. The miraculous cures are explained from a historical ellipsis occurring in all of them, viz., the omission of the natural remedies; the casting out of devils, from the power of a wise man over insane people; and the raising of dead persons took place only in such as were apparently dead. The miracle at the marriage in Cana was a marriage joke; the walking on the sea is explained from a single word (*ἐπὶ*), which here does not mean *upon*, but *at*. The transfiguration of Christ is explained from the confused recollection of sleeping men, who saw Jesus with two unknown men standing in a beautiful mountain light.—The times had not sunk so deep as that opposition should not arise. A severe earnest word was addressed to *Paulus* by *Lavater*. Who can have read *Lavater's* letter on the walking on the sea (l. c. S. 266), written with the indignation of an evangelical heart, with annihilating clearness, and yet true humility and amicable affection—who can have read this letter without giving an entire assent to it? But at that time *Paulus* was the man of reason, and *Lavater* the enthusiast. *Paulus's* activity as a teacher did not pass without the contradiction of the ecclesiastical authorities in Thuringia; but the liberal *Charles Augustus*, and the large-hearted *Herder* took him under their protection. In Wurzburg, Bamberg, and Anspach, to which places *Paulus* went from Jena, he was entirely absorbed in practical efforts; for the point aimed at was to carry through *Illuminism* in education. The desire, however, of returning to theory induced him to go to Heidelberg (1811). The times changed; but *Paulus* remained faithful to the conviction which he had already substantially embraced

when he was in the university. And it was just that fidelity to conviction which constituted his religion. In Heidelberg, he carried on an untiring warfare of light against everything which he conceived to be darkness; now against political absolutism (the King of Wurtemberg interdicted him from his territories—his native country); then against abuses in the administration of justice; at one time against the oppression of the Church, at another, against a transcendental philosophy; now against Jesuitism, then against Protestant mysticism and orthodoxy. Very much like *Krug* in the north, he was in the south of Germany—"a man who gave his opinion on every important event, whether it appeared in the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, or in the *Sophronizon*, or in a pamphlet." His indestructible liberalism took even "Young Germany" and *Strauss* under its wings; to the German Catholics he has bequeathed a legacy. It was impossible for the octogenarian friend of light to bear the secret of *Schelling's* philosophy of revelation. He published the lectures of the mysterious philosopher, whom nothing grieved more than to be robbed of his ideas. The old man, always jealous, and declaiming for progress, at last appeared with his *Illuminism* of 1790, like a spectre from the eighteenth century. He reached his 90th year. On the 31st July 1851, he still dictated: "Active practical faith in the few doctrines which are conducive to ethics, is necessary in order to be always and beforehand determined to be willing, from self-conviction, to live for that only which is right; so that neither cunning nor force are able to disturb this disposition produced in the depth of the mind." And on his last day (10th August 1851) he said, "I stand just before God, by having willed that which is right" (l. c. S. 451, ff).

*Paulus* was convinced that his rationalism was the



original Christianity. That this Rationalism was the moving power of Church history, the Church historians of this school could not well affirm ; wherever they turned, there was too much of what they called the irrational. Although they had nothing to object to the spreading of Christianity, yet they had much against the spirit by which the missionaries were actuated. These historians felt ill at ease in the times of the martyrs. The *paucitas martyrum* was, it is true, a comfort, but it was a very poor one. What meaning could be assigned to the centuries of controversies on the Trinity and the God-manhood of Christ, if the Trinity was looked upon as a nonsensical theory, and Christ as a mere man ? And if, after the thousand years' night of the middle ages, they greeted the morning dawn of the Reformation, yet they could not overlook the dark clouds with which the doctrine of justification through faith, the Augustinian view of sin and death, and the controversies regarding the Lord's Supper, covered the rising sun. Yea, even the sun of the *Illuminism* of the eighteenth century was not without spots. Whatever traces of Providence might be pointed out in the details of Church history, the chasm between the rational primitive Christianity and the *Illuminism* of the eighteenth century was too great to be filled up by their preconceived views, although with them rationalism could accomplish much. With an exposition of Scripture which resolved the miracles into natural events, corresponded the art of *Illuminism*, which understood so dexterously how to derive the great deeds of the past from the common places of the experience of common life, that the observer could go away with the feeling, "*Tout comme chez nous.*" Who does not here think of *Planck* ? Too thoroughly has this theologian examined the sources ; too sagacious are his combinations for us not, even now, to be

benefited by him. And yet one must call it a penal labour to wind one's way through this confusion of interpolations, conjectures, combinations, without a spirit congenial, and equal to the task, without true judgment. More happy in the form, more original in the conception, was *Spittler*. But one understands what opinion this historian can have had of the principal phenomena of Church history, when one reads the commencement: "The world never yet experienced a revolution which, in its first causes, was so insignificant, and in its ultimate, far-spreading consequences, was so remarkable as that which a Jew, living eighteen hundred years ago, called Jesus, made in a few years of his life." The most important representative of the historiography of Rationalism is *Henke*. He excels *Planck* in facility of representation, in the delicacy of his argumentation, in acuteness of knowledge, and strength of will. However dogmatically he has judged of the most important phenomena of the past history of the Church, yet, as regards him, one has the feeling that he is in real earnest with his Rationalism; a hue of character manifests itself in his Church history. And that he proved in his life also. He remained a German at the time of *Jerome's* Kingdom, and when the University of Helmstadt broke down, his heart broke with it.<sup>1</sup>

The systematic theology of Rationalism lies before us in extensive works (*Eckermann*, *Bretschneider*, *Wegscheider*), and yet the sum and substance of the positive which Rationalism advances is small; and even this little it has not systematically developed, as we have already remarked. But it had to settle with the doctrine of the Church, against which it leans, in the same way, it may

<sup>1</sup> *Vollmann* and *Wolff*, *Heinrich Philipp Conrad Henke*, 1816.

be, as the sons of the wilderness lean their tents against the ruins of destroyed temples. That which the Greek, the Roman, and the two Protestant Churches hold fast as the legacy of the old Catholic Church; viz., faith in the Father, who has manifested himself in the God-man, to redeem those who, by the power of His Spirit, believe in Him,—that Rationalism has changed into the belief in the *one* God, which the wise and virtuous man Jesus Christ has taught, in order that, believing in His doctrine, and following in His walk, we may attain our aim in His kingdom—the kingdom of the spirit of truth and virtue. It rejects a divine personality of the Son and Spirit as distinguished from the Father, and all which may seem to allude to it—as perhaps in *Röhr's Grund und Glaubenssätzen*<sup>1</sup>—is simply explained from the desire of accommodating itself to the *usus loquendi* of the Church. That which Rationalism teaches of Christ does not reach even to the Ebionitic stand-point, because (not to speak of the Ebionites, who taught the conception by the Holy Spirit) the Rationalist does not acknowledge the working of the Holy Spirit, in the Old Testament sense. The Socinians have gone much farther, for they acknowledged the conception by the Holy Spirit, the sinlessness, miraculous power, ascension to heaven, etc. Like the Socinians, the Rationalists declare the doctrine and example to have been the main purpose of the mission of Jesus. The death of Christ is to be explained purely historically, from the opposition with which Christ's efforts to make men happy were met by the Jewish rulers. For the bene-

<sup>1</sup> S. 63: "Christ acquired just claims to the highest dignity among all rational beings, and to the name (a) of the only begotten Son of God; (b) of the Saviour of the world; (c) of the Mediator between God and man; (d) of the Redeemer; (e) of the Lord of Christendom; (f) of the King and Ruler of the kingdom of God established by Him."

fit of the weak ones, says *Wegscheider* (*Instit.*) S. 142, p. 509, 7th ed.), the death of Christ may be represented as a symbol that the sacrifices are abolished, and God reconciled to man ; as a symbol of the establishment of the new covenant ; or as a symbol of the love of God, and of the love of Jesus to us ; “only,” so he adds, “let Christian teachers take good care lest thereby they put a plaster on the consciences of bad men, by laying too much stress on the expiatory power of the blood of Christ, by which God, like a bloodthirsty Moloch, has been reconciled. Let them rather look to this, that they exhort every sinner to a change of life, and, as much as possible, to a restitution for injury caused.” While the old Rationalism viewed the supernatural events of Christ’s life, especially the miracles which He performed and experienced, as natural events, the later Rationalism, which had become aware of the irrationality of these natural explanations (even *Hermann* has ridiculed the exegetical miracles of those who thus explained the miracles), wrote on the whole territory a *non liquet*. The evangelists, so they said, were, it is true, men who, in a high degree, loved the truth, but were too uneducated to form a truly scientific opinion on that which was really before them. One may allow that to rest as it is ; it is, after all, secondary. As regards the resurrection of Christ especially, the old Rationalism (*Paulus*) had recourse to the supposition of an apparent death—a subterfuge which the later Rationalists did not advance without a certain timidity and caution. “The idea of an apparent death,” says *Bretschneider* (*Handbuch der Dogmatik*, II., S. 231) need not be thought to be something dangerous, inasmuch as even in that case the revival of Jesus would be an unmistakeable work of Providence ; and the occurrence of such an unheard-of event, and that

just in the case of Jesus, could not but be considered as a special arrangement of God, distinctly declaring that Jesus was the Christ." *Wegscheider* does not mean to deny that the apostle Paul has laid great emphasis on this fact; but, at the same time, it is also certain that Christ has not rested His doctrine on this foundation, and that the truth of Christianity is based upon its rational contents. "Let us only hold fast that Christ returned to life, and that this was a distinguished proof of Divine Providence" (*Instit.* p. 474). With greater courage the myths of Hercules and Romulus are referred to, in treating of the ascension. What the doctrine of the Church calls the third person of the Godhead, is nothing else than a personification of the working of God. Since Rationalism thus gave up the oecumenical belief in a triune God, it was compelled to give quite a different meaning to the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith. It is not by outward works, nor by a merit imputed to him, but only by faith, and by a disposition of mind directed to Christ's example and doctrine, to God's holiness and goodness, that man obtains God's favour. Man *can* practice virtue, because he is destined to do so. The doctrine of original sin is a gloomy delusion. Although all men are, more or less, sinners, that has its foundation solely in their will, and may be accounted for by the power of sensuality, by the epidemic force of example, etc. It is only pietists and mystics who can speak of an immediate operation of God upon the soul. The word and sacraments operate in a manner altogether natural. In the doctrine of the sacraments, the Rationalists, of course, agreed with *Zwingle*. Baptism is a right of consecration; the Lord's Supper a meal in remembrance of the death of Christ. The Eschatology, they reduced to a recompensing future life. The immortality of the soul,



we have already seen above (p. 79), was a favourite doctrine of *Illuminism*. Great is the number of works which endeavour to prove this belief from the simplicity of the soul, from the capacity of the mind for development, from the claim of the virtuous to reward, from our longing after re-union with our beloved ones. *Kant*, so we likewise saw, reduced these arguments to a mere axiom. The Leipzig philosopher, *Wötzel*, confesses that, as a man and a Christian, he gave himself up to this belief, but that, as a philosopher, he was not firm in it. Then, in a miraculous manner, he obtained certainty. For his wife, from whom he had once received the promise that, in case she should die before him, she should give him tangible proof of her continuing to live, had really appeared to him after her death, and that at midnight and noon, with the words, "We shall see one another again."<sup>1</sup> This communication was, of course, a welcome prey for the literary birds of prey of *Illuminism*. The fact, however, that the author was a philosopher, occasioned some difficulty, and whatever was advanced against his importance as such, he very well knew what he was doing, and was, moreover, ready to take an oath upon it before the *Senatus Academicus* in Leipzig. Here the theologians of *Illuminism* had a case to try the weapons with which they had struck down the miraculous contents of the gospels. The whole, so old *Wieland* assured in his "Euthanasia" (1805), with a wit which was then already expiring, was the work of a jester. In general, he added, the arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul are very weak. Without this body, the continuance of a personal existence is inconceivable; virtue is

<sup>1</sup> *Wötzel* published several pamphlets on the event in 1804-5. The literature of this subject is given by *Bretschneider*, *Systematische Entwicklung*, etc., S. 832.

reward enough to itself; people will employ life better when death is regarded as the termination of it. The author of the "First remarkable Apparition of a Ghost in the nineteenth century" (1805), exercises Semler's art; and the Brunswick Superintendent, *Hellmuth*, undertook the exegesis of *Dr Paulus*. By means of his knowledge of natural science, he made it probable that the ghost-like breathing had been caused by a nocturnal butterfly of the family of the firelickers (*pyralides*); the noise at the window by a night-crow (*Caprimulgus Europaeus*); the apparition by night, by a concave mirror, and by day, by a dream. *Wötzel* answered perseveringly. But *Illuminism*, which had got the better of *Swedenborg*, *Schröpfer*, *Gassner*, etc., did not yield.

Let us now, in closing, cast a glance on the manner in which Rationalism showed itself in practice, and appeared in the Church. Scripture, the past history of the Church, the doctrine of the Church, were facts which could not protest against the proceedings of Rationalism; but the religious convictions of the congregations could do so; and they had still institutions, rights, traditions, to support and protect them. To these convictions the Rationalists, on the one hand, came down, and met them by the principle of accommodation. A strange circle indeed! From their practice, the Rationalists had introduced into the evangelical history the motive of accommodation, in order thereby to remove whatever did not agree with the image of Christ and the apostles, as the fathers of Rationalism; and now this idea returned from theory to practice, in order to cloak the proceedings of Rationalism. If Christ, by way of accommodation to the popular *usus loquendi*, had called the evil principle, devil, why should a Rationalist, who considered the devil to be a mere personification of the popular belief, not speak also of a devil? On the

other hand, however, the convictions of the congregations, which had been probably shaken in the age of *Illuminism*, met Rationalism so far, that the latter might imagine that the time could not be very far distant when the veil of accommodation would drop. In the sermon, Rationalism was fettered by prescribed biblical texts. Where it was not feasible to select more convenient passages than the traditional lessons and texts—*e. g.* from Sirach—a wide field was opened up by the art of transitions, applications, etc. He who has witnessed the practice of many Rationalists will not find it incredible that in the Christmas lesson the manger furnished occasion for economical expositions; in the lesson for Easter, the early walk of the women to the grave, gave a wished-for point of connection for exhortations to early rising, etc. What the Rationalist detracted from faith he added to morality; in it men, such as *Zollikofer, Spalding, Teller, Henke*, etc., sought their strength. With respect to the form of the rationalistic sermon, it had, from principle, a doctrinal and argumentative character; the man of reason just wrought with arguments of reason. At first, this mode of preaching might obtain the applause of the congregations; to the charm of the practical and clear, that of the novel, of opposition to the existing, was added. But when Rationalism stood there as victor, the churches emptied to the same extent that the theatres were filled. The common saying, that one might say to oneself what was heard there, was not without foundation. The gift of fascinating by art, and by the spirit of eloquence, was not granted to every one; he who possessed it might hope to learn from the ancient orators. In Saxony, the seat of classical studies, the study of Demosthenes and Cicero, for the sake of pulpit eloquence, had the example of *Reinhard*, and the theory of *Schott* in its favour. And it was

not only from the rhetoric of the ancients, but also from the poetry of the time then present, that the rationalistic sermon thought to be able to benefit. How many morning dawns, starry lustres, full moons, flower seas, greetings of love and friendship, night and grave thoughts, etc., may, at that time, have filled the pulpits! As Kant says, they preached in prose run mad; and from thence it was not very far to the opinion:

“I often heard it said that a pastor might be benefited by the lessons of an actor.”

The apostle proclaimed the foolishness of the cross, not in the eloquent words of human wisdom; but of such preaching, that of the present was the very opposite; so that, in the language of the educated, the preacher soon became a pulpit orator, the congregation a public which gave or withheld its applause, according as the discourses had pleased or not pleased them. Still the hymn-books bore witness to the old faith. The practice of Rationalism was either to omit the old hymns from the new hymn-books, or to change them so as to suit *Illuminism*, or to introduce new hymns, the matter of which was in harmony with the spirit of the time. In the old well-known hymn of praise: “To Him the triune God,” they read, “To Him the thrice great God.” They changed, from geographical scrupulosity, the words: “The *whole* world is asleep,” into, “Half the world is asleep.” They composed hymns about eternity: “I believe in eternity; I am convinced by reasons; and the more I inquire, the more I find them in me.”—Still, the liturgical forms were bearing witness to the old faith. The mode in which Rationalism here proceeded has been exhibited to us in the life of *Dinter*, one of the chief men of the school.<sup>1</sup> They were anxious to set aside the exor-

<sup>1</sup> *Dinter's Leben*, S. 116.

cism, the old baptismal formula in general, private confession, the liturgy, the traditional responses, etc., but the congregations were still attached to them. Thus, a peasant, who insisted upon having the exorcism in baptism, is quieted by the remark of the clergyman: he should have it at all events, as they were allowed to omit it in the case of people of rank and education only. At a banquet, the peasants are persuaded to give up the baptismal formula. With private confession, *Dinter* disgusted the peasants by the uncommon length to which he extended it. In a still more summary way that country minister may have proceeded, whom *Claudius* makes to write that excellent letter, from which we have already, on another occasion, quoted: "I don't tell you anything of the empty ceremonies; I don't observe them any more; I don't observe almost anything at all. I have the honour to be," etc. In the School, Rationalism wrought just in the way of clearing up—*i. e.*, setting aside old things according to the principle of contradiction, and introducing new things according to the principle of the sufficient reason. In the elementary schools, the old catechisms were abolished; in the gymnasia, the orthodox handbooks. The art of an elementary teacher consisted in drawing forth the principles of religion and virtue, from the awakening reason of the child, by means of the so-called Socratic method. That these principles did not agree with the doctrine of the Church, the enlightened educationist confessed to himself and others; but that they agreed with Scripture, he learned and taught from *Dinter's* Bible for teachers, which made the practical the measure for Scripture exposition. What *Dinter* was for the elementary school, *Niemeyer* was for the gymnasia and higher education. Those who came from these schools to the university did not easily avoid Rationalism.



There can be no doubt that, about the beginning of the present century, Rationalism had the supremacy in theology ; but yet it was not without opposition. Its opponent in principle was *Supernaturalism*—i. e., that theological school which made the revelation laid down in Scripture the test of religious truth. The most important representatives of these views were *Reinhard* in the north of Germany, and *Storr* in the south. He who considers that Supernaturalism was a child of that transition period, cannot entertain the opinion that the standpoint of Supernaturalism was the same as that of the orthodoxy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It put an altogether inferior value on the agreement with the doctrine laid down in the symbolical books ; it was the substance and essence only to which it held. From Scripture, indeed, it would vindicate its position and propositions ; but in its view of Scripture, it was more or less dependent upon *Töllner's* views on inspiration, *Semler's* Criticism, and *Ernesti's* Exegesis. It professed that the right of decision lay with Scripture, and not with reason ; but, in determining what was the doctrine of Scripture, reason had a weighty influence. If Rationalism reminds us strongly of Socinianism, Supernaturalism does of Arminianism. The doctrines of the Trinity, of the union of the two natures in Christ, of the mystical indwelling of the Holy Spirit, were not denied, but neither was any stress laid upon them ; and, avoiding systematically to elaborate them, it gave them, if possible, a practical turn.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Morus* says, in the doctrine of the Trinity: "Caeterum missis studiis nimis definiendi quae maxime sit trium illorum interior relatio, a Patro per Filium and Spiritum Sanctum expectamus et petimus ea beneficia," etc.; in the doctrine of the divine nature of Christ: "Ab omni studio explicandae definiendaeque rei quemlibet modestum et concordiae amantem

Christ was the Son of God, subordinate to the Father, the Redeemer of mankind from the bonds of error, sin, and death. Original sin was more or less changed into a disposition for evil; and, for that very reason, man's agency in appropriating salvation was prominently brought forward, in a way more or less strongly Pelagian. The work of the Holy Spirit was rather loosely expressed. In the definitions of the Church, wisdom and virtue occupied as prominent a place as, in the Eschatology, the striving for progress in goodness and truth. The ethics of Supernaturalism stand so near to that of Rationalism, that the opinion of the latter that it was a neutral territory, had indeed sufficient ground.<sup>1</sup>

"Strict systematic connection, unity of principles, logical thinking on religion, take place only when one adheres altogether either to reason or to Scripture; it is only the Rationalist and the Supernaturalist who are really consistent. It is obvious, that one becomes inconsistent, loses a

deterrenere potest ecclesiastica historia, recensens multa odia, vocabula, concilia, chismata."

<sup>1</sup> On *Reinhard's* ethics *De Wette* thus judges, in the *Berlin Zeitschrift*, 1820, H. 2., S. 74: *Reinhard* is known as a strict supernaturalist, but nothing of Supernaturalism has hitherto become visible in his system of ethics. There is wanting, in the first instance, the principle of the revealed Divine Word in Christ, as the highest rule of morals; and, in the second place, the principle of the Divine Spirit. The precepts of Christ and the apostles are much spoken of, but they are always only adapted to the rational principle. The human need of salvation, and faith in Christ founded thereon, are, indeed, mentioned as a source of Christian love; but that need of salvation is not properly established, as the idea of original sin is misrepresented, and reason is exempted from it, and the connection of Christian love with Christian faith, remains unintelligible. The influence of the Holy Spirit could not find a place in this system which does not acknowledge the affections as a mental principle, but entirely confounds the self-acting springs of the affections with the aspirations of man through the medium of his intellect.

sufficient all-determining principle which regulates all our cognition, as soon as a middle path is entered upon, as soon as one refuses to make Scripture and reason subordinate to one another, and insists upon making them co-ordinate." Thus declared *Reinhard* in his Confessions.

Theoretically, he was, no doubt, right ; but, practically, the Supernaturalists themselves had entered upon a middle path. In this respect, they stood on one and the same ground with the Rationalists, that they viewed religion as, substantially, a matter of knowledge. Our reason can, by its own power, question this knowledge, said the Rationalists. No, replied the Supernaturalists, we require a higher communication in order to know what is necessary for salvation. But that which the Supernaturalists brought forward as the higher communication, was so intelligible, practical, and moral, that *Lessing's* saying about a revelation which reveals nothing, might well be applied to it by the Rationalists. Thus much one may affirm, in order that all praise may be given to truth, without being blind to the great merit of the men who, at this period of dissolution, still held fast the divine foundation of Christianity, and thus, between the doctrine of the Church of the past and of the future, formed a bridge, however exposed and endangered its pillars might be in the ice-floods of that time. Those words of *Reinhard* caused a movement in which a middle school came out with its claims and demands. "I cannot," said *Tzschirner* in his letters, called forth by *Reinhard's* Confessions (S. 78), "agree with Reinhard's judgment on the absolute contradiction between Rationalism and Supernaturalism, and am convinced that one may still believe in the divine origin of Christianity, even although one does not receive the contents of Scripture in all their extent. I think that system also, which brings forward an idea of reason

as the highest rule of faith, and according to its standard, judges of the contents of Scripture which have been delivered to us, may consider Christianity as a higher revelation, and the Bible as a collection of writings of men sent by God ; provided that the object of revelation be not viewed as the disclosure of that which cannot be known by unassisted reason, but rather as the establishment of the Church, and the confirmation of the religion of reason by the authority of a Divine Ambassador. It appears to me, therefore, that Rationalism is reconcileable with the belief of the higher origin of Christianity ; and I am thus accustomed carefully to distinguish the Rationalism which, although vindicating the supremacy of reason, yet holds fast the idea of a supernatural revelation,—which acknowledges the truth of sacred history, the Bible as the record of revelation, and the Church as an institution established by Providence, aiming at the promotion of morality,—from *Naturalism*, which rejects the idea of revelation as a delusion and deception, denies the truth of evangelical history, declares the Bible to be merely a human book, and the Church a union which has arisen by chance.” This was the so-called *rational Supernaturalism*, a stand-point which Locke had previously maintained in his work “On the Reasonableness of Christianity.” Christianity is a revelation ; but the matter of this revelation is reasonable. Supernaturalism and Rationalism came, in this view, so near one another, that distinguished representatives of them could go even from Supernaturalism to Rationalism (*Bretschneider*, *Schott*), without substantially changing their position. *Dinter* claims to be considered as a rational Supernaturalist ; but one may unhesitatingly regard him as a Rationalist. *Ammon*, in his controversy with *Schleiermacher*, who (and with him, the theological world) had hitherto considered him

as a Rationalist, could assure him that, so far as twenty-two years back, he had professed rational Supernaturalism, and that, for this reason, he had been abused by many Rationalists. *Schleiermacher* answered: "The reference to a preface twenty-two years old, in which M. *Ammon* has already openly and distinctly professed rational Supernaturalism, is of very little use to me; for I know as little as nothing when I am told that some one has, however openly, declared, twenty-two years ago, for something by which, I believe, even to-day no one knows to think of anything definite and distinct, as little as twenty-two years ago. I, for my part at least, feel quite uneasy when I hear the *Ra*, and the *Irra*, and the *Supra*, rushing forth, because it appears to me that this terminology becomes more and more hopelessly confused. But in order that the concert may be complete in all its parts, I beg earnestly, in addition to the irrational and rational Supernaturalism, to propose not only a supernaturalistic rationalism and irrationalism, but also a naturalistic and unnaturalistic super-rationalism. And when those harnessed sons of the earth, for none of them could be of a higher origin, shall stand there in complete array, I hope that the old desire of killing one another will seize them. But as regards M. *Ammon's* rationalistic Supernaturalism, it is indeed a strange thing with a system which, as he himself says, by a gradual tuning taking place at measured periods, has been brought up to the proper height, so as to fall in with the pure tone of the Church (*Werke*, V. S. 417).

*Ammon* has practically confessed by his later development, that the stand-point, which he at that time occupied, was untenable. *Tzschirner*, also, cannot have been strongly convinced of the tenable nature of this middle position, inasmuch as, in his lectures on Systematic Theology, he allowed his hearers to choose between Supernaturalism



and Rationalism. Nowhere did the medium stand-point of neutralization, the eclectic dividing and portioning out, appear to be more untenable than in the history of the Church. The feeble neutrality of rational Supernaturalism could not be the solution of the opposite tendencies. The eighteenth century handed them over unsolved to the nineteenth century.



## SECOND BOOK.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### THE RENOVATION.

THE Subjectivism of the eighteenth century centered, as we saw, in *Fichte*. This height of Idealism, however, *Fichte* himself was not able to maintain; he steered more and more towards Realism both in his philosophy and in his life. But it was not for him only, that that height became the turning point, but for his time also. Two streams have taken their rise there, which have conveyed rich elements of life to the nineteenth century,—a speculative tendency, the heads of which are *Schelling* and *Hegel*; and a tendency of the immediate religious life, the most distinguished representative of which is *Schleiermacher*.

*Schelling*, in his first minor productions, followed altogether in the track of *Fichte*; but as early as in the "Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism" (1795), the traces are clearly found of his stepping beyond the Idealism of *Fichte*. The stand-point of *Kant*, who submits the objective existence to thinking (Criticism), as well as that of *Spinoza*, who submits thinking to the objective existence (Dogmatism), is one-sided. In the meantime, however, *Schelling* contents himself with having pointed out the higher unity of both stand-points. He directed

his regards towards a territory which *Fichte* had left uncultivated—viz., to the Philosophy of Nature. On different sides, desires and efforts had, at that time, been put forward, to rise from the inquiries into the particulars of nature, to a view of its general life.<sup>1</sup> In a number of writings, following each other in quick succession (from 1796 to 1799), he published *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur* [Ideas on a Philosophy of Nature], *Von der Weltseele* [On the mundane Soul], *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Natur* [First Sketch of a System of Nature], he gave to these efforts a great expression. At first, Schelling attempted to prove, from its own ways, that that investigation of nature, did not perform what it promised, and that it was in a higher view of the whole only, that the solution of its contradictions was to be found. At a subsequent period the settling of the relations of the individual sciences, stepped into the background. It is here that the philosophical genius of Schelling comes out most prominently: surprising glances into the whole, most ingenious combinations, poetical conception and style. *Schelling* beholds in nature two powers pervading one another; one working into the infinite, and one opposing it, by which it is obliged to individualise itself, just as a stream, by some obstacle in its course, is obliged to divide itself. The effect of this co-operation of powers opposing one another is organised nature.—The lightnings of *Schelling's* genius kindled everywhere, just because the soil was volcanic. The Ego lost in idealistic webs, greeted, with mysterious forebodings, a world of thoughts behind the phenomena of nature. The powers which worked in the light, the magnet, or electricity, appeared to be analogous to the powers of the mind. “The mind also,” says *Schelling*, “is a world, consisting in the co-operation of

<sup>1</sup> For particulars, see *Rosenkranz* (1843), S. 39.

opposed powers." *Steffens, Schubert, Oken*, and others, proceeded, with the impulses which they had received from *Schelling*, to the investigation of the life of the universe, not, indeed, without being much ridiculed by professional men, but yet not without bringing out some important and lasting results in particulars, and opening up a way for an aim which naturalists in their researches cannot again abandon. Although *Schelling's* Philosophy of Nature was used for establishing a foundation for Materialism (*Oken*), yet it was an important stage in the way on which we see the German mind entering since the beginning of the century—viz., the way of reconciling the subject with reality. It has prepared a more profound, more Christian contemplation of nature, and has set up a barrier against the self-complacency of superficial education, which waged war against Scripture, with the perceptions of the ordinary course of nature. The mystery in which it saw the universe moving, has, in many of its disciples, awakened the longing for a higher mystery (*Schubert, Steffens*). When the master had quickly traversed the territory of the Philosophy of Nature, he represented his entire view in a number of writings, which followed one another in rapid succession, and among which *System des transcendentalen Idealismus* (System of transcendental Idealism, 1800), and *Vorlesungen über die Methode des Academischen Studiums* (Lectures on the Method of Academical Study, 1803), are the most important. Neither the Ego nor the non-Ego, neither Idealism nor Realism is the truth, but the identity of both. God is the absolute which represents itself as divided into the spheres of mind and nature, just as in the magnet we perceive the difference of the positive and negative poles. *Spinoza's* spirit was revived in this view. As *Spinoza's* substance is the negation of all



finite phenomena—which are comprehended in the two attributes, extension and thought, material and spiritual world—and yet manifests itself only in bringing forth these finite phenomena ; so Schelling's God is the *neutrum* of Idealism and Realism, of nature and mind, and yet exists only in the process of his transition and change into these particular forms ; just as the point of indifference of the magnet, which is neither north-pole nor south-pole, and yet is indifference only in so far as a difference exists. The essential difference between *Spinoza* and *Schelling* consists in this, that the latter conceives, in a more positive manner, of the relation between the absolute and the particular phenomena, as a vital process. This doctrine was, no doubt, an inference from *Fichte's*. The Ego, which could not get rid of the non-Ego, proved itself to be finite. It was only one step to say : neither the Ego nor the non-Ego, but the identity of both is the truth.—*Schelling*, however, soon abandoned this position ; his philosophy became, under the influence of *Jacob Böhme*, theosophy. In his treatise, *Ueber die Freiheit* (on liberty, 1809), God is conceived of as will. The discord of the vital process in God, the opposition of the pure will in God to a natural ground in God, manifests itself in the course of the world, which represents the struggle of freedom against blind necessity. One might almost say that this view stands in the same relation to the former as Parsiism does to Brahminism. After this, *Schelling*, for a longer period, withdrew from the scene of philosophy.

In the meanwhile, another (*Hegel*) had taken the lead in philosophy. *Kant* came out in his strength when an old man ; *Fichte* and *Schelling* reached the zenith of their glorious career when still in youth—*Fichte* being the youthful philosopher, striving upwards like a Titan, while

*Schelling* was the youth of creative genius. *Hegel*, on the other hand, stands before us as a man. He was not possessed of *Fichte's* ardent desire for deeds, nor of *Schelling's* philosophical poetry, but of a power of philosophical abstraction, of a consistency of thought, of a thoroughness of methodical deduction, of an extent of knowledge such as very few only have shown in the history of philosophy. If, after all, we wish to judge of modern philosophy from its own stand-point, we must say that *Hegel's* philosophy is the fruit of the blossoms of the philosophy of *Fichte* and *Schelling*. As *Fichte* started from *Kant*, as *Schelling* from *Fichte*, so *Hegel* started from *Schelling*. But he soon found a twofold error in *Schelling's* doctrine of identity—a formal and a material one. *Schelling*, it is true, was a disciple of *Fichte*; but that very thing, in which the strength of the *Wissenschaftslehre* lies, viz., the strict methodical deduction of all the results of philosophy, from one principle, he never accomplished. He never attained to a method; he demanded the so-called intellectual intuition. This, indeed, was tantamount to granting the system at the outset. But this demand, *Hegel* says, must be proved. Philosophy stands or falls with its method. The fundamental material mistake of the doctrine of identity is this, that the absolute is not the concrete, but the neutral unity of nature and mind. The substance of *Schelling* is, as it were, the “dark in which all cats are grey.” These thoughts pervade the preface of his *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807). The object of this work, which *Hegel* afterwards used to call his voyage of discovery,<sup>1</sup> is to demonstrate how all the positions which consciousness assumes towards objective being, resolve themselves, by their inner dialectics, into

<sup>1</sup> *Michelet*, History of the last systems of Philosophy in Germany. II., S. 616.

that stand-point with which philosophy begins, viz., the stand-point of the thinking, which knows itself to be identical with being. The great difficulties which are offered to the study of this work, lie mainly in the undeveloped state of the whole stand-point; but the foundation of it is clearly expressed. The absolute is the concrete unity of nature and mind, of being and thinking; but this unity is the *Notion*. The Notion is not only the absolute contents of thinking, but also the substance of all being. Every thing which is, in nature as in the life of mankind, is a form of the Notion. This Notion, in its logical substance, is treated of in his *Logic*—the principal work of Hegel, which he wrote during his rectorship in Nuremberg (1808-16). Thinking, which views its matter, not as subjective thoughts merely, but as the substance of all being, evolves its logical contents by means of the absolute method. "This realm is the truth as it appears in itself and without covering. One may, therefore, well say, that these contents are the representation of God as He is in His eternal being before the creation of nature, and of the finite mind." Just as with *Spinoza* and *Schelling*, God is in reality a logical definition only, whether it be called substance or absolute; so with Hegel also, God is a logical idea only—viz., the Notion itself. Starting from pure being, Hegel shows how the most general Notion points beyond itself, condenses itself into Notions more and more concrete, until at last it centres in the absolute Notion. The categories, which *Logic* had hitherto treated as purely formal definitions, are here viewed as thoughts full of meaning, as stages by which the Notion rises to a higher stage. Hegel shows how each of these stages has found its expression in some philosophy. Brahminism viewed God as Being, *Leibnitz* as Monad, *Pythagoras* as Number, *Spinoza* as Substance,

etc. Thus, this work becomes a logical theogony, and dialectic judgment of the world. Whatever paths the human mind may yet enter upon, this Logic will remain one of its greatest works. After Hegel had thus given the metaphysical foundation of his system, he found himself called upon, by his position as Professor of Philosophy in Heidelberg (since 1816) to bring out the sketch of his system in his "Encyclopædia of Philosophy" (1817). God is the absolute Notion, in whom thinking and being are identical; but this absolute Notion has a purely logical existence. Just as *Spinoza's* Substance, *Schelling's* Absolute, although infinite, yet exists only by producing the finite, so the logical truth exists really only by giving existence to itself in nature and finite mind. The Notion exists in nature as an immediate reality in a number of stages, in which its essence manifests itself more and more clearly. Nature is the dumb mind, the Notion fettered by the bands of matter. The highest stage which it attains is life; it receives consciousness in the human mind only. The single individual (*subjective mind*) enjoys the liberty of recognising objectively in the spheres of jurisprudence, morals, and politics (*objective mind*);—and to strive after this liberty is its highest aim. This sphere of the Notion, Hegel has elaborated in his *Rechtsphilosophie* (Philosophy of Law, 1821). The stand-point which he occupies here is quite the ancient one. As the man of classical antiquity knew nothing higher than to be a beautiful representation of the common life of his native land, so Hegel's man is lost in the objective mind which spreads itself in the states of the earth, and is evolved in the history of the world. In the human race's consciousness of God, the Notion goes back into itself (*absolute mind*). Its consciousness of God, mankind expresses in art, religion, philosophy. In art, the idea is



expressed in physical materials. Their consciousness of God has, by the nations, been cut in stone, represented in colours, breathed forth in music, uttered in poetical words; but the physical materials are not the corresponding form of existence for the idea. In religion, we have the idea in the form of conception and feeling. The absolute religion, of which all the others are only preparatory stages, is Christianity. In the God-man, that was manifested, which is the substance of all religion, viz., the unity of man with God. That which in the God-man represented itself in absolute originality, is, in the Spirit, to become the common property of mankind. It is true, even religion is not yet the pure form of the idea. If God be *the* Notion, then the corresponding form in which we conceive of Him can be notional thinking only—*i. e.*, philosophy. Mankind's knowing of God is God's knowing of himself; in the mind of mankind God evolves himself. This process of the development of mankind, Hegel has drawn in bold, grand outlines.

This course of philosophy, since *Fichte*, had a powerful influence upon the development of the general, as well as of religious life. The Ego which, ever since the eighteenth century, had absorbed all powers of life, returned, in *Schelling*, into nature; in *Hegel*, into the moral and religious life, with the conviction of finding there eternal truth. These philosophical systems produced a reconciling and restoring character. As regards, more especially, the religious life, the pantheistic spirit represented by *Schelling* and *Hegel* produced a beneficial reaction against the insipid Theism of the eighteenth century, although, in itself, it was a grave aberration from truth. These philosophers called forth the conviction, that that Supreme Being, whom *Illuminism* had placed beyond the stars, as a dead abstraction, was the essence, truth, power,



and life of the world. The bold attempts to comprehend, from a single principle, heaven and earth, again impressed it upon the conviction, that if men wished to know the truth, they must know everything in God; and doctrines of Christianity, which were looked upon as being long ago set aside, such as the Trinity, the union of the divine and human natures, etc., displayed depths into which they looked with amazement. This speculative school became, of course, a stone of offence to the disciples of *Illuminism*. The philosophers of *Illuminism* could not conceal from themselves that these philosophers, too, possessed reason, and undoubtedly greater skill and depth in philosophy than they themselves did. And now to behold these results opposed to everything which, according to the common intellectual sense, could exist! In boldness of investigation, in acuteness of thought, in moral energy, in power of language, in everything, in short, which they admired, *Fichte* was far superior to the men of *Illuminism*, and yet he walked in paths of thought absolutely inaccessible. Him, too, *Nicolai* at length ventured to assail, but only to find his literary death. *Fichte's* pamphlet (edited by *A. W. Schlegel*): "*Frederick Nicolai's Life and Strange Opinions*," is one of the most crushing controversial treatises which was ever written.

The second school, which proceeded from *Fichte*, is commonly designated by the name of the "Romantic." The Ego of *Fichte* was not the individual, but that which is common to all individuals—the universal personality. But life is not so logical as science. A circle of distinguished literati, who, with the critical severity of *Lessing*, renewed *Lessing's* demand for genius, covered themselves with the cloak of this philosophy. The mystery of life, they said, lies in a God-given original life, in an instinctively working genius of the Ego. By *Schelling* this is

called "intellectual intuition," by *Schlegel*, *Tieck*, *Novalis*, "poetry," by *Schleiermacher*, "sense and taste for the infinite." To follow this divine impulse of life is the highest object and duty. This circle knew that, with such a view of life, they were in decided opposition to the world of *Illuminism*, which, in moral life, followed ethics,—in their vocation, utilitarianism,—in social life, education,—in philosophy and religion, common sense. The bold youth comprehended this world, governed by such aims, under the name of *Philisterwelt* (world of Philistines), and never wearied in holding them up to ridicule. This irony was a power, because it appeared combined with eminent sagacity and humour. That which is most splendid in *Tieck's* productions of that period is the humour which he has poured out upon the whole literature of common sense. The critical skill of the two *Schlegels* becomes terrorism in the "Athenæum." The ironical feature which pervades *Schleiermacher's* character comes most prominently out, when, with superior understanding, he compels common sense to confess its nothingness. But, hand in hand with this negative element, there was a positive one also. They who thought this to be the mystery of life, to follow, without reflecting, the poetical genius, looked with deep longings into a time when poetry still ruled the nations—the time of the middle ages. *Novalis* celebrated the middle ages in his *Ofterdingen*. *Tieck* revived the world of tales, the popular traditions, the minnesong, the ancient German art. Although they saw a very scanty remainder of mediæval glory in the modern Roman Catholicism, yet they found in it more pasture than in cleared out Protestantism. *Fred. Schlegel* and *Zach. Werner* went over to Roman Catholicism, and *Görres*, at a later period, placed his Romanticism entirely at the service of Rome. Creations of true art, however,

have not been produced by this Romantic school, not even by *Tieck*; and however strangely it may sound, the reason is, that it had too much of that which it fought against, and too little of that which it aimed at. There was too much reflecting understanding, and too little original genius in these Romantics. All of them were stronger in criticising than in creating, more powerful in their aims than in their poetry. Even *Tieck* never denied his philosophizing native place, Berlin. As their predilection for the middle ages was only a poetical dilettanteism, so the authority also for which many a disciple of this school was longing was rather a palliative for the unbridled caprice of his doings, than a truly moral bent. *Werner* continued, after he had turned a priest, to have, in the pulpit, his sport with the most sacred things, just as formerly he had sported with Protestantism. He, in the Vienna Conference, performed the parts of *Abraham* and *Santa Clara*. "The Romantics," says one of them, "wished, indeed, the positive, not from an orthodox zeal, but for the sake of the mysterious and miraculous, for the sake of the beautiful halo which surrounds the positive; they fought for a faith which, in reality, they themselves had not. Hence their uncertain conduct, this artificial, eccentric, forced Roman Catholicism."<sup>1</sup> This school, however, also fulfilled its mission. The crushing irony with which they assailed *Illuminism* has had a ventilating and purifying influence. Romanticism has awakened a historical sense, the farther development of which we shall see at a subsequent period. But it has especially contributed to produce the conviction that moral life is its own aim, not a mere appendage to

<sup>1</sup> *Eichendorff* on the Moral and Religious Importance of the Modern Romantic Poetry in Germany. S. 31.

ethics; and it has been the merit of *Schleiermacher* especially to vindicate this.

In 1799, appeared *Schleiermacher's* "*Reden über Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*" (Discourses on Religion, addressed to the educated among its despisers). It was the same year in which *Fichte* was accused of atheism, and obliged to leave Jena. This affair with *Fichte* is an historical commentary on these discourses. *Fichte* was quite the man of his system; the man of the Ego, which submits to itself the non-Ego, was of the boldest energy. According to a family tradition, he was the descendant of a Swedish soldier who, during the 'Thirty Years' War, had remained in Lusatia.<sup>1</sup> Whether that be the case or not, he was a man possessed of the reflection and boldness of a Northlander. In the same powerful manner in which, in his chair, he dealt with his students, and, in his writings, with the public, whom he would compel to understand, he broke, in life also, through everything which he imagined to be a barrier. In his system there was no room for the supra-mundane God of Kant; all religion became faith in the moral order of the world. This he gave forth, with regardless candour, in an essay "On the grounds of our belief in a moral order of the world." In consequence of the agitation called forth by this essay, the government of Electoral Saxony called upon that of Weimar to interfere against excesses directed against even natural religion. Charles Augustus of Weimar, who shortly before had taken *Dr Paulus* under his protection, thought only of satisfying the government of Electoral Saxony by a certain appearance. *Schiller* gave, in the name of the Duke, the most satisfactory declarations to *Fichte*; *Goethe* judged on the whole affair like an Epicurean: on God and divine things people should observe

<sup>1</sup> *Fichte*, the younger: Johann Gottlieb Fichte. I.



the deepest silence. And what could *Herder* say, with his Spinozistic views of God? The most distinguished theologians were anxious to assure Fichte of their sympathy. Fichte would have easily got off, if, confiding in his right, he had not asked an honourable victory. In the whole business, the atheist appears as the most moral man. The government of Weimar got out of the scrape by accepting the resignation which, in a private letter, Fichte had offered. Fichte went to Berlin, where his democratic tendencies, at first, caused some hesitation; but when the people became convinced that he was not a Jacobin, they neither remembered nor meddled with his controversy with God. Frederick William said: "If Fichte be a quiet citizen, a residence in my realm may be readily granted to him. If it be true that he is engaged in a controversy with our blessed God, the Lord himself may settle that with him; I don't mind it." It was in such a time, when not Christianity merely, but general religion and piety had thus fallen into decay, that *Schleiermacher* came out with his Discourses on religion: "I know," he says, "that you worship the Deity in holy retirement as little as you attend the deserted temples; and that in your adorned dwellings, no other sacred things are to be found than the wise sayings of our wise men, and the glorious fictions and creations of our artists; and that humanism and sociality, art and science, have so completely taken possession of your hearts and minds, that no room is left for the eternal and holy Being whom you place altogether beyond the world." He told them that he did not come to them as a clergyman, in order to plead for the doctrine and faith of the Church: "I have nothing to do with these old orthodox and barbarous lamentations whereby they would again cry up the fallen walls of their Jewish Zion, and its Gothic pillars." He



came to them as their equal, and he would fight with no other weapon than their own. You have begun to doubt of religion, because you do not find a proper place for it, either in the territory of knowledge, or in that of will. You are right; but you are mistaken in imagining that you thereby strike at religion. Religion is neither knowledge, nor willing, but feeling. The moment of original life, out of which all the powers and faculties of the soul spring, is that when, unconsciously and immediately, man, the incarnate reason, is united with, and absorbed in the universe. This moment, which lies beyond all consciousness is required. "If I, at least, may advance a simile, and compare it, since I cannot describe it, I would say that it is fleeting and perspicuous, like that fragrance which the moisture of the dew calls forth from blossoms and fruits, sacred and fruitful like a bridal embrace." As soon as consciousness and reflection begin, man separates what that moment unites, viz., the Ego and the universe. To know, is to place the universe into the Ego; to will, the Ego into the universe. In the realm of knowledge, which is divided into that of physics and ethics, there remains as little a place for religion as in the realm of action, which is either moral or artistic. Religion is in the feeling which refers all the phenomena in the universe to the whole, to the Infinite, to the Spirit of the universe. It is first in religion that that original unity of man with the universe is restored, although only within consciousness; it is first in religion that knowing and acting find their connecting link. Inasmuch as all life stands in an internal connection, the religious life will also communicate itself to knowing and acting; but in neither sphere does it appear in its purity, but as in an ore, and mixed with dross; doctrines of faith are, so to speak, cooled lava. This feeling does not rise immediately

to the infinite, but always through the medium of the phenomena of the universe. This feeling perceives, in all the forms of nature, phenomena of the life of the universe working according to laws ; and in all forms of humanity it perceives revelations of the one indivisible humanity. Religious feeling seeks to communicate itself. There are virtuosos of religion around whom those are gathering whose religious life falls in harmoniously with the sounds which are raised by the former. Thus there arise circles of religious communities. One must not, indeed, in speaking of them, think of our ecclesiastical communities, which can scarcely be viewed as preparatory schools of these. "I have represented to you a society of men whose piety has become conscious to them, and in whom the religious view of life has become predominant above all others ; and as I think I have convinced you that these must be men of some education and much energy, and that there can be only a few of them, you must not seek their union where many hundreds are assembled in large temples, and their singing strikes your ear even at a distance. You know that men of this kind do not stand so near each other." Religious life, although one as to its essence, viz., sense and taste for the infinite, expresses itself in various religions, because there are many modes of viewing the universe ; variety in religion is a necessary thing. It is altogether wrong to say : This religion is true, and that is false ; it is only when religion is viewed as knowledge that we arrive at the notion of true and false. "Everything which is immediate in religion is true, for in what other manner could it have arisen ? But immediate is only that which has not yet gone through the notion, but has grown up purely in the feeling. Even everything which anywhere takes a religious form is good, for it does so only because it expresses com-

mon higher life. Modern Rome, ungodly, but consistent, fulminates excommunications, and casts out heretics. Ancient Rome, truly pious and religious in a higher style, was hospitable to every god, and for this reason it was full of gods." Christianity does not claim to be the only true religion. "Although there will always be Christians, shall Christianity be, for this reason, unlimited in its general diffusion, and alone prevalent among mankind as the only religion? It scorns this exclusive dominion, which would degrade it; it sufficiently honours each of its elements to look upon it with delight as a centre of a peculiar whole; it not only wishes to produce infinite variety out of itself, but would like to look, out of its sphere, on all that variety which it cannot produce out of itself. It never forgets that it has the best proof of its eternity in its tendency to degenerate, and in its own history, often so sad; and it always waits for a redemption from the imperfection by which it is pressed down. It is just for this reason that it would like to see, away from this corruption, proceeding other forms of religion, younger, and, if possible, stronger and more beautiful, close by itself, from all points, and even from those regions which appear to it as the extreme and doubtful limits of religion in general. The religion of religions cannot gather materials enough for its pure tendency towards all that is human; and just as nothing is more irreligious than to demand uniformity in mankind in general, so nothing is more unchristian than to seek uniformity in religion."

*Neander*<sup>1</sup> bears witness to the impression which these discourses produced upon their time. "Those who at that time belonged to the rising generation, will remember

<sup>1</sup> *Das verflossene halbe Jahrhundert* (the bygone half-century) in *Abhandlungen*, S. 224.

with what power this book influenced the minds of the young, being written in all the vigour of youthful enthusiasm, and bearing witness to the neglected, undeniable religious element in human nature. That which constitutes the peculiar characteristic of religion, viz., that it is an independent element in human nature, had fallen into oblivion by a one-sided rational or speculative tendency, or a one-sided tendency to absorb it in ethics. *Schleiermacher* had touched a note which, especially in the minds of youth, could not but continue to sound everywhere. Men were led back into the depth of their heart, to perceive here a divine drawing which, when once called forth, might lead them beyond that which the author of this impulse had expressed with distinct consciousness." In these words, there is a simple expression of what that is which constitutes the power and eternal truth of these discourses. The eighteenth century wished to reduce all relations to their natural foundation; but that which they considered to be the natural foundation was, when more closely examined, nothing but abstractions of the intellect. They considered the conviction of the reality of the ideas of God, duty, and immortality, as the natural foundation of all religions. The futility of this proceeding is incontrovertibly proven by *Schleiermacher*. Religion, whatever may be the matter of conviction, is a fact of immediate life in man. He who would understand the nature of religion, must point out this root of life. This even *Lessing* had declared; this had been maintained by *Jacobi* also, of whom *Schleiermacher* says, that he owed to him more than he himself was aware of. *Schleiermacher*, the son of a pious mother, brought up in the schools of the Moravian Brethren at Niesky and Barby, could call religion the motherly breast by which his young life had been nourished. But, beside this religious disposition, a tendency to reflection very



early manifested itself, which made the boy doubt the truth of all history, and of the doctrines of faith handed down; and, the youth having been nourished by classical and philosophical studies, speedily became estranged from the sphere of Moravianism.<sup>1</sup> But that which *Schleiermacher* ever retained from this education, was a religious fervour, which, according to the manner of the Moravians, concentrated itself in the heart. The study of Plato, which engaged him when still in Niesky, and which afterwards produced as its fruit his masterly translation of the dialogues of Plato, seems, in the first instance, to have influenced his style only, and his dialectic disposition, and hence to have exercised an influence which was only formal. On the other hand, his Discourses on religion, point to another philosophy. All religion is to be in feeling,—that feeling, which views all finite phenomena as the manifestations of the life of the universe. “The contemplation of the pious is only an immediate consciousness that all finite is altogether in and through the Infinite,—all temporal in and through the Eternal. It is this which we seek and find in all which lives and moves,—in all growth and change,—in all doing and suffering; and to know life itself in this light, is religion.” There is, no doubt, although *Schleiermacher* at a subsequent period has confounded the judgment by his sophistical interpretation, that this feeling corresponds with the stand-point of that philosopher, of whom it is recorded that he said: “Offer reverently with me a lock to the manes of holy rejected Spinoza! He was inspired by the high Spirit of the universe; the Infinite was his beginning and end,—the universe his only eternal love. In holy innocence and deep humility he beheld, as in a glass, his image in

<sup>1</sup> See the autobiographical fragment, communicated by *Lommatzsch* in *Niedner's Zeitschrift*, H. I., S. 435.



the eternal world, and was anxious that its image too should be reflected by him in the most lovely manner. He was full of religion and of the Holy Spirit ; he therefore still stands out alone and unapproached, master in his art, but elevated above the profane craft, without disciples, and without citizenship." If God be viewed as the substance of the universe, which has existence in the single phenomena of nature and mind only, then all religion can, of course, consist only in acknowledging the universe in the single phenomena. For this very reason, feeling is not allowed to rise immediately to the Infinite, because this Infinite has existence in the finite only. The passages which we have quoted shew what a low position *Schleiermacher*, from the stand-point of this pantheistic religion, assigned to Christianity. It is a religion, beside others which have an equally good title, and has yet to expect more perfect forms of its essence. "The original view of Christianity is none else than that of the universal striving of all which is finite towards the unity of the whole, and of the manner in which the Deity treats this striving, and in which it reconciles the enmity against itself, and puts limits to the increasing alienation, by single points scattered over the whole, which, at the same time, are finite and infinite, divine and human." The simple meaning of this strangely worded speech is this: The centre of Christianity is the reconciliation of sinful mankind with God by the God-man. If all religion consists in the union of the finite with the Infinite, then sin appears as "resistance of the finite to the unity of the whole." But altogether unintelligible are "the points scattered over the whole, which are divine and human." It seems almost as if Christianity were teaching several God-men and Redeemers. At all events, it appears how very far *Schleiermacher* still was from Christianity.

As in five discourses, *Schleiermacher* represented his religious stand-point, so almost contemporaneously (1800), in five monologues, his moral stand-point. That which constitutes the nature of man, is not his outward actions, nor his outward fate, but his free personality. That which the prevailing opinion calls moral law or conscience, is nothing else than our universal Ego. But it is absolutely wrong to attempt to reduce all men to the Ego of mankind. Moral excellence rather consists in representing humanity in an individual manner. In the face of mankind, every man should cultivate his individuality, but in such a way as to preserve sympathy and love for other individualities, and hence to remain in union with mankind. "Now, it has become clear to me, that every man is in his own way to represent mankind, in a peculiar mixture of its elements, in order that it may manifest itself in every way, and, in the fulness of time and space, really become all which, by any possibility, it can,—and that all that variety may come forth from its womb, which in any way it may contain." *Schleiermacher* knows that, with these moral views, he stands as isolated in his time, as he does with his views on religion; but a better time is coming. "Thus, in my mode of thinking, as well as in my life, I am a stranger to the present generation,—a prophetic citizen of a later world to which I am drawn by a lively imagination and strong faith, and every deed and every action belongs to it." But whatever may come to pass, he who has found his innermost being fears nothing. "To become more and more that which I am, is my only wish." In the last monologues, the Ego confesses that it is a world which is sufficient for itself, whatever the outer world may bring. It knows itself to be old in youth, and vows to itself eternal youth in old age. "To the consciousness of inner freedom, and acting

in accordance with it, corresponds eternal youth and joy. This I have got hold of, and shall never give it up again; and, with a smile, I thus see vanishing the light of mine eyes, and white hairs springing up among my fair locks. Whatever may happen, nothing shall grieve my heart; the pulse of my inner life shall remain fresh until I die."

In these monologues, the stand-point is vindicated, which, as we have already seen, proceeded from that of Fichte—the stand-point of the individuality—which indeed has given up the bold unbounded aims of *Fichte's* Ego, but yet not its idealistic self-possession. This moral view of the world, according to which mankind is represented in the individual, has something classical in it. The individual does not seek truth beyond the stars, nor after this life, but it is, and he has it, in his individuality, which he shapes into a moral work of art. And with this classical stand-point, no doubt the classical calmness of *Schleiermacher's* style is connected. The language in which a beautiful moral personality represents itself, must itself be artistically formed, and the spinning out of the individual life manifests itself in the structure of the periods calmly spun out. But it is only a classical tendency which this stand-point has. In the ancient world, the moral common life of the State was the substance of the individual; here, all the moral powers of life are only enlargements of the individuality. It is in this going out from the individuality,—in this idealism of disposition,—in this general self-enjoyment,—in this youthful courage,—which, in the discourses on religion, assumes to be the mediator of religious life, and, in the monologues, the seer giving forth oracles,—in this feature of irony which takes the weapons of dialectics;—it is in this that the romantic elements in *Schleiermacher* consist. *Schleiermacher*, who, at the time when the Dis-

courses and Monologues appeared, was a minister in Berlin, had at that time much intercourse with *Frederick Schlegel*. A monument of this intercourse are the "Letters on Lucinde," which cast a shade on *Schleiermacher* that no apology can remove. In these letters, the wife of the minister *Grunow*, has a share. With her *Schleiermacher* stood in a relation which, likewise, cannot be justified by any defence. She was just about to be divorced, and he was on the point of marrying her, when her conscience awoke. He belonged to the circle of Prince Louis, in which intellect and art, but not morality, reigned. A clergyman, who was a pious and honourable man, although his theology was adulterated with *Illuminism*, Court-chaplain *Sack*, at that time reproved him, with paternal gravity, for his intercourse, his haughty irony, his unnatural style, his Spinozistic views, his position, unfitting him for the ministerial office. *Schleiermacher* answered in the clever and evasive manner, which, in his notes to the Discourses on Religion, has erected to itself so sad a monument.<sup>1</sup>

To the theistic intellectual naturalism, *Schleiermacher* had, in the Discourses, opposed a pantheistic naturalism of life. However, he came nearer to positive Christianity. In the *Weihnachtsfeier* (Christmas celebration, 1806), Christ appears as the heavenly centre of all religion. This dialogue is an imitation of Plato's Symposium; as the latter is a kind of apotheosis of Socrates, so the former is a glorification of Christ. It is divided into three parts. In the first, a child appears in the foreground, with its

<sup>1</sup> On *Schleiermacher's* relation to *Schlegel*, see *Varnhagen von Ense, Denkwürdigkeiten*, IV. S. 367, ff; on that to Madame *Grunow*: *Gass, Schleiermacher's Briefwechsel mit Gass*, P. xxxi. xxxvi.; on that to Prince *Louis*: *Fürst, Henriette Herz*, S. III. ff; *Sack's* Letter: *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1850, H. 2, S. 143.



child-like joy in Christ, representing itself in pictures and music. In the second part, women of different dispositions exhibit their inner life in Christ. In the third, the critico-rationalistic, the reflecting, and the speculative views of Christ are set forth by men. This dialogue resembles the work of a watch, in which every pin is calculated. It is in this intentionality, no doubt, that the fundamental error of the whole lies. The representation of the pious child is a total failure, and the enthusiastic Joseph, an abortive Alcibiades. In general, the artistic form of these works does not appear to be successful; the individual is too dialectic, the dialectic too individual. The language of *Schleiermacher* is wanting in the simplicity of truth, the instinct of genius; there is too much which is artificial, studied, and intentional in his style.<sup>1</sup>

To the two streams which had sprung forth from his own height, *Fichte* himself opened up a course into life. The distress of his fatherland was a powerful call upon his energy. In his "Discourses to the German Nation," he held up to the fallen people a mirror of its past history, and of its present spiritual debasement, and found the way for a better future, chiefly in a better education, as

<sup>1</sup> *Sack*, l. c. says:—Revolting to me is the revolutionary new language, which, in defiance of the first rule of all rational speaking and teaching—intelligibility—always pays in false coin, wraps itself up in mysterious darkness, and, from a fear of expressing itself in a vulgar manner, becomes bombastic; just like a man, who, in order to appear taller than others, goes upon stilts. At least, a man so well acquainted as you are with the noble simplicity of the Greeks, should despise this pompous and tasteless style, and leave it to the enthusiasts and poetical witlings, who are contented with the admiration of sentimental would-be learned women. The cutting dogmatizing also is, in matters of this kind, certainly as little a necessary requirement as a recommendation of a true philosophy.



the master of which he set up *Pestalozzi*. The philanthropists and humanists had aimed at producing cultivated men ; *Pestalozzi's* education aimed at the moral and spiritual salvation of the neglected people. By a commission from the Swiss government, he went (1798) to Stanz, to the poor children who were altogether perishing in consequence of the French wars ; and there his warm love for the people, his paternal, educational wisdom, found a sphere of truly heroic activity. The secret of his success lay in the circumstance, that he brought into the educational establishment the family-spirit, whose influence he had himself experienced. He planted the school in the soil of the family. It is for this reason that he liked so much to put his educational wisdom into the mouths of mothers. In the work, "*Wie Gertrud ihre Kinder lehrt*" (how *Gertrude* teaches her children), the fundamental thoughts of his method are expressed "Man ! imitate the doing of sublime nature, which, from the germ of even the greatest tree, first brings forth an imperceptible germ, but then by shoots as imperceptible, as daily and hourly prepared, first displays the foundation of the stem, then that of the boughs, then that of the branches, up to the last twigs on which the perishable leaves are hanging. The organism of human nature is, as to its substance, subject to the same laws. According to these laws, all instruction consists, in every department of knowledge, in calling forth by love and wisdom, that which is nearest and first, which is originally indwelling in the human mind ; then gradually, but with uninterrupted strength, to derive even higher and nobler results from that which is primary and original, and to keep all its parts and results, up to the highest and most perfect, in a living and harmonious connection." *Pestalozzi's* thought was thus an organic education following the natural development.

Like the Philanthropists, he proceeded from a belief in the natural goodness of human nature, and was indeed only anxious to bring to light the treasure of the good powers of nature ; but what he wished to elaborate was not, as in the case of the Philanthropists, the disposition of man for civil society, nor, as in the case of the Humanists, the abstract human, but the inner life. "The true teacher of this method, full of humility, feeling the weakness and imperfection of his own personality, does not venture violently to interfere with the pupil's course of development. To behold the faculties, the individuality in the child, its peculiar independent life, and to recognize how the human appears in infinite forms, and how, nevertheless, the one humanity appears in all of them ; how every one is a mirror of the whole, and reveals, more or less visibly, with greater or less glory, the one unchangeable thing :—to recognise this is the delight of the educationist, who has understood his task and his relation to humanity ; it is his weapon, his strength, his reward, the inexhaustible source of his love, and the inspiring spring of his activity." So *Schleiermacher* might have spoken, and indeed *Pestalozzi's* education stands almost in the same relation to that of the Philanthropists and Humanists, as *Schleiermacher's* naturalism, to that of Theism. This man's inexhaustible love, child-like humility, and increasing efforts, have certainly been influenced by the Spirit of Jesus Christ ; only, the gospel was not the central and culminating point of his educational system, by which, however, many a noble soul has been led to the Lord. *Pestalozzi's* method, held up as a model by Fichte in these discourses, was, especially in Prussia, employed by government, as well as by single eminent pupils of his.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In what I have said about *Pestalozzi*, I have chiefly followed *Blochmann's* book, "Heinrich Pestalozzi" (Dresden, 1846),

Fichte's thoughts, also, about a better physical education, were carried out by his disciple *Jahn*, the head-master of gymnastics (*Turnen*). It was, generally speaking, the Prussian State in which the regeneration of Germany was prepared. The soul of the political re-organization was *Stein*. The great point was to compensate, in a moral and intellectual way, for the loss of half of the kingdom, and to break from within that which added strength to the enemy. This State, carried to the brink of the abyss of destruction, by following its separate policy, now entered upon an historical and German path, leading away from the path of *Illuminism*,—a path on which non-Prussians, with German hearts, such as the Saxon *Fichte*, the Rhenish baron of the Empire, *Von Stein*, the silently working Hanoverian *Scharnhorst*, were its guides. The guerillas of Spain, the rising of Tyrol, the immense sacrificial flames of Moscow, showed what a people could do when it feels itself to be a people; and the daring enterprises of *Dörenberg*, *Schill*, *Brunswick-Oels*, showed that the spirit of chivalry had not yet died out in Germany. By his manifesto, the king at last placed himself at the head of the movement. Russia, prepared for war, stood in the back-ground; Austria soon joined. It was not the greatness of the princes, not even the strategical skill of the generals, but the morally renewed spirit of the people, which conquered Napoleon. To this prince of war, who had gone forth from the Revolution, was given power over the nations, as long as they themselves still carried the Revolution within themselves. The old German empire must fall, for it was long ago decayed; but the particular states of Germany, which had now become

which, along with the characteristics by *Raumer*, in his history of Pedagogy, is the best which has been written on this point.

independent, could not receive any better consecration for the task, assigned to them, of representing, each in its particular way, the old German empire, than this baptism of blood. The circumstance, however, that after this fearful judgment of God, the diplomatists were, as the well-known proverb says, dancing without moving from their places; and that, when they earnestly took up the matter, they gave to *Talleyrand* so much scope for his tricks, that the return of Napoleon was necessary to prevent a war among the allies;—this circumstance is indeed a sad proof for the truth of the question of the prophet: “To whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?” Those liberation-wars have, in the hand of God, been the turning-point for the religious renovation, which German science, as we saw, had foreboded and prepared;—and science is, after all, the peculiar sphere of the Germans.

A spirit of moral earnestness, an historical sense, a new religious life henceforth manifest themselves in Germany.

We say, a spirit of moral earnestness. That which imparts stability to a Christian people, a patriotic and religious spirit, had altogether perished in the age of *Illuminism*. The single individuals followed their sentimental interests, their family happiness, their humanistic societies, their particular, strange virtues, their æsthetical enjoyments. It was very wholesome for this generation, shut up in their subjectivity, that fate, of which in sentimental phrases, they were declaiming, met them in a very serious manner, in that man, who was fond of viewing himself as the servant of fate. The terrors of war showed to the people how unsafe is the world formed around the hearth, when throne and altar are shaken. This translation from the play of subjective tendencies into the earnest



surrender to the moral, fundamental powers of life, is, in a very impressive, lively, and conspicuous manner, brought before our eyes by the life-pictures of *Arndt*, *Steffens*, *Stein*, *Perthes*, and others. The *Tugendbund* (union for virtue) found in the Fatherland the object of virtue. There breathes in the Romantics of the liberation-wars, after all, another moral spirit than in *Tieck*, *Schlegel*, etc. In *Theodore Körner* patriotic enthusiasm comes out, after a struggle with sentimentalism, in such strength as could not fail powerfully to affect that period. *Rückert* breathes into the soft forms of the sonnet the courage of bold youth. In the lays of *Schenkendorf*, a chivalrous personality, full of love, truth, and faith, is displayed. *Uhland*, in the spirit and power of the Minnesingers, sang songs pervaded by patriotic enthusiasm, and gentle presentiments of the glory of the Church. In the solitude of a forest, on a place where a ringing of bells out of the depth testifies of a lost Church, he beholds the mediæval Church in the form of a minster, rising and disappearing in the skies. *Justinus Kerner* represents the spirit of melancholy, which has always been peculiar to the German people, but purified into a longing for a future better world, which, by its world of spirits, is connected with this present world. The academical youth brought home from the battle fields a chivalrous courage, a patriotic sense, a moral consecration ; but as life did not afford to them a corresponding reality, it wandered into fantastic endeavours, quixotic associations, and strange demonstrations.<sup>1</sup> Whatever of the eccentric or wrong was done, they were Marathonian times—times like those after the Persian wars in Greece.

We said that a historical sense had been evolved since

<sup>1</sup> *Raumer*, The German Universities, S. 96, H.



the liberation-wars. From the spirit of Illuminism, which waged war with all that had been handed down, Austria and Prussia had reaped destruction ; but by going back to the moral spirit of the fathers, they had conquered. Everywhere a sense for the past times of Germany manifested itself. With a wonderful enthusiasm, the three hundredth anniversary of the Reformation was celebrated, in 1817. It is true, that it was rather the German man, than the man of justification by faith, who was celebrated ; but in the liberation-wars, they had got a deeper understanding of that leader in the spiritual liberation-war. Notwithstanding all this want of clearness, a fresh breeze blows in the *Reformations-Almanach*, to which the greatest theologians gave contributions. *Marheineke's* History of the Reformation, and *Spieker's* Life of Luther (which, it is to be regretted, remained unfinished), are pervaded by a truly patriotic and earnestly historical spirit. And what a literature on the History of the Reformation has grown up since that time ! Romanticism had already opened up the way for an understanding of the middle ages. At the instigation of *Stein*, the great collection of monuments of the history of Germany (*Monumenta Germaniae*) arose. Following in the path of the brothers *Grimm*, the most distinguished men devoted themselves to the exploring of the German language, mythology, tales and traditions, customs, legal conditions, etc. The old German architecture, painting, and poetry became the subjects of the closest study. The history of Germany was treated in works comprehending the whole of it (one need only think of *Luden*), and in great monographs (one need only think of *Raumer's Hohenstaufen*). Even for hierarchy, mysticism, scholasticism, a lively historical interest was awakened. In jurisprudence, German law was most assiduously culti-

vated since the liberation-wars ; and the greatest men collected around *Savigny*, the representative of the historical law school. This historical spirit entered even into spheres which stood in a traditional opposition to Romanticism—into philological studies, as is proved by two of their most important representatives, *Passow* and *Lachmann*. This historical tendency was, however, not limited to the domain of science only. Return to the old monarchical institutions, to the old ecclesiasticism, to the old feudal glory (*Restoration*), was the thought which animated the Bourbons in France and Spain, And to these endeavours *Haller* lent his Restoration of Political Economy, *Chateaubriand* his Romanticism. In opposition to the demagogical movements which, in Germany, entered into a union with the patriotic historical sense, the policy of the Eastern powers too assumed more and more the character of Restoration (Verona). The revolution in July 1830, however, and its consequences, were able to break only a violent restoration of the old, not a healthy return to the spirit of the fathers.

Lastly, a new religious life awoke in the princes as well as in the nations, since the liberation-wars. It is equally difficult to judge of the character of Emperor Francis of Austria as of that of his father, who, as is well known, when Grand-Duke of Tuscany, stood at the head of Illuminism, but when Emperor, decidedly left the path of Emperor Joseph. Between the image of a popular simplicity which lives among the people, and that of a thoroughly calculating suspicious little soul, which others have given, a middle view seems to be the right one.<sup>1</sup> *Frederick William*, king of Prussia, walked at first in the steps of *Frederick II*. In a corrupted court, he preserved

<sup>1</sup> I think of such a view as *Pertz* has given in the *Life of Stein*.

simplicity, plainness, and humility. In his relation to Christianity, he did not deny *Sack's* school. But God took him into a school of severe trials. After the misfortunes of 1806, his heart was opened to a deeper knowledge of salvation, especially by the assistance of the venerable *Borowsky*. Even before the liberation-wars, he seriously meditated the re-organization of the Church. And when the Lord had so wonderfully raised him from his deep humiliation, his life of faith too joyfully soared upwards. On the susceptible, chivalrous soul of Alexander of Russia, the earnestness of the times made a powerful impression. The idea of a Christian union of the nations awoke in his soul. Notwithstanding the differences of creed, the people of Europe should, like members of one family, give their hands to one another, in the faith of Jesus Christ, the Lord of the Church, as the gospel proclaims Him to be. This grand idea was, to the English, too impractical, to the Pope, too unchristian. The Holy Alliance, it is true, remained only in the realm of thought; but it is, at all events, a sign of the renewed religious life in the princes. In the people, the renewed life had, as yet, a very general character, or rather the general religiousness assumed a character more full of life. The youth did homage to the God, "Who great and wonderful, after a night of long disgrace, to us revealed himself in flames; who broke with his lightnings the insolence of our enemies; who graciously renewed our strength; and dwells and reigns above the stars, from eternity to eternity."

On the anniversary of the Reformation in 1817, *Claus Harms*, archdeacon in Kiel, an original man from among the people, who, through *Schleiermacher's* school, had returned to belief, thought himself called upon to add to the ninety-five Theses of Luther, ninety-five new ones,

which set Luther's faith before the age rejoicing in Luther. The following are some of them:—III. With the idea of a progressing Reformation, in the manner in which this idea is at present understood, and especially in the manner in which we are reminded of it, Lutheranism will be reformed back into heathenism, and Christianity out of the world. IX. In matters of faith, Reason, and as regards the life, Conscience, may be called the Popes of our age. XI. Conscience cannot pardon sins. XXI. In the sixteenth century, the pardon of sins cost money after all; in the nineteenth, it may be had without money, for people help themselves to it. XXIV. In an old hymn-book it was said, "Two places, O man, thou hast before thee;" but in modern times they have slain the devil, and dammed up hell. XXXII. The so-called religion of reason is destitute either of reason or religion, or both. XLVII. If, in matters of religion, reason claims to be more than a layman, it becomes a heretic; that avoid. Tit. iii. 10. LXIV. Christians should be taught that they have the right not to tolerate any un-Christian and un-Lutheran doctrine, in the pulpits, hymn-books, and school-books. LXVII. It is a strange claim that it must be permitted to teach a new faith from a chair which the old faith had set up, and from a mouth to which the old faith gives food. LXXI. Reason turned mad goes about in the Lutheran Church: it tears Christianity from the altar, casts God's words out of the pulpit, throws dirt into the baptismal water, receives all kinds of people as god-fathers, hisses the priests; and all the people follow its example, and have done so for a long time. And yet it is not bound. On the contrary, this is thought to be the genuine doctrine of Luther, and not of Carlstadt. LXXIV. The assertion that we are more advanced and enlightened can surely not be proved by

the present ignorance as regards true Christianity. Many thousands can declare, as did once the disciples of John (Acts xix. 2), 'We have not so much as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost.' LXXV. Like a poor maid, they would now enrich the Lutheran Church by a marriage. Do not perform it over Luther's bones! He will thereby be recalled to life, and then—woe to you. LXXVII. To say that time has taken away the wall of separation between Lutherans and Reformed, is not a clear speech. LXXXII. Just as reason has prevented the Reformed from finishing their Church, and reducing it to unity, so the reception of reason into the Lutheran Church would cause nothing but confusion and destruction. XCII. The Evangelical Catholic Church is a glorious Church; she holds and forms herself pre-eminently by the Sacrament. XCIII. The Evangelical Reformed Church is a glorious Church; she holds and forms herself pre-eminently by the Word of God. XCIV. More glorious than either is the Evangelical Lutheran Church; she holds and forms herself both by the Sacrament and the Word of God."

These Theses gave rise to a powerful agitation. There appeared upwards of 200 controversial writings, chiefly directed against *Harms*. It was evident that the food was still too strong for the time; but, on the other hand, this movement showed also that religious interests had again become a power. It was in vain that the old Humanism in Halle sang,—“Strew roses on the way, and forget *Harms*.”<sup>1</sup> *Harms*' testimony did not return void.

<sup>1</sup> A play upon the word *Harm*, which cannot be translated. *Harm*, as an appellative, means “sorrow, grief, sadness,” and the genitive of it, which is required by the construction (*Harms*), differs very slightly only in the orthography from the genitive of the proper name (*Harms*). They are words from a popular



From a quarter altogether unexpected, there appeared a fellow-combatant. *Ammon* defended *Harms'* Theses in the pamphlet, "*Eine bittere Arznei für die Glaubensschwäche der Zeit*" (a bitter medicine for the weak belief of our time).

He even joined the protest against the *Union*. He says (S. 27): "Neither *Harms* nor the writer of these pages has ever protested against a Christian union of the two Churches, but only against the mixing up and confounding of the two, and especially a blending of the Lutheran Church, which threatens to change and dissolve its innermost nature." But to this earnest and distinct protest both were not only entitled, but even bound, as teachers of their Church, especially at the jubilee of the Reformation, where Luther should not be betrayed and given up, but honoured and defended.

This protest against the *Union* called *Schleiermacher* into the lists. *Schleiermacher* was originally Reformed, and the festival oration which he delivered in the University Hall of Berlin, on the Reformation festival of 1817, begins with the words: "*Spero vestrum fore neminem qui miretur, quod in his saecularibus coram vobis ego potissimum dicam qui Zwinglii magis quam Lutheri doctrinae sim addictus*" (*Werke*, Th. V. S. 311). It is true that, in the position in which we first met him, his Reformed character would say no more than the circumstance that *Ammon*, when he still walked in the ways of *Kant*, was a Lutheran, perhaps even less. Even at that time he had conceived the idea of an union between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, as appears from "an opinion in reference to Protestant Church affairs," 1803 (l. c. S. 46, ff.). The separation of the two churches is, according German song, meaning, "Take it easy, and forget what troubles you."—TR.

to him, injurious ; *first*, because it induces common people to suppose that the trifles which separate the two Churches are really something essential,—because it brings discord into families, and makes the educated doubt the sincerity of ministers who separate themselves from the Reformed, while, among themselves, they differ on far more important points. *Secondly*, because it is injurious to general morality and civilization, by producing intolerance, etc. *Lastly*, because it is also in opposition to the interests of the State, inasmuch as it brings confusion into educational affairs, allows the strength of the Reformed pastors, who generally have little to do, to lie unused, etc. One must, indeed, wonder to hear the romantic author here speaking on religion, in a manner in which *Spalding*, perhaps, would have spoken. *Frederick William* imagined that, after the liberation-wars, the time had come when reality might be given to the idea of the Union which had been entertained by all his predecessors, ever since *John Sigismund*. No resistance was to be expected from a time which, although moved by religious interests, yet had become a stranger to the faith of their fathers. Thus, the *Cabinet-order* of the 27th September 1817 appeared, which addressed to the good sense and will of every single individual, the call that, in the conviction that the separated Churches were substantially one, they should unite into one evangelical Church, the outward form of which might be arranged and settled. The immediate consequence was, that, on the Reformation festival in Berlin, the ministers of the two confessions joined in the celebration of the Lord's Supper as an expression of their Church communion. The "official declaration of the Berlin Synod" (written by Schleiermacher) closes with these words: "In this manner we, on our part offer, for the future also, to all the Lutheran and Reformed congrega-

tions which are still separated, as long as there shall exist such in and out of our country, our brotherly hand for a Church communion undisturbed, and sufficient, as hitherto, for all existing circumstances. In proof that in this we do not offer or wish for anything new or unheard of, we refer to the example of the evangelical fraternity of the Moravians, which, too, is an union of Christians of both the Lutheran and Reformed confessions, and which celebrates the Lord's Supper according to a rite which is satisfactory to both the parties" (Werke, Th. V. S. 306). Against this attempt at a Union *Harms* and *Ammon* protested, as we have seen. Schleiermacher, in a circular letter to Ammon, answered his examination of Harms' Theses (1818). Of *Harms*, Schleiermacher always spoke in a respectful manner, opposed his Theses more from a formal point of view, and always with the leniency of the teacher towards the former pupil ; but *Ammon* had to feel the acuteness of his dialectic intellect, and all the stings of his irony. The sum and substance of his arguments is this : "*Ammon*, such as he is known to the theological world, is in contradiction with himself if he rises up for Harms, and has no right to contend against the Union, inasmuch as he himself does not acknowledge the doctrine of the Church, to which he appeals." *Ammon* was in a difficult position. In his answer, which soon (1818) appeared, he endeavours to fill up the chasm between his former stand-point, and that expressed in his "*Bittere Arznei*," by pointing out that he had always been a rationalistic supernaturalist,—that he had, in his development, come more and more near to the doctrine of the Church,—and that it was conditionally only that he had defended Harms and opposed the Union. The tone in which *Ammon* defended a cause for which so much might be said, and especially against a man whose de-

velopment surely presents dark sides also, proves to every one who understands the language of faith, that *Ammon's* return to the faith of the fathers was not so sincere.

We have touched upon the *Harms'* controversy, because it is indeed a barometer of the time. A new life has awakened. This is proved by the enthusiastic celebration of the Reformation jubilee, by *Harms'* Theses and *Harms'* opponents, by *Ammon* and *Schleiermacher*, by the promoters as well as the opponents of the Union. This new life, however, is by no means connected with the Church, or in harmony with the confession of the Church. This is proved by the isolated position of *Harms*. But it tends towards positive Christianity. This is proved especially by the importance which *Schleiermacher's* theology has acquired since that time.

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## CHAPTER II.

### THE MEDIATING THEOLOGY.

A MAN, whose testimony on historical points is willingly received, Neander, in the preface to the second edition of his monograph on Tertullian, thus speaks of the new life after the liberation-wars: "The first edition of this monograph spread first among the German public at the time of the beautiful morning dawn of our liberated, re-youthed Fatherland, which was also the time of the beginning of a new life. It is a time to which all those who lived then cannot look back, without deep melancholy, from the many profane, un-German doings of the present (1848). At that time there was a favourable season for such a

monograph. A new life of faith had awakened, and had begun anew to animate science also. One felt thereby urged on to investigate the stream of Christian life in the former centuries, to engage with love in ancient Christian life. A superficial, spiritless, and heartless *Illuminism*, the motto of which was: 'How gloriously far we have now at length got,'—which, in the conceit of miserable boasting, despised the greatest and most glorious events of former centuries;—it was judged by life and science."

*Illuminism* was judged, but it had still a wide existence. In the offices, in the chairs, in the pulpits, in the literature of the day, among the middle classes of the people, it had still the command. But it is in the history of the kingdom of God as it is in nature. In March, the green blades from the seeds, however unassuming they appear, have a greater future than the masses of snow by which they are still covered. Not at once does the spring-sun obtain the victory over snow and ice; but the grey masses of ice in the hollow ways do not stop the spring; it is spring nevertheless. The time subsequent to the liberation-wars represents this struggle of the newly-awakened spiritual spring, with the snow-and-ice masses of *Illuminism*. This struggle reaches down to the present; but the sun becomes more and more powerful, the winter becomes weaker and weaker. In the old northern mythology, *Thor*, the god of thunder, can in this way only get at the winter-giant *Thrym*, who has stolen his hammer, that, disguised in the swan's garment of the goddess *Freya*, he betroths himself to him. According to *Uhland's* ingenious interpretation, the swan's garment of *Freya* is the brightness of spring, in which the summer heat, harbouring the thunder, is concealed. Thus, the re-activated positive theology after the liberation-wars



was not yet the ripe and ripening science of the Church, furnished with the fire of life and the fire of death, but only the brightness of the spring announcing the summer of the Church.

That, as we have just seen, was experienced by *Harms*, with his Theses directed against Rationalism. It was a thunder in the first spring which the winter-giants of Illuminism did not fear. Even the after-thunder: "*Dass es mit der Vernunftreligion nichts ist*" (i. e. that there is nothing in Rationalism, 1819), died away without any visible effects. This book contains splendid incontrovertible thoughts, brought out with learning and spirit, and in unanswerable syllogisms; but it came too early. The mass rather drank the water which the inexhaustible *Krug* offered to them in his pamphlet: "*Dass es mit der Vernunftreligion doch etwas ist*" (i. e. there is, after all, something in rationalism). But the time was influenced in a manner altogether different from that of *Harms*, by a theology which, to speak once more in that figure, appeared in the swan's garment. Two names may be mentioned as its representatives, *De Wette* and *Hase*. Neither of these theologians repudiates the rationalistic soil which produced them. They declare reason to be the highest arbiter in matters of faith; in their doctrinal conclusions they agree, in essential points, with the common Rationalism; they occupy towards Scripture and the Confession a position as free as only Rationalism could demand; and yet neither of them is a Rationalist. In *De Wette's* doctrinal novel: *Theodor oder des Zweiflers Weihe* (Theodore, or the sceptic's consecration, 1821), the hero at first occupies the stand-point of Rationalism, but breaks off with theology, in order to find the consecration by a positive philosophy. The philosophy here alluded to is that of *Fries*, the theological results of which *De Wette* has represented in

a series of writings. For our purpose, the short, free representation in that novel seems to be sufficient and well-suited, just because it is a representation of himself. "The system of this philosopher appeared to him (Theodore), to stand just in the midst, between that of *Kant* and that of *Schelling*, and to combine both. He proceeds from an original consciousness of the human mind, which he calls faith, by which one is reminded of *Schelling's* intellectual intuition and identity. But he does not, like the latter, deduce from it the world, with its laws and powers, but, adhering to this internal standpoint, he shows how this original consciousness displays itself in the different activities of the mind,—how the whole edifice of human knowledge is built up out of experience and internal self-activity, by composition and connection; and thus a world in time and space, and under natural laws, represents itself to the mind. But this knowledge is only the imperfect image of the substance of things, the original image of which is implied and concealed in that original consciousness; and the highest truth and satisfaction of the mind is to be found in faith only, by the light of which the universe appears glorified and purified as an harmonic whole in divine glory. He distinguishes between understanding and reason; the former he calls the lower indirect consciousness, by which the universe, in time and space, and in its natural laws, is comprehended; by the latter he understands the immediate knowledge, and the whole life of the mind, in all its activities; and as the original source and centre of it, he designates faith. He shows that knowledge is only one aspect of the human mind; that by the side of it stand the affections and will, and that, by all these three faculties only, the life of the mind is complete, inasmuch as it enters into connection with the

world by knowledge, as well as by the affections and action. With knowledge alone, neither the world nor human life can be understood. It is the affections and love only, which first give the living meaning, to everything, and it is the deed which completes the truth of knowledge and feeling." It had never occurred to, and been expressed by, *Rationalism* and *Kantianism*, that although reason may be the arbiter of religion, it does not follow that it is its source and seat. We saw that *Jacobi* and *Schleiermacher* held by the immediate religious life, which the former placed in faith, and the latter in the affections. Here both are combined, inasmuch as an immediate perception of the divine in faith is ascribed to reason. Whilst understanding is the faculty for arranging logically the perceptions by the senses, reason is the immediate organ for the divine. Reason perceives the things of God, because God has revealed them to it. "I distinguish between reason and the revelation indwelling in it. It is the latter which is the ultimate, absolute ground, or original source of the former—the sun, as it were, from which all the rays of knowledge and spiritual life are proceeding. What God is for the universe, that revelation is for the human mind; it is, as it were, its inner God, in whom man believes, from whence he receives light and life." But all revelation is nothing but the kindling of that original light in man. "Every man in whom the divine has, relatively, obtained the preponderance and dominion over the human, is, for his contemporaries, the medium of a revelation; but he in whom the perfect union of the divine and human has taken place, has completed the circle of revelation, and such faith was in Christ." As, then, in the mind of the Mediator, Jesus Christ, it is this divine act or faith which overcomes, penetrates, enlightens, and purifies the understanding, so it will be the internal

sense (*Gemüth*), and not the understanding which understands the Divine. Upon this internal sense, *i. e.*, the faculty in us by which we directly discern the Divine—a Mediator cannot exert any influence by means of words, but only by deeds, by his moral personality. “The personality of the Mediator of a revelation is the first and surest guarantee of a revealed faith.” By Christ, a community, the Church has been founded. But for a moral community, a moral spirit, and a moral form are required. If the community of Christ is to stand, its spirit must be bound to a confession, to an authoritative faith, and a form of worship positively ordained. “Now, we can fully comprehend the relation of reason to the revealed faith. It is an act of reason, viz., of the original internal sense to acknowledge a given revelation, in which reason appears to be perfected in point of truth and goodness, so that reason, as it were, recognizes itself in it. This activity of reason, however, is prepared and guided by a public or party spirit, which has arisen and been propagated in an historical way. Now, in this, there is as yet no free, conscious, reflecting examination, but every thing still rests in feeling and habit. But the understanding is not to be excluded from it. The understanding will, indeed, be allowed to compare and examine freely, in order to bring to light the general reasonableness of the Christian religion; but the jealousy of the Church will step as a guard at its side, not in order to fetter its liberty, but only to keep alive and stir up the religious feeling, in order that it may not be violated and suppressed by scepticism. . . The difference between the theological and free philosophical science consists in this: that the former, in the investigation of truth, proceeds from a definite feeling, and an unchangeable presupposition, while the latter enters, freely and independently,



upon the path of inquiry, and pursues it wheresoever it may lead." With this view of theology, *De Wette* stood in a very near relation to *Schleiermacher*, with whom, in life too, he was very closely connected.<sup>1</sup> Like *Schleiermacher*, *De Wette* placed religion in the internal sense, in feeling ; only that *De Wette's* "religious feeling" was more definite, more closely connected with the powers of knowledge and will, and more free from Pantheism. Like *Schleiermacher*, *De Wette* connected his religious feeling with positive Christianity, by seeing in Christ the absolute Mediator of the new religious life. Like *Schleiermacher*, *De Wette* left all that is historical, doctrinal, objective, which does not stand in immediate connection with the religious feeling, to a bold criticism of the understanding, which went much farther than even Rationalism had ever done. We need here only refer to the critical dissection to which *De Wette* subjected the historical books of the Old Testament, to his anxiety in pointing out negative results in the New Testament criticism, and to the great concessions which he made to *Strauss's* criticism of the Life of Jesus. A later period will have much difficulty in reconciling the facts, that, by the same man, who saw in the gospel the word of life, accounts of miracles which he could not explain, were called anecdotes, and words of Christ to which his understanding did not reach, were rather imperiously criticised, or simply thrown overboard, as being spurious. A few weeks before his death (1848), he made this confession regarding himself: "I fell into a time of confusion ; the unity of faith was destroyed. I, too, mixed myself up with this struggle—in vain ! I have not settled it." The circum-

<sup>1</sup> *Lücke, zur freundschaftlichen Erinnerung an Dr. W. M. L. de Wette (Stud. u. Krit., 1850, H. 1).*



stance that a man of such sobriety, could so well understand the enthusiasm of the German youth after the liberation-wars (in consequence of the letter of condolence which he wrote to the mother of *Sand*, the murderer of *Kotzebue*, he was dismissed from his professorship),—that a man of such negative tendencies had, notwithstanding, so much love for the historical Christ, and such a warm heart for the past history of the Church, is a significant sign of the change of the times.

As a second representative of that spirit after the liberation-wars, we mention *Hase*. When still a youth, he, in quick succession, now in the form of the novel, then of the pamphlet, at another in that style suited for educated circles (*Gnosis*), and then again in that of the compendium (*Dogmatik, Life of Jesus, Hutterus, Church History*) exhibited a stand-point, in which the romantic tendency of youth, the influence of modern philosophy, especially of that of *Schelling*, the impulses of *Schleiermacher*, the historical tendency of the age, and, above all, a religious enthusiasm, were so remarkably united, that a great effect could not fail to be produced. As a motto of *Hase's* Theology, the commencement of his *Gnosis* may here be quoted: “During a whole night Socrates was looking up to the stars above him, and to the unfathomable depth of his mind within him; but when the sun rose, he fell down and worshipped the Deity. Thus, every one whose mind rises above the chaos of the world, looks up and down, and meditates on the riddles above and within him. Through the course of long nights, individuals and nations were thus meditating. But when their sun rose, and they heard the ringing of the morning-bells from heaven, they fell down and worshipped the great Spirit of the universe, remembering that they themselves were of his divine offspring. Every thing human becomes clear to itself, and purifies itself

only in the divine ; and all love of wisdom is completed and perfected in the love of God. It is to such philosophy that this book is devoted. Before us there opens up a long procession of thousands of years, like a crusade to the Holy Land and to the holy grave, seeking and struggling for divine things. And farther, there lies before us that breath of the Infinite which, ever since the unuttered longings of childhood, has in every sacred hour pervaded us. Earnestly and devoutly science rises in order to read in the eternal law of the mind, and to pronounce judgment upon the passing, changing phenomenon." *Hase* considers reason as the arbiter of religious truth, but reason philosophically developed. His *Dogmatik* pretends to be a system. The characteristic feature of man he considers to be liberty striving from the finite to the infinite. This liberty, when more closely examined, is a relative one ; first, because it has not formed itself ; and secondly, because it does not reach the infinite. It thus points to a power by which it was formed, and to an unattainable ideal ; and that power, that ideal, is God. The essence of religion is thus love to God, as the ground and aim of this ever-striving liberty. Whilst Pantheism (*Schelling*) views God one-sidedly, as the *ground*, Idealism (*Fichte*) defines him one-sidedly, as the *aim*. The middle unity of both stand-points is the truth. God is the absolute personality which, out of free love, is the cause of the universe for the perfecting of all created life in the kingdom of God. From this point of view, *Hase* has regarded Christ as the *ideal* man, in whom that striving, that love centred,—was sinless, endowed with the power of pure humanity over nature, truly risen, the beginner of the new life in the kingdom of God. The history of this kingdom *Hase* has represented in his Church History with historical skill, with a spirit affectionately sympathizing

with the spirit of past times. A meritorious, although rather strange monument of this historical sense, is the *Hutterus redivivus*, in which the systematic theology of the old Church is represented from the position of an old divine, as he would speak in our own days. On the supposition that *Hase* was one of its adherents, Rationalism had hitherto remained quiet, although shaking its head when it perceived all the elements of a re-youthed theology; but it was puzzled by this book. *Röhr*, with his common sense, did not know what to make of the historical tendency of this book. "What does this *Hutterus redivivus* want among us?" so his review of it begins. "What has the phantom of this evangelical scholastic, conjured up from the grave of the sixteenth century, to say to the Protestant sons of the nineteenth? With the assistance of the formulas used in the symbolical books of the Church, and by the old orthodox divines, in which *Dr Hase* is so well versed, *Hutterus* is selected to give an appearance of Church orthodoxy to his own peculiar doctrinal systems, and to be used on the territory of religious science for carrying out a miserable *quid pro quo*. For *Dr Hase* belongs to the theological school which has grown up from the soil of *Schelling's* philosophy, and whose efforts have for their object to transfer its poetical dreams into Protestant religious science, and which one may call the dogmatico-allegorical school, because it puts upon the words, in which our Church once expressed her doctrinal definitions, a sense altogether different from that which she herself connected with them, although, for reasons easily perceived, *Dr Hase* himself would rather have it called the Christian-philosophic school." This attack induced *Hase* to publish his *Streitschriften* (Controversial Writings, since 1834), which we consider as his most important theological production. *Hase* was privi-

leged to pronounce the final judgment, in the scientific law-suit, which, ever since the beginning of the century, had been carried on against Rationalism.

“ There was a time when that Rationalism prevailed in theology, and, in the name of the celebrated *Illuminism*, without farther ceremony, declared all opponents to be ignorant and unreasonable. Let us not forget that it occupied a positive position towards Christianity also, and that especially in opposition to those, who, in the general destruction, went beyond everything Christian, it maintained a friendship for Christianity as a necessity of reason. But it appears that now, at least in Germany, its mission is fulfilled. That which has rescued modern times from this Rationalism may be reduced to these three heads: *First*, The awakening of a strict sympathising historical sense for the condition and circumstances of the past. All sciences have been touched by it. It is well known how, at the time of the rationalistic terrorism, the manifestations of piety in the middle ages were misunderstood and misrepresented by the celebrated Church historians of that period, and how the Biblical histories have been abused by expositors, in order to explain the miracles. It belonged to Rationalism to do away, in religion, with all historical peculiarities, and to put the purely rational in their stead. The *second* blow which was inflicted upon the dominion of Rationalism, proceeded from the awakening in the people of a previously repressed religious fervour, by which the religious feeling was reposed in its own proper place. In systematic theology, rationalism has altogether disregarded this place due to the religious feeling. In homiletics it maintains the principle, that one must work upon the heart through the understanding only—a principle not acknowledged even by the political orators of antiquity, and which no great orator has ever followed.



It has, finally, almost altogether misunderstood and misused the poetry which is contained in the old traditions of the Church : the mutilation of the old hymns is a proof and example of this. We do not mean to charge Rationalism with what was more or less the prevailing tendency of the time ; but since it is just in that Rationalism, that that tendency has chiefly taken a hold, it is natural that a changed age, which has again put to its lips the full cup of life, should turn away from Rationalism. *Finally*, the most important objection has grown up in the soil of science itself. Be it hereby openly declared, that this Rationalism is wanting in scientific power and acuteness." *Hase* demonstrates from *Wegscheider's* "Dogmatik," that it assumes reason to be the highest authority, without establishing, in a scientific way, what are the laws of reason in matters of faith ;—that that which Rationalism calls reason, is nothing else than common intellectual sense. "It is this, indeed, which is the highest authority of Rationalism, and it is in its name that *Wegscheider* gives forth his criticism ; it is just this, moreover, which constitutes the empiricism of this proceeding." He goes on to say, that every age has its common sense, which is partly a certain feeling for truth, partly a sum of convictions in the common popular consciousness. The latter element is something very changeable. "The common sense of Rationalism is partly a result of historical and philosophical investigations, which have obtained a certain general authority, and partly also, a certain sound feeling for religious truth, which has proceeded from the general popular life. It is hence very important that there be much, and right common sense among theologians, and we must confess that our age is not deficient in it ; but it is utterly wrong that this common sense, solely in and from itself, and without in any way vindicating itself



in a scientific way from the nature of the mind, should pretend to be the highest law of science."

These arguments were incontrovertible, and the number of misunderstandings, yea, even the coarseness with which *Röhr*, in the progress of the controversy, meant to put them down, had no other result than still more to expose his cause. But that about which the rationalists felt most keenly was, that this blow was inflicted with the very weapons of Rationalism. *Hase* assured them that he did not contend against Rationalism as a *genus*, but against a *species* of it only, viz.—against *Rationalismus vulgaris*. The school which, in the first instance, reaped the advantages of victory was a higher kind of Rationalism, striving after a reconciliation with positive Christianity.

This is, in general, the character of the theology which prevailed from about 1817 to 1840, viz., a striving to reconcile the natural and rational with the positive doctrine and ordinances of the Church. The theology of this time may simply be designated as a theology of mediation. What it aimed at was the doctrine of the Church, but not because it was the doctrine of the Church, and in the manner in which it was so, but only the substance of it; and by this it always understood that which was reconcileable with the general religious spirit. That which we have just said of *De Wette* and *Hase* may, in the meanwhile, be considered as an illustration. It was especially from two different quarters that this mediating effort was put forward, viz., that of *Schleiermacher*, and that of *Hegel*. We have already exhibited the fundamental character of these stand-points; let us now consider the forms it assumed in the field of theology.

Just as Prussia, after the liberation-wars, was the hearth of the new life, even so the newly-founded Uni-

versity of Berlin was the head-quarters of the renewed theology. After the University of Halle had been annexed to the kingdom of Jerome Napoleon, *Schleiermacher* had gone to Berlin (1807), in the hope, as we see from a letter to *Gasz*,<sup>1</sup> of obtaining a place in the newly established University. He had greatly contributed to its foundation by his publication, *Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten im Deutschen Sinn; nebst einem Anhang über eine neu zu gründende, i.e.,* Stray Thoughts about Universities, in the German sense; with an Appendix on a new one to be founded (1808). He was a pillar of the Theological Faculty, on whom especially *De Wette* and *Neander* were leaning. A master in the chair, as certainly few academical teachers have been, he lectured, as is proved by his now published prelections, not only on almost all the branches of theology, but also on the principal departments of philosophy (dialectics, ethics, politics, æsthetics, pædagogy, and the history of philosophy). His position as the Secretary to the Philosophical Class of the Berlin Academy of Sciences (since 1814), induced him to write a number of distinguished articles in the department of philosophy. The classical translator of Plato remained in an uninterrupted literary communion and intercourse with *Buttmann*, *Böckh*, *Heindorf*, *Lachmann*, and other eminent philologists. Not long after his settlement at Berlin, *Schleiermacher* found employment in the ministry of the Interior. When this situation was abolished, he became one of the principal agents in all the ecclesiastical movements which proceeded from Berlin, especially in the affairs of the Union, Liturgy, Constitution of the Church, etc. Whoever in Berlin felt deeper religious cravings, and were capable of loftier conceptions, collected around his pulpit in Trinity Church

<sup>1</sup> *Briefwechsel mit Gasz*, S. 72.

(since 1809). And it was not only on the territories of science and of the Church that he was a living agent, but also in the general development of the age. As he had taken the most lively interest in the liberation of his father-land, so all the fresh youthful movements after the liberation-wars found in him a warm representative. Himself a never-fading youth, he sympathised with youth, with that keen perception of individualities which was characteristic of him. His object was, not to found a school, but to stimulate, and that he gained in a most extraordinary degree. One can well imagine what an influence such a man, in connection with *De Wette* and *Neander*, must have exercised on the immediate sphere of his activity. In the newly founded University of Bonn, *Nitzsch*, *Bleek*, and *Sack*, laboured altogether in the spirit of *Schleiermacher*. In Breslau, *Gasz* was the practical echo of his friend. *Lücke*, in Göttingen, and *Schweizer*, now in Zurich, followed entirely in the steps of the master. And how large is the number of theologians on whom *Schleiermacher* has exercised a decisive influence! We mention only *Baumgarten*, *Crusius*, *Hase*, *Ullmann*, *Tholuck*, *Müller*, *Rothe*, *Dorner*. *Schleiermacher* died in 1834, still in full vigour, after a lovely dream of a final reconciliation between faith and philosophy.

But the *speculative* reconciliation with the doctrine of the Church found likewise its centre in Berlin. When *Hegel* was, from his retired life in Nuremberg, called to Heidelberg, it was especially *Daub* who stood by his side. In this original theologian, the dialectic progress of modern philosophy has, as it were, been personified. At first (besides some Essays, especially in his Sermons according to Kantian principles, and in his *Katechetik*) he was a Kantian, then inclined to *Fichte*, and in his *Theologoumena* (1806) and "Introduction to Christian

Dogmatik" (1809), he applied *Schelling's* doctrine on theology. As *Schelling* closed with a theosophic dualism, so *Daub*, in his *Judas Iscariot* (1816 and 1818), displayed a supernaturalism of speculation, almost bordering upon Manicheism. This work bears witness to his struggle with *Hegel's* phenomenology and logic. *Hegel* prevailed in him; and this theologian, although already growing old, had still the mental power to elaborate, from all sides, his theological view, from the newly obtained principle. This theologian, representing as he does, the change of modern philosophy, was, notwithstanding, of anything but a versatile nature. He was a man of old German simplicity, moral energy, grand objectivity, warm faith, of a mind of creative intellectual power, united to a great store of knowledge and experience. With a great talent for teaching, he was, nevertheless, in his literary productions, too abstract, too abstruse, indeed, to have influenced a large circle. This is specially the case with his last work: *Die dogmatische Theologie jetziger Zeit* (i. e., the Doctrinal Theology of the Modern Times, 1833),—"this Hell of Dante," as *Strauss* called it, "heated with the doctrinal systems, commentaries, and theological journals of the last sixty years, in which Ghibellines are roasting by the side of Guelphs, supranaturalists by the side of rationalists,—through the confined groups of which the spirit of the departed immortal philosopher (*Hegel*) accompanies, as a cicerone, the theologian, just as Dante was led through his, by the spirit of Virgil." The effect of this work was lost, because, in order to continue with *Strauss*, "it was written in the language of the Olympians." In 1827, he wrote to his pupil *Rosenkranz*,—"Vacation, you say; has the old man not yet got his everlasting vacation? No, my dear friend, not yet; nor do I desire any; I wish, if possible, to die in the chair *docendo*."



This wish was granted to him. On the 19th November, 1836, he was seized, while lecturing, with an apoplectic fit, after having just uttered the words, "Life is not the highest good."<sup>1</sup>—In the dim hope and desire of opening a practical sphere for his philosophy, *Hegel* accepted, in 1818, a call to Berlin, where he soon acquired an influential position. While the enthusiasm of the German youth had its advocates in *Schleiermacher* and *De Wette*, *Hegel*, in the preface to his *Rechtsphilosophie* (Philosophy of Jurisprudence), expressed himself in a manner almost contemptuous, about the doings of this school which followed the impulse of the heart:—"A leader of this shallowness, which calls itself philosophizing, *M. Fries*, has not hesitated on a solemn occasion, which has become notorious, at the Wartburg-feast, in a speech on State and State Constitution, to give utterance to the idea, 'That in a nation in which a true patriotic spirit prevails, life would be imparted to every business of the public affairs from beneath, by the people; that living societies, indissolubly united by the holy tie of friendship, would devote themselves to every single work of national education and public service.' It is chiefly the aim and meaning of that shallowness to place science, not on the development of the thought and idea, but rather on immediate intention, and accidental imagination, and in the same way to dissolve the rich organization of the moral element in itself which the State exhibits,—the architectural beauty of its reasonableness, into the pap of 'heart, friendship, enthusiasm.'" In 1821, *Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre* (System of Theology)

<sup>1</sup> *Rosenkranz* (*Erinnerungen an Carl Daub*. Berlin, 1837), and *Strauss* (*Charakteristiken und Kritiken*) have splendidly characterized their teacher. *Hermann* (*Die speculative Theologie in ihrer Entwicklung durch Daub*), is not equal to his subject.



appeared, which makes the feeling of dependence the foundation and fountain of the doctrines of religion. In the preface to the *Religions-Philosophie* (Philosophy of Religion) of his pupil *Hinrichs* (1822), Hegel declared,—“If religion in man be founded on feeling only, this feeling can be correctly defined only as the feeling of dependence; and hence the dog would be the best Christian, for he has this feeling most strongly developed in himself, and lives chiefly in this feeling. The dog has even cravings for salvation, when his hunger is appeased by a bone.” The great antithesis, which we thus see pervading the age of Illuminism and Renovation, the antithesis between a religion which is defined and determined by reason, and a religion which depends upon the emotional life, entered, in Schleiermacher and Hegel, into its most significant phasis. Two personalities, thus coined, could, according to the laws of nature, only repel one another. In a city so excitable, and so dependent upon intellectual impulses as Berlin, Schleiermacher, with his freshness of life, his sympathy for individualities, his intellectual presence, his practical development of thought, and his rhetorical skill, was the man of the moment; while *Hegel*, with the granite firmness of his dialectics, with his earnest, manly surrender to the objective powers of life, for a long time attracted only a limited circle of men inquiring more deeply.<sup>1</sup> In

<sup>1</sup> *Hotho* (*Vorstudien für Leben und Kunst*, S. 385) thus characterizes his delivery: “Hegel had to bring to light the most powerful thoughts from the deepest ground of things. Altogether absorbed by his subject, he seemed to evolve it only out of itself, and for its own sake; and yet it originated only from himself. He began stammering, strove forward, began once more, stopped again. The proper word seemed always to fail him; but it was just then that he most surely hit upon it. Advancing slowly and considerably through middle links, apparently insignificant, some full thought had been limited so as to present one side only, had been split into distinctions, and

the theological faculty, *Marheinicke* was decidedly on Hegel's side. He comes nearest to *Daub*. He had not the depth and originality of *Daub*, but a better style. He had not *Daub's* simplicity and strength of character, but he was more practical, and was possessed of a more religious and ecclesiastical sense. *Daub* was only a professor, but *Marheinicke* was also a minister, and something of an ecclesiastical prince. Like *Daub*, *Marheinicke* too had been led to *Hegel*, by striving to reconcile the doctrine of the Church with science. This reconciliation is presented to us in the second edition of his "Dogmatik" (1827). More successful than in this system of theology, which was more assuming than demonstrative, and which dealt in a very summary way with Scripture and history, *Marheinicke* was, in his "Symbolik" (1810), a work which marked a new epoch in the sense of a historiography entering into the depth of the phenomena, and which has been excelled in individual results, but not in the spirit and cast of the whole. Like *Daub* and *Marheinicke*, so *Hinrichs* too, had been led to *Hegel* by the positive tendency of the age. "From my youth," so he writes to *Hegel* (*Hegel's Werke*, xvii. S. 304), "religion had always been to me the highest and most sacred object, and I hold it to be true, for the simple reason that the spirit of mankind cannot be deceived in this respect. But science took from me the

involved in contradictions, the victorious solution of which had the effect of finally reconciling that which was at first opposed. It was just in these depths of things, apparently inexplicable, that that powerful mind was moving and digging with grand self-possessed delight and calmness. It was then that his voice rose, that his eye flashed brightly upon those assembled, and shone with the calmly burning fire and brightness of deep conviction, while, with words never failing, he touched all the heights and depths of the soul."

demonstrating element in which I was accustomed to behold truth ; and what was more natural than that I should be anxious to remove, by means of science, the greatest discord and the deepest despair from within me, and thus to obtain a reconciliation of the elements of science. Then I said to myself: If that which Christianity brings forth as the absolute truth, cannot be conceived by means of philosophy in a purely scientific form, so that the idea itself shall be this form, I will have nothing more to do with any philosophy." The same desire led *Göschel*, *Gabler*, *Rozenkranz*, and others, to *Hegel*. What, in general, raised *Hegel's* philosophy more and more every year in the Prussian State, was the spirit of restoration on which it took its stand. Around *Hegel* a school had soon gathered, which carried his thoughts into all sciences. While entertaining the strongest hopes regarding the future prospects of his system, *Hegel* died of Cholera (1831). "A man," so Marheinicke spoke at his grave, "who, like this monarch in the realm of thought, has reared a new edifice of science on the immoveable rock of the mind, has achieved an immortality such as few have done." *Förster* added: "Let it henceforth be our calling to preserve, proclaim, and confirm his doctrine. No Peter, it is true, will rise, who would have the presumption to call himself his vicar ; but his kingdom, the kingdom of thought, will extend more and more, not indeed without being attacked, but yet without being effectually resisted. No successor will ever ascend the vacant throne of Alexander ; satraps will divide among themselves the provinces bereft of their ruler ; but as at that period, Greek civilization, so now, this German science, which was excogitated and created by *Hegel*, during many a waking night, spent beside his quiet lamp, will become world-conquering in the domain of spirits."

This comparison with Alexander was fulfilled in a different sense. As Alexander's monarchy, so *Hegel's* supremacy in the domain of philosophy was, after his death, broken up by the internal strifes of his disciples. While *Hegel* lived, his system had wrought in the sense of a restoration. As in *Hegel* himself, so we find in *Daub*, *Marheinicke*, *Hinrichs*, and others, a certain massiveness and heaviness of thought, an inability to comprehend with elegance, acuteness, and freshness, the phenomena of life as they occur and exist, and a thorough and violent transformation of facts into notions. With the greatest assurance, this school asserted the agreement of Christianity with their doctrine; but the question was, whether this assurance would stand the trial of criticism. In the first instance, there arose a controversy as to whether immortality in the sense of personal existence after death, was taught by the school. *Richter* maintained that *Hegel* did not know it; *Göschel*, who by his high position, and his mighty individual power, enjoyed great authority in the school, endeavoured to prove the reverse (1835), but evidently by a forced interpretation, and in opposition to the whole sense of the system. Then appeared the "Life of Jesus" by *Strauss* (1835). Here mental elements appeared which hitherto had not been common in the school, a powerful realism, an eminent critical understanding, a rounded, perspicuous, and fresh style, a thorough entering into, and mastery of the learned materials. By these means *Strauss* brought out the result, that the historical existence of the God-man, which *Hegel* had represented in a very obscure manner, was against the principles of his system, as the idea could never exhaust all its riches on the person of one individual; that not Christ, but mankind, was the Son of God. The Christ, as proclaimed by the gospels, is historically



impossible, because the sources contradict each other and the laws of historical reality, and is to be explained as a myth only, from the Messianic expectations of the time. This publication called the whole of theology into the lists, since the very existence of Christianity, was at stake. In the first instance, the school, from which Strauss came, had to decide. That which was brought forward by *Bauer*, *Schaller*, *Göschel*, *Rosenkranz*, and others, was so far from entering into the main question, that the belief in the power of *Hegel's* dialectics and its agreement with Christianity, was not a little weakened. *Strauss*, however, did not content himself with transferring the life of Jesus into the world of myths; but in his *Glaubenslehre* (1840), he proved that the whole Christian religion was dissolved by modern science; the religion which was alone fit for our age was the worship of genius. After the negative tendency had once begun to speak out, it thought itself bound to remain consistent even to the destruction of all positive foundations of life. After it had been proved by evidence, that God was not a person elevated above the world, but had an existence only in the self-consciousness of mankind, *Feuerbach* did not risk anything in representing God to be merely an imaginary counter-part of the Ego. While *Strauss* had declared the Christ of the gospels to be the product of the myth, unintentionally inventing, *Bruno Bauer*, went the length of declaring Him to be an invention of the so-called creative original evangelist, who, according to him, was Mark. While, at its former stage, Hegelianism acknowledged faith as a lower but fully warranted stage of consciousness, the negative spirits who had their organ, first in the *Hallesche Jahrbücher*, afterwards in the *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, proposed to themselves to persecute every one who still adhered to and professed



the faith of the fathers, and to pour blasphemous mockery upon every thing sacred to the Christian faith. While Hegelianism had formerly co-operated in the restoration, the Hegelites now, under the name of Protestantism, openly proclaimed revolution. Stormy waters may cause fearful destruction, but they cannot continue. *Strauss*, *Bauer*, *Feuerbach*, *Ruge*, *Vischer*, are no more; *Bauer* in Tübingen, however, still for some time continued to advance these views, after his pupil *Strauss* had left the scene. The sphere of his critical operations is history, specially the history of religious thought. His forte lies in bringing it into union with his own sphere of thought by means of criticism, combinations, and dialectics. In this manner he has treated the Greek mythology, the views of the Manicheans and Gnostics, the doctrines of the Atonement and the Trinity, and lastly, and especially, the sources of the primitive Christianity. In transforming this world of thought into his own, he is deficient, notwithstanding his thorough study of the sources, in respect for the facts as such, in sympathy for the life out of which the thoughts spring up, in an eye for the individuality and peculiarity of the phenomena. The poet says, "thoughts may dwell close upon each other, but the things in space roughly strike against each other." It is just because *Bauer* considers thoughts only to be the substance of the religious phenomena, and his own view to be the truth of all thoughts, that it happens to him that he gives himself up to boundless combinations. Thus, in opposition to *Möhler*, he dissolved the Augustinian element of Protestantism into the Pantheism of modern philosophy, made *Schleiermacher* a Gnostic, compared Eusebius with Herodotus, etc. In a truly destructive manner has primitive Christianity been treated by him. Starting from the idea, that

the foundation of Christianity was Ebionitism, with which Gnosticism afterwards joined—a union prepared by the more liberal Pauline views—he has, with unheard of arbitrariness, set aside, in the canon and in the first monuments of Christian literature, every thing which did not agree with that hypothesis; while, on the other hand, he gives an importance, reaching far beyond their historical sphere, to the forms of the Judaic Christianity, and to every thing which he thinks he can consider as such. He was assisted by able pupils, such as *Zeller* and *Schwegler*. The most eminent exegetical and historical scholars replied to *Bauer*. But the experience that all truth rebounds from prejudiced and biassed investigation,—the opposite views which rose in the school itself,—and the exhaustion which the books on these subjects unceasingly called forth by one another, could not fail at last to produce;—all this has destroyed the influence of this school.

When the supremacy of the Hegelian system was thus broken up (since about 1840), a favourable moment seemed to arise for those philosophers who had gone beyond Hegel, and occupied a more positive relation towards historical Christianity (*Fichte* the son, *Weisze*, *Branisz*, *Chalybaeus*, *Fischer*, *Ulrici*, and others). It is certain that, in the circle of these philosophers, a considerable amount of talent existed, and a positive theology could not refuse to offer its assistance to the effort to produce a Christian philosophy out of the results of modern speculation. Yet these philosophers could not gain any influence how often soever they attempted it; *first*, because every one of them, after all, brought a peculiar system of his own—and hence, for the unprejudiced inquirer, a proof of the insecurity and arbitrariness of philosophical systems; *secondly*, because the positive, which they

brought was, after all, not positive enough for the deeper tendency of the time, while the dialectics, from which it resulted, was not sufficiently dialectic; *finally*, because the spirit of that time in general pursued practical interests. Moreover, the authors of these views had intentionally pointed to the mysterious master in the south of Germany, to *Schelling*, as the restorer of true philosophy. And, indeed, when he at length, in 1841, appeared in Berlin, it seemed as though he was to break his long silence. The loftiest expectations were entertained. There was, indeed, something wonderful in the spectacle of a man who, when still a youth, had performed a great philosophical task, coming in the evening of his life into the midst of his opponents' camp, in order to bring the whole movement to a close. And the promises with which *Schelling* appeared—to rear a castle in which, henceforth, philosophy was to dwell in safety, etc.—could not but increase still more the expectations which had been awakened. These promises might, and did, indeed, raise suspicions. Even although *Schelling* had had the absolute truth to offer, the aged thinker might have known that truth does not manifest itself to the strained expectations of the masses. The lectures, which were communicated to a most brilliant audience, could not remain a secret from wider circles. They were published by *Frauenstädt* and by *Paulus*. A theosophical system came out, reminding men strongly of Gnosticism, in which the history of the world was looked upon as a divine process. Heathenism was to him the period of the enmity of the creature, Christianity that of its reconciliation; and after the times of James, Peter, Paul, he now announced the age of John, the period of peace between faith and science. Of that in which *Hegel's* strength lay, of methodical demonstration, there was, if possible, still less to be seen, than in his former

writings ; and history, mythology, and theology, are very rudely dealt with. The union with Christianity was evidently a gnostic appearance only. According to what was whispered abroad by the notables among *Schelling's* hearers, a stroke of immense consequence had been struck in the realm of mind ; but up to this day little has been seen of it. Hegelianism opposed the destructive sentences which fell from this master's tripod, and the triumph of its old antagonists, who, exultingly, as far as they could do, greeted *Schelling* as the anti-Hegel ; yet, it was not the arguments of Schelling, but the circumstance that the master of modern speculation publicly and emphatically renounced his progeny, which fully destroyed the authority of Hegelianism. Public interest withdrew more and more from philosophy, and has now nearly sunk to zero. *Fichte*, the younger, says in the preface to his *Journal for Philosophy*, which was renewed in 1852 : " It is now to be lamented that after the period of a one-sided prevalence of philosophical speculations over the so-called exact sciences, as well as over practical activity, there seems to have fallen upon us that nervous depression which usually follows excessive effort. Because philosophy cannot perform what, in its speculative conceit, it promised, therefore all philosophy is rejected as useless, profitless, and superfluous. Because, with dogmatic presumption, it meddled with things which lie beyond its sphere, especially with the springs of purely practical conditions, with ecclesiastical and social questions of the moment, where it could produce only confusion, and furnish no light,—therefore all philosophical inquiry is regarded as dangerous, and men seek, by all possible means, to suppress the tendency to it. But even in the territory of philosophy, there prevails at present a kind of apathy and indifference, or, if one may call it so, rather a



careless security. The most opposite principles, the most antagonistic tendencies, exist apparently in perfect peace; every school, every class, almost every individual philosopher goes on rearing on his territory a small hut beside his small house, as if, besides this, there existed nothing in the world worth while noticing."

When *Hase* assailed the common Rationalism, this was done in the interest of the philosophical Rationalism; but the latter, too, as we have just seen, was giving way. Its downfall, as it seems, could not but increase the influence of that school, which held by the immediate religious life, the religious feeling, and which we saw attained its greatest eminence in *Schleiermacher*. We saw that this great theologian came, from the stand-point of a Pantheistic mysticism, nearer to positive Christianity. The agreement of his religious consciousness with the evangelical Confession, he exhibited in his principal work, "The Christian faith, according to the principles of the evangelical Church, systematically represented."<sup>1</sup> All religion is, according to him, even still based on feeling. As formerly he called the religious feeling, sense of, and taste for, the infinite, so he now called it a feeling of dependence. But this feeling of dependence is an absolute one, as distinct from the conditional, which is called forth in us by relations to the world; for we can react against objects of the world, but not against God. Yet the religious consciousness does not immediately rise to God, but through the medium of the phenomena of the world; so that it is only in co-operating with the consciousness of the world that the consciousness of God is called forth. The consciousness of God ought to prevail during every moment,

<sup>1</sup> "Der Christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der Evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt" (1st ed. 1821; 2d ed. 1830).



and in every event of life; but in our natural condition we do not find this to be so. In the natural man, the religious consciousness is fettered by sensual consciousness. But in the community which has proceeded from Jesus of Nazareth, we obtain an emancipation, a redemption of the consciousness of God. This cannot be the effect of the community as such, inasmuch as it consists of men in need of salvation, but of the divine life only which the founder of the Church left to His people. Jesus Christ was the man possessed of the absolute power and energy of the consciousness of God, the *ideal* man who has redeemed the world by the life which proceeds from Him. To represent in a scientific way the Christian consciousness, as it exists in the redeemed as a matter of fact, is the task of systematic theology. It does not prove, but it evolves the existing feeling in its connection. But that this consciousness, thus evolved, agrees with the Protestant consciousness, is proved by texts from the symbolical books of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. And since systematic theology is not a proof and demonstration of any object of knowledge, but only the scientific description of a part of the mind, it has nothing at all to do with philosophy.

This assurance of *Schleiermacher*, as to his being independent of philosophy, was not readily believed by his contemporaries; they found in his "*Glaubenslehre*" the same philosophy which they had found in his "Discourses on Religion," viz., Spinozism, and the proofs which *Strauss* (see *Characteristiken* and *Kritiken*, S. 146, ff.) gave, have not yet been invalidated. But certainly, religion is a life independent of all philosophy; to have demonstrated this is the great merit of *Schleiermacher*. It is, however, a different question, whether the feeling of dependence be the vital foundation of all religion. What

this "feeling of dependence" really meant, the principal theologians did not exactly understand, even after the explanations which *Schleiermacher* gave in his two *Send-schreiben an Lücke*. But even supposing that the feeling of dependence had proved itself to be a fact of life, a fact of life is not yet a fact of truth. And a consciousness must certainly know of something; consciousness of God is a knowledge of God; Christian consciousness of God is a knowledge of God as He has revealed himself to us through Jesus Christ. Of God, however, philosophy, too, knows something, and so does history of Christ. *Schleiermacher* develops the philosophical idea of God in his *Dialektik*, and the facts of the life of Jesus, in lectures in which a very bold criticism is to be found. Of what use, then, was it to systematic theology to be told that it did not stand in need of philosophy, if it was unable to prove the matter of its faith in any other way than by pointing to the fact of its existence in the mind, and thus stood powerless by the side of philosophy which sought its God in its own ways. When, after *Schleiermacher's* death, his *Dialektik* brought out an idea of God which was thoroughly Pantheistic, but agreeing well with the statements of his *Glaubenslehre*, it could no more be doubted that theology had ploughed with the heifer of philosophy. But, if such be the case, the vital nerve of this *Glaubenslehre* is cut. After the impulses which have proceeded from it shall have been digested, it will be to posterity like the doctrinal monologue of a great theologian.

In *Schleiermacher's* school a development took place similar to that which had occurred in *Hegel's*. One part of it entered into a positive relation to the doctrine of the Church (*Twisten, Nitzsch*) while another (*Jonas, Sydow*) joined the dissolving tendencies of the time. In this respect, *Twisten* says of himself: "He who has paid some

attention to my exposition in the first volume, must have perceived that I do not altogether follow Schleiermacher in his definition of the relation of Gnosis to the religious consciousness, but that I assign to it a more prominent position. A consequence of that is, that differences which, in the first instance, concern the element of cognition, must lead to differences in doctrinal views also ; and this accounts for my thinking differently, partly in the relation of doctrinal theology to the declarations of Holy Scripture, and partly also on many philosophical notions and doctrines. To this I may add farther that *Schleiermacher's* relation to the doctrine of the Church is not the same as mine."<sup>1</sup> There was little consistency in this tempering of the theology of feeling with speculative elements ; it was more natural to reduce both of the elements into a higher unity. *Rothe, Ullmann, Dorner, Lange*, and others, represent this stand-point. In a time when the great creations of German philosophy lay scattered and broken in pieces, a theology which, out of its ruins built speculative huts, in which the so-called Christian consciousness could take up its residence, seemed to have all the sound intellects of the time in its favour. It claimed the past, inasmuch as it pretended to stand on the ground of the Confessions of the Reformation, and at the same time called itself the Theology of the Future ; it made considerable concessions to modern science, and yet it did not abandon the claim of being in harmony with the doctrine of the Church. In the consciousness of its scientific depth, it called itself the "German Theology," and yet it paid attention to the present practical interests of the Church also. *Ullmann's Wesen des Christenthums* (*i. e.* Essence of Christianity, 1845), may be considered as the

<sup>1</sup> *Dogmatik* II., S. XIX.

average profession of this school. Christianity is not essentially doctrine, as Rationalists and Supernaturalists have one-sidedly said ; nor a law of morality, as Kantianism has asserted ; nor redemption, as Schleiermacher would have it ; but it is union of man and God, effected by the person of its Founder, a person perfectly united with God, perfectly divine, and perfectly human. This definition, at first sight, seems to be quite sound, and in harmony with the doctrine of the Church. But its truth is not proved from the formal principle of Protestantism, but by means of a dialectic settlement with the various, and especially the recent views of Christianity which have appeared in the course of the history of the Church ; and it proves its correctness, by showing that from this point of view all these views are organically comprehended in one ; and hence the definition of the essence and nature of Christianity is a product of mediation. It is, then, not justification by faith, as the doctrine of the Church so emphatically declares,—it is not even redemption, in the sense of *Schleiermacher*, but the union of man with God through Jesus Christ, which is the central point of Christianity. This union is a vital union, an union of man with God in the Holy Spirit, as sometimes, also, it is expressed, which manifests itself in all the faculties. The ideal of such an union is Christ. With some unessential modifications, we have thus here the Christ of *Schleiermacher*. It is in their view of the person of Christ that the theological systems have always characterised themselves. *Dorner*, *Rothe*, *Lange*, and others, saw in Christ the *ideal* man, in whom the human species has been personified, the personal recapitulation of mankind, “ the man of the species ” (*Gattungsmensch*).<sup>1</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> A comprehensive representation of this view is given by *Liebner*: *Christologie*, S. 27, ff.



*ideal* man originated from Schleiermacher; the "man of the species" was a production of speculation. The idea which this school entertained of Christ is thus an expression of the combination between the theology of feeling and the speculative school. By means of the same agents, *Rothe* came to the result, that the State is the realisation of the Church,—a view by which almost all the theologians of the time were offended, although it had a support in the practice of the Erastian State Churches. Notwithstanding all objections, *Rothe* returned to this result in his *Ethik* (1845). The speculative element and the religious consciousness have here united into a theosophy, which feels itself to be independent of philosophy proper. "I declare expressly that this work does not contain anything of philosophy, but only theology and theosophy, although I wish it to be noticed by philosophers also,—and that I make no claim whatsoever to understand anything of philosophy." But who was to receive and acknowledge these results? The convictions, confessions, symbolical books of both the ancient and the Protestant Churches know nothing of that Trinity, that Christ, that Church which this *Ethik* taught; while Dialectics, which had produced these views, fled from the court of speculation, under the assurance of not being philosophy. It was obviously a blending of the theology of feeling and of speculation, the centre of which was an ingenious individuality pervaded by Christian elements, and formed in the school of modern philosophy. If any one should yet doubt whether this combination of philosophy and Christian consciousness was deficient in the objective exponent, he must be freed from all hesitation by the dilettanteism of *Lange* assuming every hue.

The theology of mediation had vital power as long as it went along with the tendency to the positive which



pervades this period of transition, just as a blossom has beauty and strength as long as it is the prospective fruit. But the blossoms of subjective efforts could not but fall off when the summer of the Church set in, just as the fruits of this summer will disappear when the Lord shall come to His harvest. From the schools of the mediating theologians there could not fail to proceed a theology for which the business of mediation was accomplished, a theology which started from the positive. But these theologians could not understand, and accommodate themselves to this natural course. The same theologians who formerly, when assailed by Rationalism, had demanded a return to the positive, now uttered voices of warning against the sickly tendency of youth to the old, against the spirit of restoration which spread more and more alarmingly,—voices of warning which, even to single phrases and turns, agreed with those rationalistic ones. That was a new proof of the old truth, that he who does not advance recedes. In the mediation-theology, the two agents: the general—whether it was called reason (philosophy) or religious consciousness (*Schleiermacher*)—and the specifically Christian—whether it was determined as revelation or as the doctrine of the Church—were not truly united. The negative tendencies which proceeded from the schools of *Hegel* and *Schleiermacher* made it manifest that this union was untenable. But the Lord caused these supports to be broken, in order that faith might begin to walk on its own feet. The love for the positive, more or less subjective and arbitrary, one might almost say that of a dilettante, must become a truth. When now that time of separation came, that “German theology” imagined that a new mixture of rational and positive elements, in which each of them loses a little, was the remedy of the Church. It is mistaken; such mixtures will neither

stand the test of science, nor that of life. Ever since that separation took place, the tendency towards the Church became more and more powerful, and even that "German theology" could not resist it. Then an ecclesiastical form, which holds an infinitely elastic medium between old and modern, positive and subjective, viz., the *Union*, offered itself to it. Of this we have now to speak in the last chapter.

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### CHAPTER III.

#### THE CHURCH RENOVATING HERSELF.

THE new life after the liberation-wars had a tendency towards the Church; but it was nothing more than a tendency. To how very small an extent ecclesiastical consciousness was developed, is proved not only by the theology of this period, but also by the manner in which, at that time, in some Protestant countries, the *Union* of the Lutheran and Reformed churches was accomplished.

It was first carried in *Nassau* (1817). In the discussions, the confession of faith was only incidentally spoken of, but so much the more was said regarding the most external of the externals of the Church. The *United* Clergyman promised to "teach the Christian doctrine, according to the principles of the Evangelical Church, in such a manner as he himself, after honest inquiry, and according to the best of his convictions, draws it from Scripture." In Rhenish Bavaria, the Union was effected

in 1818, with this declaration: "The Protestant Evangelico-Christian Church holds in due estimation the Catholic symbols, and the symbolical books used by the individual Protestant Churches, but does not acknowledge any other foundation of faith, nor rule of doctrine, except holy Scripture alone." In the deed of the Badish Union (1821), the Augsburg Confession and Heidelberg Catechism are acknowledged, *as much* and *in so far* as the right of free inquiry was claimed in the Augsburg Confession, and applied in the Heidelberg Catechism. In Rhenish Hesse (1822), the Union declared "that the symbolical books, *common* to the two separated Churches, should in future also be the rule of teaching, with the exception of the doctrine on the Lord's Supper, contained therein, and on which they had hitherto differed."

In his proclamation of the 27th September 1817, King Frederick William III. of Prussia, had distinctly stated the ground, way, and aim of the Union:—Ground: the two Churches are essentially one; way: from the sentiments of the single individuals, the Union shall gain an ecclesiastical form; aim: the two sister Churches, hitherto separated, are to unite into one national Church. While it is obvious and well known, that in Nassau, Baden, Palatinate, Rhenish Hesse, and Dessau, it was Rationalism and Indifferentism that spoke the decisive word at the introduction of the Union; it may be said that Frederick William III., in the spirit of his ancestors, was anxious for the Union in an Evangelical sense, yea, even with a sense for the dignity, authority, and institutions of the Church. Although, upon the whole, the theology of that time was more advanced than the court theologians, *Neander*,<sup>1</sup> *Eylert*, etc., who supported the king; yet the

<sup>1</sup> Not the celebrated Church historian, but Bishop Neander.  
—T.R.

evangelical earnestness of Frederick William, his veneration for Luther, his love for the old ecclesiastical institutions and forms of worship, still stood very much isolated. The king wished by no means to set aside the Confessions by the Union. On the 16th September 1822, he himself answered to Dean *Michler* in Brieg, who, in a direct address, had petitioned that His Majesty should ordain that the gospel alone was to be received and sworn to as the highest and only rule of faith: "It is true, that holy Scripture is the source of the Evangelical Confession of Faith, but it is so to the Greek and Roman Catholic Churches also, and to so many tolerated Christian sects. The Augsburg Confession, and the other symbolical books, generally received in the Evangelical Church, just contain that in which this Church differs from those other Churches; and it is therefore, even for this reason, appropriate to impose upon the ministers of this Church the duty, not to disseminate by their teaching and preaching any other doctrine than that which is in harmony with holy Scripture, and the Evangelical Confession of Faith contained in it, and in the symbolical books. The exposition of holy Scripture is a particular branch of theological science; but if those truths of our faith, which ought to stand immoveable, and ought to be held fast, were to be interpreted by every clergyman according to the measure of his ability for expounding, and if this, his individual interpretation, were, by means of teaching and preaching, to be transferred to the congregation—a thing which hitherto has been only too often done—then the substance of the truths of the evangelical faith could no longer stand unshaken. It is just in this interpreting that the origin of the sects is to be sought for, and it has, for this reason, been deemed necessary to limit all individual interpretation of Scripture—in so far as its spreading

in the congregation by means of teaching and preaching is concerned — by an obligation to the gospel, and, at the same time, to the symbolical books, as the authorities recognised in the Evangelical Church for three centuries. *This arrangement will rather promote than impede the union of the Evangelical Confessions of Faith.*” This last sentence rather contrasts, by its ambiguous expression, with the noble assurance and confidence which pervade this royal letter. It is certain that when the king took the introductory steps towards the Union, he was not aware of the full importance of the Confession ; he did not perceive that it is not possible to declare the distinctive doctrines, which both the Confessions declare to be essential, to be unessential, without taking a position above the Confession, without criticising the Confession, without neutralizing the power of the Confession. It was impossible that he should overlook the fact, that the masses adhered to the Union, just because in it they saw the barriers of the Confession falling. In a way not to be mistaken, that fact came out in the same year in the provincial synod of Breslau. There *David Schulz* and *Cölln* put the question : “Is the synod resolved to acknowledge the symbolical books of the Evangelical Church, in so far as they agree with holy Scripture, as witnesses for the above principle (viz. the sole authority of Scripture), for the actually accomplished purification of the Church, for the evangelical spirit which animated the Reformers, and not to remove from their principles and spirit ?” They quickly obtained an affirmative answer. To the few who did not say, Yes, *Scheibel* belonged. His protest against the Union rested on the conviction, firm as a rock, that the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord’s Supper alone was in accordance with Scripture ; but that the Reformed doctrine was an



offspring of Rationalism. His own views of the Lord's Supper *Scheibel* declared in a sermon: "The Sacrificial Feast of the New Covenant" (1821). Then *David Schulz* stepped forth as the champion of the Union, in an anonymous pamphlet: "Disorder in the Sanctuary;" at the close of which he says: "Behold, then, this man,—this enemy to light and progress,—this dark ecclesiastical comet, which strives to raise itself into a new light of the world, and is thought to be so by a small number of weakly devotees, who are labouring under the spleen of the time, of mystified women and men seeking deliverance from a troubled tormented life, who allow themselves to be dragged along by its tail through all the errors of its perverse, unclean path of apocalyptic fancies, of unchristian absurdities, in superstitious, conceited folly, claiming to be the truth;—behold, and be startled." That which *Scheibel* had brought before his congregation in that sermon, he endeavoured to establish in a scientific monograph (1823). Immediately after it appeared *David Schulze's* Treatise on the Lord's Supper, which, in consequence of the Rationalistic foundation on which it rests, could not miss the result of *Zwingle*, faithful to this model even to the bringing forward of the charge of cannibalism. Of course, this theology walked on the broad road of the masses. A number of the members of his congregation, however, *Steffens* among them, were gathering around *Scheibel*. After many wanderings of life, and aspirations, *Steffens* had been led back to the Confession of his fathers, by the earnest tendency of the time; and it was not his way to allow his experience and development to mature before he communicated them to the world. It was with shaking of their heads that his old friends from the time when he was an adherent of the Philosophy of nature, Romanticism, Germanism, and the

Theology of feeling, read "How *Steffens* again turned a Lutheran," and his passionate testimony "against the false theology," among which he reckoned the theology of his friend *Schleiermacher*. But this opposition was lost amidst the unanimous assent of theologians of every sect, who received the Union with shouts.

Frederick William was less fortunate in his liturgical arrangements. His love for liturgical forms, together with a tendency to uniformity, peculiar to the princes of this house, had given rise in him to the thought of a liturgy for his whole kingdom, which was effectually to meet the arbitrariness and variety which had crept into public worship. The Liturgy of the court-chapel and cathedral-church (*Hof-und Domagende*), the chief author of which was the king himself, which was laid before the country for a trial, met with much opposition. The king convinced himself that he must pay greater deference to the provincial claims, but was determined to make use of his pretended liturgical rights. The bi-centenarian jubilee year of the presentation of the Augsburg Confession was fixed for the introduction of this Liturgy (*Agende*). The reception of the Liturgy was commanded, but that of the Union was arbitrary. That circle in Breslau, shortly before alluded to, refused to receive the Liturgy, because it stood in the service of the Union. Altogether apart from former declarations of the king, and the public confession of *Eylert*, this was indeed the case, and could not be denied, inasmuch as the Liturgy was intended for Lutheran as well as for Reformed congregations ; and not to speak of other tributes which it paid to an age of transition, in the celebration of the Lord's Supper, it evidently assumed the Union. The protest against the Liturgy could not remain without consequences in the case of clergymen. *Scheibel* was

deposed. And when pastor *Kellner*, a man of great popularity, and of remarkable energy, as a minister of another Church which alone existed according to law, refused to comply with the arrangement of an United Church authority, government interfered with military force, in order, of course, to conquer. It is certainly not only in accordance with the reverence due to crowned heads, but also with history, to judge of the king as leniently as possible. From the calumnious character which *Eylert* has given of *Scheibel*, one may well infer how the king was informed about the whole movement. It cannot be doubted, that he who instinctively hated every thing which had the appearance of revolution, looked upon this as the fruit, on the ecclesiastical territory, of the French July revolution. It escaped him that the Union was carried out in a way which was altogether unlawful, and was upheld by a party in the Church which stood much nearer to revolution than they did who adhered to the faith of their fathers. Through the atmosphere of ambiguous and violent theologians of the *Union*, and of a Minister who, when he wanted arguments, betook himself to the rude means of violence, of bureaucratic boards, etc. the thoughts of the king received so many earthly materials, that they fell heavily enough on the poor Lutherans. But among the darkest signs of that time is the circumstance, that men like *Hahn* and *Olshausen* took part against the Lutherans of Silesia. One cannot but call it a melancholy fact, that *Hahn*, who in Leipzig had advocated the right of the Church with the weapons of the Spirit, now stood in connection with the weapons of force; this man of truly evangelical love and gentleness, with bayonets. *Olshausen*, well furnished with official facts, endeavoured with much ingenuity to point out the mistakes which the suppressed had committed in the form, without

mentioning, even by a word, the camels which were swallowed by the other party, viz., the opinion that this Lutheran movement was merely the echo of a party long outlived, and altogether without claims, inasmuch as more than 7000 congregations stood against a few clergymen. The king could not make up his mind to grant to the opponents of the Union the right of existing as a separate community. But they were so in fact. Scattered all over Prussia, they were and are a protest, in fact, against the Union, an awakening call to the faith of the fathers, a proof of the vital power of the Confession, perhaps the harbingers of future independence of the Church upon the State. At their head stands a man (*Huschke*), who alone proves that God's spirit and gifts are with this community. In contrast with them, those of Lutheran tendencies who had remained in the National Church of Prussia, appealed to the Cabinet-order of 1834, which guaranteed, within the Union, the legal existence and authority of the Confession. But altogether apart from the little authority which Cabinet-orders have in matters of the Church, for every one who has yet a recollection of the Free one, which is the Mother of all, especially when these Cabinet-orders claim to be rules of faith,—the assurance that within the same National Church two contradictory Confessions have simultaneously a legal existence, bears within itself too evident a contradiction, to allow those who looked deeper to be at their ease. Under a consciousness of the acts of violence committed at the introduction of the Union, and of the claim which the adherents of a Confession with so strong ecclesiastical supports might raise, of being at least allowed to exist, legal existence and recognition was secured, by the General Concession (1845), to the Lutherans who had seceded from the National Church. And theology, the chief prop of the Union, had

meanwhile so far advanced, that it felt the contradiction in which a Church Community with a two-fold Confession stands to the Protestant principle, that the unity of the Church depends upon the unity of evangelical doctrine. That the *consensus* of the Union must have some symbolical expression, if the Union was to be maintained at all, they saw; but how was it to be established? One essential feature of the Confession of Faith in the Lutheran National Church is this—that it is the expression of the ordination vow and engagement of clergymen; but as to this ordination vow, matters were in a state of desolation in the Prussian National Church. It is ascertained, that at the same time when the Union was carried out (1830), such a vow and engagement were, in most congregations, altogether dispensed with. It was, therefore, now the thought of the most eminent theologians of the Union (*Nitzsch, Dorner, Müller, etc.*), to carry through an ordination formula in which the *consensus* of the two Churches was to be contained, without taking from the individual congregation the right of giving a call on the ground of the particular Confessions. This was most dexterously planned, and altogether in the spirit of the Union. They had no confidence in the power of the Union to get up and introduce a Confession; but to the opponents who, it was to be expected, would rise, they could reply, that an ordination formula is not a Confession; and yet it was to have a power which hitherto had essentially belonged to the Confession. To abolish the particular Confessions of the two Churches was what they neither would nor could do; the individual congregations were at liberty to rejoice in them; but the barrier of the ordination formula, which contained the profession of, and adherence to the Union, would be sure to prevent them from being carried away by their convictions beyond



the limits of the Union. The principal task of the General Synod of 1846 consisted in carrying through this well-meditated plan ; but the ordination formula, which the mediating school produced—a wretched child of theology—was, by itself, rendered impracticable. And in this offspring the character of the mother herself came clearly out ; it was seen that the mediating theology was strong in criticising, weak in producing, incapable of existing without the antagonistic principles which it imagined it had overcome, and itself not holding the *consensus* on which it built the Union.

At a time when this theology still claimed to be the victor, a school appeared which, in opposition to the prevailing science, and contemptuously looking down upon the coryphaei of this science, held that to love Christ was of greater value than all science. The most eloquent representative of this school was *Tholuck*. *De Wette* had made his doubter find reconciliation and consecration in a reanimated theology of feeling. To this *Weihe* (consecration) *Tholuck* opposed "*Die Wahre Weihe*," the true consecration of the new life proceeding from faith in the Saviour. This new life, which calls itself regeneration, indifferent to the "pilgrim's dress of the Confession," not restricted as to doctrine by the faith of the Church, has a Pietistic character. Solitary in the present, it is in expectation of a victorious future. "Dearly beloved," says the patriarch of this new life to the consecrated one, "take that which I am now to tell you as the legacy of an old man who is soon to part from the world, and who, before his departure, is anxious to deposit within the breast of many a young theologian who is called to stand in so great a time, that which the experience of a long life, and the extensive acquaintance with many thousands in different countries and ranks, have taught him. I there-

fore tell to you, as one who will, perhaps, soon be in some University as one of the instruments of the great days which are in store for us: the work of the Spirit of God is, in these days, greater than you, than most people think. Yes; a great resurrection morning is dawning; hundreds of youths are being awakened everywhere by the Spirit of God. Everywhere the converted ones enter into closer connections. Even science will become an handmaid and friend of the Crucified One. The authorities, also, although as yet partly hostile to this great change, from fear that it might produce political consequences, favour it in many places; and where they do not, the power of light becomes so much the more manifest. Many enlightened ministers even now already proclaim the gospel in its power; and many, as yet concealed, will come forth. I see the morning; but the day mine eye will no more behold here, but from a higher place." This theology is beyond the stand-point of mediation, for it draws from the new life in Christ; and this life is its own evidence. But the endeavour to connect itself with everything induces it to enter with versatility and elasticity upon all the interests of science and life. For this business of spiritual exchange, an exposition of Scripture is suited, which, in an expert and skilful manner, changes the text into spirit and life, although not always into that which has produced the text.—Between *Schleiermacher* and *Tholuck* stands *Neander*, whose school *Tholuck* has never denied. *Neander* himself has professed the theology of the *Christian Consciousness*. "By this term is designated the power of the Christian faith in the subjective life of the single individual, in the congregation, and in the Church generally, a power independent, and ruling according to its own law,—that which according to the word of our Lord, must first form the leaven for every

other historical development of mankind.”<sup>1</sup> When more clearly viewed, the Christian consciousness is only the form which Christianity has obtained in the heart. *Pectus est quod facit theologum*, is Neander’s watchword. With this principle, he knew himself to be in opposition to all the tendencies which were urging to objectivity in religion, whether they were philosophical or orthodox, or in general, formed in conformity with the Church. “I shall never cease to protest against the one-sided *intellectualism*, that fanaticism of understanding, which is spreading more and more, and which threatens to change man into an intelligent, over-wise beast. But, at the same time, I must protest against that tendency which would put a stop to the process of development of theology, which, in impatient haste, would anticipate its aim and goal, although with an enthusiasm for that which is raised above the change of the days,—an enthusiasm which commands all respect, and in which the hackneyed newspaper categories of ‘Progress and Retrogression’ are out of the question.”<sup>2</sup> From his Christian consciousness Neander saw, in the past history of the kingdom of God, a new and variegated life ; and it was his talent and his delight to follow the individual forms and expressions of it in different ages. But both were wanting to him when the life of the Church condensed itself into objective forms. But that which, by means of his psychological Pragmatism, he could, to some extent, still be reconciled to, and sympathize with, in the history of the Church, he at last rejected with increasing bitterness, when it met him in life. The contradiction of the intolerance of tolerance, of the fanaticism of gentleness with which people forebore, in this noble

<sup>1</sup> *Abhandlungen*, S. 240.

<sup>2</sup> Preface to the 4th Edition of the History of the Planting of the Apostolic Church, p. xiii.

man, could not by any means be overlooked in the poor followers who afterwards represented this stand-point. *Tholuck* and *Neander*, raised above the theology of mediation by the energy of the Christian life, in which their theology rested, yet paid it their tribute in the subjectivity of their stand-point, and in the concessions which they made to modern science. From that *Hengstenberg* kept himself free, who, from the very outset, most emphatically pointed to the firm prophetic word, to the objective rule of faith and life. While the mediating theology had given over to modern science, the old theory of inspiration, and, in history, admitted contradictions, even myths,—in doctrine, subjective elements,—and in the canon, spurious elements ;—*Hengstenberg* took upon himself, with great ingenuity, the vindication of the most assailed writings and portions of the Old Testament,—pointed at and proved the supernatural christological contents in the prophetic books which had been naturalized by *Illuminism*,—developed, with ingenuity and intelligence, the meaning of the history and forms of the Old Testament dispensation,—and, with the anti-critical sword of the understanding in the one hand, and the building stones of the experience of the Church in the other, expounded the Old Testament books. The sum and substance of the divine word he found in the symbolical books of the two Confessions, which he found agreeing in all essential points. With this conviction he joined the Union, although he belonged by birth to the Reformed Church, and had derived his theological education chiefly from Calvin. He looked down, as from a certain height, upon the Lutherans of Silesia struggling for the exclusively Lutheran Confession. Such was his stand-point. Never has *Hengstenberg* been afraid of the stigma of orthodoxy; and it was never the way of this high



principled manly theologian to coquet with the winds of the time. As long as he struggled with the narrow-minded men of *Illuminism*, his position was indeed much assailed, but internally strong; but when he opposed the Lutheran movements, this man of the Church, standing as he did on the ground of the Union, seemed to be without a Church. However, the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, edited by him, without doubt the ablest and most influential ecclesiastical periodical of the present, shows a progress from the undeveloped evangelical to the ecclesiastical, with a tact which seizes wonderfully upon the signs of the time. While, at first, it was connected with positive tendencies of very different characters, the Halle controversy (1830), in consequence of which *Neander* and others withdrew from it, gave it a more distinct turn, until, in 1840, the preface, which demonstrated that Pietism was untenable, declared the internal separation from a party which, at first, had chiefly supported this organ. Even from the Union, *Hengstenberg* more and more alienated himself. While in 1844 he had still declared that the Union could exist only if both of the Churches would relax in their Confessions, he declared in 1848 for Confederation as distinct from Union; and when this distinction soon became illusory, he declared for the necessity of a separate organization of both the Churches within the general framework of the National Church. And thus *Hengstenberg* has been raised by God to be, in a time of transition, a pioneer of the Church.

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A tendency, endowed with growing strength, found its expression in the theology of the new life. Everywhere in the congregations which, upon the whole, and generally, were under the sway of Rationalism and worldly-mindedness, small crowds of faithful men were collecting, upon



whom so-called public opinion looked down with contempt. What, at a former time, the Pietists had been charged with—weakness of mind and softness of disposition, religious eccentricity, monkish seclusion from the world, pride in seeking to distinguish themselves from others, etc.—with all these things, an age that had gone through *Illuminism* upbraided these so-called “Peaceful ones in the land” in a still higher degree. There was a certain amount of truth in thus classing them with Pietism. As these believers did not lay so much stress upon the grace of God, which calls them through the word and sacrament, as upon the grace which converts them by special leadings of Providence, they rarely found in public worship what they were in search of, but in smaller devotional circles which were, in many instances, organized into conventicles. The devotional books which prevailed there belonged chiefly to the Pietistic school. They knew themselves to be in the most cordial communion with the Moravian Brethren; it was in their colonies that many found the communion of the children of light which would not appear in the State Churches. They paid little attention to doctrine and confession; but life and works in the Spirit of Christ was everything to them. But in one aspect this Pietism was altogether different from that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While the latter, an enfeebled ecclesiastical institution, was without theological power, and without any influence on a future renovation of the Church, the Pietistic fervour which prevailed in those circles was a life full of good hopes for the future, out of which very different tendencies developed themselves.

It was in the retired circles of Pietism, that, throughout the eighteenth century, missions had been carried on. As long as the two Churches of the Reformation had still to struggle for their existence in Germany, the isolated

voices which held forth the duty of offering the gospel to the Gentiles found only an indifferent hearing. Quite in keeping with the activity which, from the outset, was peculiar to the Reformed Church, a commencement of missionary activity manifested itself in those Calvinistic countries which held commercial intercourse with heathen countries, as in Holland, England, and Scotland. Then an important impulse proceeded from a Lutheran prince, Frederick IV. of Denmark, who thought that he was bound to offer the gospel to his heathen subjects. In connection with the *Halle Waisenhaus* (Orphan Institution), he established a mission in the Danish colony of Tranquebar, in the land of the Tamuls. It was under him that *Hans Egede* went to Greenland, in order there to sow with tears where others were to reap with joy. It was under him that *Thomas von Westen* went to Lapland, in order to kindle in that cold land a fire of love, which did not die with his premature death. In Germany, the *Mission* was in the hands of the Pietists. The care for the salvation of individual souls through loving faith in Jesus Christ, which was the vital point of Pietism, could not fail to extend to a care for the conversion of the heathen world, according to the word of our Lord: "When thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren." *Francke* once said to a young theologian of his school: "If, in the Gentile world, one soul is in truth brought to God, this is as much as if a hundred were gained at home; for the latter have daily means and opportunities sufficient for their conversion, while the latter lack these entirely." This word kindled in the soul of that youth, and became a fire which alighted with blessings on a heathen land. That youth was *Ziegenbalg*, the father of the mission in the land of the Tamuls. Pietism acquired an organic form in the community of the Moravian

brethren ; and hence it was in the bosom of this community that the duty of missions was not only recognised, but made also a function of the ecclesiastical life of the community. Borne on the wings of a community which, in a time of general apostacy from the faith of the fathers, and of love generally waxing cold, preserved an ardent love for the Lord, the mission of the Moravian Brethren displayed, in a short time, in the snowy regions of Greenland and Labrador, as well as under the scorching rays of the sun in the West Indies, and among the degraded nations of the Cape of Good Hope, the same spirit of quiet pleading and seeking for the Crucified One,—a spirit which without intruding into the labours of others, overcame by the walk and conversation even without words,—which marked out for its aim not the masses, but single souls, and was, therefore, in earnest with conversion, and with the ordering of the life and conversation. To withhold from the Moravian Brethren the testimony of having done much for the kingdom of God, would be hardening ourselves against the truth. Like the community of the Moravian Brethren, so their mission also kept itself as free from the spirit of the age of *Illuminism* as it was conceivable ; while into the missionary field of the *Halle Waisenhaus* a shallow Doctrinalism entered, against which the abler missionaries, such as *Gericke* and *John*, protested in vain (*Fenger Gesch. d. Trankebarschen Mission*, S. 257, ff.). A crisis in the territory of missions took place in England in the last decades of the last century. Prepared by Methodism, challenged by the powerful impression of the French Revolution, an evangelical spirit awoke there, which, after the English mode, threw itself upon practical objects, and, among them, the conversion of the Gentiles and Jews. The London Missionary Society, which, consisting of the

children of God from among different denominations, would not spread Presbyterianism, or Independency, or Episcopacy, but the gospel of Christ, was the freshest expression of that spirit. The missionary tendency, spreading from England to Scotland, America, Holland, and France, was taken up by German Protestantism also, when, after the liberation-wars, hearts had become susceptible for works of faith. From beginnings, more or less small, arose the missionary societies of Basle (1815), Berlin (1833), Barmen (1828), Hamburg (1836, *Nord-deutscher Verein*), Dresden (1836, now Leipzig). In the ancient Church, the soil was so prepared, the spirit of testifying so powerful, that the extension of the Church was effected by the Church without any special organization. In the beginning of the Church of the middle ages, single heroes went forth (*Patricius, Bonifacius, Ansgar*) to conquer kingdoms to the Lord; but in most cases conversions of the masses were effected by external means. From the bosom of the Romish Church, restoring herself in the face of Protestantism, missionary heroes again went forth, most of them belonging to the Society of the Jesuits. In such heroes the Protestant mission has not been wanting. But the extraordinary works which God effects by single selected individuals, do not exclude the ordinary ones. As in the organism of the Established Churches, which, upon the whole, were still suffering from the consequences of Illuminism, there was no room for missionary activity, it was carried out by free societies, which stood on the ground of a living faith in Jesus. It was on these missionary societies that the offence of the cross of Christ was lying; but that was just the barrier which kept off infidelity and worldly-mindedness from the mission; and the missionary societies, by throwing nets of associations over the Established Churches,



became thus the rallying points of faith. The monthly missionary meetings existing over all the earth became meetings for the edification of the faithful. And the night which covered the heathen world preached repentance more powerfully than any sermons could do, while regeneration was preached by the new life arising, out of faith, on the dark ground of heathenism. Wherever the missionary cause took root in larger circles, the missionary festivals have become true popular festivals, in which the most beautiful motives of the Mediaeval Church—pilgrimages, processions, popular eloquence, etc.—were found again, cleansed and purified; while, wherever they stood isolated, they have worked as awakening voices. With the consultations in the head-quarters of the missions, consultations about Church affairs generally were naturally connected;—the Conferences which took place in Leipzig, in connection with the missionary festivals, have had the character of consulting assemblies in the affairs of the Lutheran Churches of Germany. Thus, the old National Churches were themselves built up while building Churches in the heathen world. Those missionary societies which proceeded from the new life, after the liberation-wars, possessed the undecided character of it. The Basle Society especially, a true copy of the Established Church of Wurtemberg, most emphatically declared for the Union,<sup>1</sup> at a time when the movement was already

<sup>1</sup> *Hoffmann, Die Ev. Missionsgesellschaft in Basel im J. 1842*, S. 36, XXI.:—"The Basle Society has, from its beginning, believed that the division of the Evangelical Church into different forms of Confessions is a consequence of human imperfection, and that none of these forms of Confessions is eternal, but that all of them are transient; that none has the truth alone and throughout, but that they all supplement one another. As a missionary society, it declares its belief in the word of God, or in that which is common to all the Evangelical Protestant Churches."



tending towards the Lutheran Church. In Prussia, the contrarieties of the Union without a Confession, and of the Union seeking a Confession, were transferred to the mission also. When the Hamburg Society was being formed, and about to express its Union-character, powerful voices were raised for the necessity of carrying on the missions in connection with the Church. The Leipzig Society, which labours on the missionary field, which the Danish Crown has founded in connection with the *Halle Waisenhaus*, on the field of *Ziegenbalg*, *Schultze*, *Schwarz*, stands decidedly on the ground of the Evangelical Lutheran Confession, and is the only work carried on in common by the Lutheran Established Churches of Germany and the North. The more that the mission will see that its duty is not only to save single souls, but to build up Churches, the more it will become an affair of the Church.

An argument which was again and again urged against these missions, was the fact, that at home there were so many heathens still to be converted. It was not this argument, but the fact to which it pointed, that was sufficiently well founded. During almost the greater portion of the seventeenth century, in all the evangelical countries of Germany, from the prince down to the beggar, it was thought to be of paramount necessity to know in whom one believed, and to walk according to this faith. In the houses, Bible and hymn-book were the first and the last, the most faithful advisers in all the events of life, a rod and staff on the path of tribulation and death. In the higher, as well as in the elementary schools, the Confession of the fathers was considered as the chief knowledge; to be regular in attending the house of the Lord, and in coming to the table of the Lord, formed part of the family honour. All the ordinances of rank, of law, of the State, were connected with religion. The minister-

ial order could, with the word of God, reprove delinquencies with which no human candour could venture to deal. In short, religion was the rule of domestic and public life. But since the Westphalian peace, we see this power of religion over life disappearing more and more. In the higher classes, ostentatious worldliness, refined love of pleasure, and frivolity, were introduced from France. In the middle and lower classes, the pious tradition was still preserved, down to the middle of the eighteenth century; but life withdrew itself more and more from its regulations and forms. Pietism, called forth by a reaction against an externalized Churchism, gave up the masses in order to deliver up the future of the kingdom of God to a small remnant, to a little Church of the regenerate. The circumstance, that henceforth, as we saw, the disciples of the living faith in Christ Jesus were called Pietists, had its foundation in the fact, that the religious life had lost its substantially working power by which it governs the masses, and penetrates the world, and had, instead of it, become the affair of single individuals. During the age of Illuminism, we likewise saw that it formed a part of education to be rationalistic in religion, humanistic in social life, and to think according to the rules of utility in the ordinary calling. In contrast to the excesses of Illuminism in France, the German sought honour in keeping a medium. "To whom," says *Schleiermacher*, in his discourses on religion, "to whom shall I address myself, but to the sons of Germany? It is only here, in our fatherland, that there is the happy climate which does not altogether refuse any fruit; here you find everything, though scattered only, which adorns mankind; and everything which thrives is somewhere, at least in isolated cases, developed into its most beautiful forms; here, neither *wise moderation*, nor quiet contem-

plation, is wanting." This moderation had, indeed, often the character of petty formalism. It is true that, after the liberation-wars, a better, deeper, and more serious spirit pervaded the people; and it had the appearance as if religion was again to enter into the number of world-ruling powers, yea, as if it were to become the first power. But it soon became manifest that it was in single individuals only that the new life advanced into a living faith in Jesus Christ, while, in the middle classes of the educated world, the views of *Illuminism* continued to prevail. In addition to this, there came the political dissatisfaction which, during the period of the Restoration, seized a great portion of the nation. The so-called Pietism was seen in the company of Absolutism, of a violent restoration of old things, of a tendency opposing the march of intellect. Wheresoever, therefore, there arose conflicts between the representatives of the so-called Pietism and the theology of *Illuminism*, the mass of the educated were throughout on the side of the latter party. Liberalism and Rationalism naturally supported one another. The fall of the kingdom of the Restoration in France, by means of the July Revolution (1830), was therefore a triumph for the Rationalism of the *bourgeoisie*. The July kingdom, with its *juste milieu* between monarchy and revolution, its bankers' wisdom, its calculated religiousness,—this kingdom of the *bourgeoisie*, was exactly the expression and support of that moderate progress which those of an average education in Europe wanted. Wherever, therefore, in Germany, the July movement was victorious, Liberalism and Rationalism appeared as the leaders. Prussia kept herself free from this movement. When, after his accession to the throne, Frederick William IV. declared that he did not wish for a constitution after the French fashion, and, in word and deed, professed

his adherence to the Christian spirit which, after the liberation-wars, had found its head-quarters in Prussia, then Rationalism, although conquered in the territory of theology, gained, in those middle classes of the educated, a new power, by becoming an element of opposition. It is only in this way that we can account for the agitation which was called forth in Germany by the "Friends of Light," by the German Catholics, and by the Protest-Agitation.<sup>1</sup> Religious opposition went hand in hand with the political. To suspect after-thoughts in all the measures of government, constituted the ingenuity of Liberalism,—to shake all the barriers, its art,—to overthrow ministries, its heroism. But, with all that, it was of opinion that the opposition must keep within bounds,—that it must never meddle with the laws which protected the claims of the *bourgeoisie*. The *bourgeoisie* was conservative, as far as the conservation of themselves and their interests was concerned. These interests were substantially of a materialistic kind. To promote traffic and intercourse by means of railways and steam-engines, to outbid invention by invention, to supersede human powers by means of machinery, to make the most of political combinations for mercantile purposes, to open up new mercantile connections,—these were the interests which here domineered over everything. How entirely different from this *bourgeoisie* was the civic class of the *good olden time*,—truly and rightly called thus from this point of view! Then the profession was still subservient to the moral relations of the citizen. To be the head of a family of good name, member of a respected class citizen of a town to which he adhered in joy and in sorrow, above all, to be a good Christian,—these were the

<sup>1</sup> Striking views of the causes of these movements are given by Hundeshagen in "*Der Deutsche Protestantismus*" (1847).

objects at which a citizen of that time aimed. What our modern citizen aims at as the highest good is gain. Where all are running to such a goal, each individual must betake himself to the most refined means. In this haste of competition outbidding one another, the modern citizen has neither time, nor rest, nor opportunity, to feel himself to be a man and a Christian, to allow himself to be led by moral and religious motives. The single individual does not feel as a head of a family, as a member of a corporation and community, but as such and such a clever man, who has obtained such and such a fortune. This natural egotism saps and destroys all the moral ties by which the civic life of the fathers was held. And what did the single individuals obtain by this running and overthrowing of those moral orders? *Education and enjoyment.* Education is the aggregate of knowledge, of rules of life, of interests on which the intercourse of the world depends. The *Spiritus rector* of education is the spirit of the time; and the ideal of education is to be a man fitted for higher society, a fashionable man. Education is the modern knighthood. As yet, there was still nobility that had come down from the middle age. But that which constituted the mediæval nobility, viz., descent from an ancient noble family, landed property, the right of being a member of the Diet, to behave as a gentleman in worldly affairs,—all that had been very much sapped and destroyed by the spirit of the time. Many of the nobility, forced by external circumstances, had lost themselves among the people; while, on the other hand, many, by their merits, had been raised to nobility from the rank of commoners. More than half of the landed property had in many countries passed into the hands of commoners. And even landed proprietors of the nobility displayed on their estates a wisdom in farming and manu-



facturing, which certainly was often rather common. That, however, which, more than any thing, did away with the difference between nobility and *bourgeoisie*, was education. Nevertheless it is certain, that there has been preserved among the nobility a historic spirit, a gift of personal representation, a simplicity of surrender to the purely human relation by means of which they are raised above the refined business life, and a poetry of life which even the world of authors involuntarily acknowledge by their fondness for making their heroes members of this class. But this education penetrated even to the lowest strata of society. The class of those old, solid, pious farmers, faithful to their pastoral traditions, gave way to agriculturists who cultivated their farms in a rational way, with all the claims and wants of modern education. On the ruins of the old organically and originally formed relations of life, education thus reared a uniform empire of a *bourgeoisie* feeding upon the progress of the time. In this kingdom of education, religion had an altogether subordinate position. By Illuminism, people had been estranged from the faith of their fathers; and to return to it was against the laws of progress. Moreover, the Rationalists had succeeded in making the conviction general, that the faith of the Church was irreconcilable with the intelligence of modern times,—and intelligence was the highest court of appeal for education. It is true, however, that a great number of these educated people, who would never have pardoned themselves for not knowing an event of the day, or some celebrated literary phenomenon, were in absolute ignorance of that about which Christianity treats. Thousands of our educated men have no answer to the question: "What must I do that I may inherit eternal life?" While, at one time, the knowledge of salvation was considered as the science of all sciences, it now forms

part of the character of an educated man to know of everything in the world except that which the Lord of the Universe has revealed. In the home of the educated, family worship, bringing up of the children in the fear and admonition of the Lord, grace before meals, searching of the Scriptures, etc., are, as a rule, out of the question. If, according to the oft-repeated words of Cicero, no people is so uncivilized as not to have religion, there is, on the other hand, no people so civilized as to be able to do altogether without religion. The educated man of our time looks upon religion as a private concern, in which every one does as he can and wills. And thus it is even considered as a sign of religion, if an individual only takes the trouble of forming an opinion on religion; and it is regarded as a sign of special depth, if, from his experience, reading, and fancies, he sets up an opinion of his own. Wherever religion ventures to appeal to heavenly necessity, and to administer law and discipline in life, there the educated world sees night, slavery, oppression of conscience, etc., breaking in. For over his intelligence and liberty, our man of education watches with a jealousy which forms a strange contradiction to his phrases about the irresistible conquering power of the spirit.—The dark side of our modern educated world is formed by the *Proletaries*. There have always been poor; but the enormous mass of bodily and spiritual destitution belongs to our time only, nor are the reasons of it so very far out of the way. With all educated people, having wants which are ever increasing, industry becomes, of course, more and more refined, and hence the mass wanting in skill and industry larger and larger. By the factory system of our time, by the application of machinery, masses of our labourers are rendered superfluous, while other masses find transitory employment only, and are then again given up to chance.

The solid middle classes are more and more disappearing. To this we must add the concubinage and prostitution which are spreading more and more widely. There are capitals in Germany in which the half of the new-born are illegitimate. That these will, to a great extent, become *Proletaries*, is obvious. The number of children who grow up without instruction and education, like the beasts of the field, is astonishingly large, even in the best educated countries. Who then will wonder at the number of young criminals? Many thousands live by crime, prostitution, theft, fraud, etc.; others trust altogether to chance. With these masses of *Proletaries* it might happen, at a time which viewed everything from principles, that this state of distress and destitution was made a virtue of; and emancipation from all laws of morality, atheism, and red republicanism, with community of goods and women, were, indeed, systematically taught and maintained. The *bourgeoisie*, for the sake of self-preservation, put a limit to the political and religious Liberalism; but the *Proletaries*, in their state of dissolution, had no reason for doing so. Nor did they want intellectual protectors. These were the *Literati*, the *Proletaries*, in the kingdom of mind. These *Literati*—most of them men who, in the superficial versatility of their aspirations, thought themselves too good for the narrowness of some particular science, or too important for labouring in the sweat of their brows in some office, and had therefore assumed to be the leaders and spokesmen of mankind in their most important affairs, to be the organs of the spirit of the time, to be representatives of intelligence without a moral foundation—instinctively worked into the hands of dissolution. It was out of the midst of the body of these *Literati* that, in the fourth decade, the Romanticism of *Young Germany* proceeded. More than of the literature

of any other nation is it characteristic of the German, to connect genial creative power with the reflecting, critical, theoretical consciousness. One might be disposed to believe that *Shakspeare's* genius could not have existed with a versatility of scientific aspirations such as we find in Goethe. The fundamental fault in *Schiller's* poetry is, no doubt, the prevalence of reflection. We saw that the Romanticism of *Tieck*, *Schlegel*, and others, never brought forth any true creation, just because it was too much in the service of a theory (see p. 202-3). The more that the directly working genius became extinct, the more the theory became elastic, one might say poetic. Thus then it was that there arose that Literati-Romanticism, the poetries of which were properly revised reflections, elegant and ingenious in characterizing, but, notwithstanding all the brilliancy of style and glitter of refined wit, powerless in producing. This Romanticism fascinated, by its reflections, the thinking Germans; by its pungent turns, a generation *blasé*, and requiring nervous excitement; by its giving vent to a licentious carnal mind, the carnal mass. By the boldness of its mental leaps, by its daring attack on everything existing in State and Church, it broke through the barriers of the wisdom of the *bourgeoisie*. It announced a world gone mad in Pantheism. On a soil thus prepared by this Romanticism were cast the views of *Strauss*, *Feuerbach*, *Ruge*, *Visher*, and others, who, after having attempted in vain to carry through in theory their principles, at last likewise betook themselves to the means of these Literati. When then, in 1848, the July King fell, the head of the *bourgeoisie*, the moment appeared to be favourable in Germany for carrying through the ideals of the liberal *bourgeoisie*, such as—Unity of Germany, a Constitution on the broadest foundation, the arming of the people, a



free press, etc. But very soon this Liberalism saw itself outflanked by the leaders and spokesmen of Republicanism, who had the unchained masses at their disposal. Just as powerlessly as formerly, in Theology, Rationalism had stood over against the criticism of Pantheism, did Liberalism now stand at the abyss of the Socialistic republic, which threatened to swallow up not only the Throne and Church, but the *bourgeoisie* also. As yet, this abyss has been again closed; but whether Liberalism has been benefited by the lesson, is the question.

Against this so powerfully spreading corruption, the ordinary means of the Church seemed to be insufficient; it was only a union *en masse* of all those who stood in the faith which seemed to be able to cope with this corruption of the mass of the people. This endeavour called itself Inner Mission, because, as distinct from the Foreign Mission, it has to do with the heathenism within the Church.<sup>1</sup> Even this definition, however, is still too wide, The aim and object of the Inner Mission is, by means of free societies, to gain back to the Gospel the unchristianized people.<sup>2</sup> The Inner Mission opens to children, to whom the parents cannot devote the necessary care and attention, its infant-schools and nurseries; to destitute

<sup>1</sup> From the state of things in Germany, Church can here mean the Established Churches only.—TR.

<sup>2</sup> In determining what Inner Mission means, much doubt and uncertainty prevail, as Lindner, "*Martha und Maria*," S. 13, shows: "It is all that in Christendom is done for elevating the masses, within the pale of the Church, from their destitution and corruption by united efforts, especially in the form of societies, without being guided by the ministerial office. Its substance, Christian love proceeding from faith, and manifesting itself in mercy towards the brethren, is as old as the Church herself; but its form, that of an association, is a new one, which arose only a short time ago, and is now striving for a more perfect organization" (S. 18).



and demoralized children, its asylums and reformatory schools; and takes care of the spiritual and temporal improvement of the adults, in Sunday Schools and Young Mens' Associations. It takes care of the poor in relief-associations, which not only support, but also watch over the bodily and spiritual welfare of their charge. It nurses the sick; gets up healthy and cheap lodgings; increases, in savings' banks, the mite of the poor; seeks, by the power of communion, to educate the intemperate to renunciation; penetrates into the gaols of the criminals, and takes care of those who have been dismissed; circulates Bibles and Christian books, for awakening Christian faith and love, and seeks to make the Sunday again a Sabbath, a day of rest and of elevation to the Lord. It takes care of prostitute girls; descends, reproving and helping, into the abodes of filth; offers to the traveling journeymen<sup>1</sup> places of spiritual recreation; brings the Word of God to the crowds of labourers who do not find time to take care of their souls; endeavours to strengthen destitute and sunken congregations, by itinerant preachers; educates nurses, who not only attend to the bodies, but also to the souls of the sick, etc. At the head of these efforts for elevating the bodily and spiritual pressure which bears upon the Christian people, *Wichern* placed himself,—a man of unflinching energy, rich experience in the abodes of misery, and of great talent for organization. At a time when the German States were threatening to succumb to the outbreaks of a

<sup>1</sup> By the laws of Germany, journeymen are obliged to be abroad for a period of at least three years, in order to improve in their respective trades. The young men, with knap-sacks on their backs, whom one meets with on every road in Germany, belong to this class. It needs scarcely be said that during the time of their journeying, they are exposed to hardships and temptations of every kind.—TR.

wild popular fury (September 1848), he unrolled before a large meeting at Wittenberg, which had been gathered together by solicitude for the existence of the Evangelical Church, a picture of the spiritual destitution and corruption of the people;—and the moment had come when the labours of saving love could be systematically organized. The care of the poor does not need any vindication; it is as old as the Church. That which belonged to modern time was the form of activity by means of associations; but even that existed long before the name of Inner Mission was mentioned. That which was really new was the comprehending of all efforts of this kind into an organized whole. This organized mass seemed to be demanded by the organized masses of the enemy.<sup>1</sup> Very well founded objections, however, were raised against this organizing of associations. A large community had been formed for the salvation of the poor, without any organic connection with that society for the salvation of mankind which God himself has founded through Jesus Christ, viz., the Church. The existence, by the side of the Church, of a community which ascribed to itself effects that belonged to the Church only, was not justified by appealing to the general priesthood, by an assurance that there was no intention of encroaching upon the ministerial office, by asserting that they would keep within the bounds of the Evangelical Confession (*i.e.*, of the Union), etc. If the existing means of the Church were not adequate to the wants of the time, it was not a new building which was

<sup>1</sup> *Wichern, Die innere Mission*, S. 16. "The object of this organization can be none other than that the general corruption over-growing the congregations, and pervading the whole Church, may be met by a religious elevation as Catholic and Evangelical, as organized, as a free congregation of God, with the message and offer of salvation, wherever and in what manner soever it is required."

required, but a strengthening and enlargement of the walls on the foundation laid by God, the foundation of the Prophets and Apostles, of which Christ is the cornerstone. To this, it may still be added that, in order to have large masses and means at their disposal, they had to make some allowance as to the evangelical character of the individual members and associations. Although a number of existing associations of this kind were united for the work of the Inner Mission, they were, thereby, not yet brought under the Gospel. Not a few have come forward as labourers in the work of the Inner Mission, who should rather have been the objects of it. Even in enthusiastic vindications of the Inner Mission, there is a confused mingling together of Humanism and Christianity.<sup>1</sup> And then this Pelagian confidence in the power of outward means! The centre of Christianity is the salvation of the single individual soul by faith in Jesus Christ. Where there is nothing of the heart of the Shepherd going after the single sheep in the wilderness, there is no saving love, in the sense of Christ. The Inner Mission means to be able to overcome the masses by masses,—by the mass of distributed Bibles, scattered tracts, established asylums, and institutions for the destitute and demoralized, etc. To exhibit their good works, in boasting numbers, such as is done in the so-called meetings of the *Kirchentag*, agrees ill with the word of the Lord about that doing with the right hand of which the left is not to know anything. There

<sup>1</sup> *Braune, Unsere Zeit u. die innere Mission*, marks (S. 86), as the fundamental thought of the Inner Mission, the idea of Humanism which loves, in man, the image of God, and is rooted in, and grounded on the faith of Jesus Christ, the express image of God, the man as he is to be, the person in which man's nature attains to full maturity. "His (Christ's) mercy has anew revived in it (the Inner Mission). Humanism and Christianity are by it comprehended in one" (S. 91).

was and is much show and mere appearance in these associations. As one of our poets confesses, that in his poems he had delivered himself of mental matter which pressed upon him, so associations, with their clattering mechanism, are, for many, a means of discharging their duties in an outward form. Yet those and other objections are not directed against the matter itself, but against the form only. It is not probable that this form will stand for any length of time, perhaps, only until the Church is stirred up to produce, out of herself, or at least organically to connect with herself, all these efforts for the salvation of mankind.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> In reading the above views on the Inner Mission, the reader will kindly bear in mind the fact, that by the Westphalian peace, the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Churches, having obtained a legal standing in Germany, are the established Churches of Germany. Non-conformity is as yet an illegal, unknown thing. The only evangelical Dissenters are the Baptists, who, up to this day, are persecuted in many parts of Germany, and have only of late obtained a legal standing in Prussia. In the mouth of a Lutheran, Church, therefore, means the Lutheran Church. Our author, moreover, belongs, as we mentioned above, to the High Church section of that denomination, who, in their views on the Church and the sacraments (baptismal regeneration and consubstantiation), come pretty near the Puseyites of the Anglican Church. That such cannot look with a very favourable eye on such efforts as those of the Inner Mission, every one will easily understand. Our author's evangelical sentiments however, are too strong to allow him to deny altogether the necessity of such efforts, and the good accomplished by the Inner Mission. As regards his objections, they apply with equal strength to the missionary efforts and associations, of which he spoke on a previous occasion; but then he did not urge them, probably because the objects of those efforts, being the far away heathens, did not come home as a charge and reproof to the Churches, in such a manner as the Inner Mission must necessarily do. Moreover, the *Kirchentag*, from the very outset, wished to be nothing else than a handmaid and helper to the Church. Its independent position was forced upon it by the apathy and inactivity of the Established Churches, which again are the conse-



The Inner Mission seeks to reclaim the unchristianized *Proletaries*; but the world of the educated was no less unchristianized. To influence them appeared to be the God-given duty of that order which has to watch for souls. What could be obtained by means of a cure of souls, was proved by shining instances in England and Scotland. In some parts of Germany also, in which there is Christian life, *e.g.*, in Würtemberg, in the Wupper-Valley, a lively practice prevailed. It was chiefly in the country that the ministers had remained pastors; in the towns, the ministers ordinarily did nothing except preach and perform the official acts and duties incumbent upon them. The higher clergy were, for the most part, employed to such a degree by the bureaucratic business transactions of the outward Church, that very little time was left to them for exercising a free influence upon the souls of their parishioners; and that so much the more, that in large places the parishes were generally so extensive, as to make a regular cure of souls impossible. What could a pastor, in a parish of twenty thousand souls, do? In the larger places, the number of the inhabitants had increased exceedingly, and, along with that, wants of every description; but a want of additional churches was

quences, partly of a want of life, and partly of strange doctrinal views, on the part of the leaders, but chiefly of their connection with the State, by which their freedom of action is circumscribed within rather narrow limits. The *Kirchentag* has repeatedly expressed its sorrow at being forced into this independent position, but confidently expects, that the time will come, when the Church shall herself take up and carry on the work of the Inner Mission. The mission of the *Kirchentag* would then be accomplished, and it would hail the moment when it could give up its commission into the hands of the ordinary Church-Courts. As regards the special charge of the indifference of the *Kirchentag* to the confessions of the Church, the *Kirchentag* at Berlin (1853), unanimously declared the Augsburg Confession to be their Confession.—TR.



rarely felt ; yea, even in the churches, which at one time had not been sufficient, there was at present abundance of room. In the city of Berlin, with 400,000 inhabitants, not many more than 20,000 are supposed to attend church. It was now, especially in Prussia, that the question was taken into serious consideration, as to how the cure of souls could be renewed, and the number and influence of the clergy could be increased. Of course, commanding was here out of the question ; all that could be done was to remind, and to stir up. The king, by a committee of clergymen, caused experiences to be gathered in Great Britain, and the attention of the ministers to be very specially directed to this point, in the district-synods of 1843. A Pastoral Assistant Society, originated and directed by *Otto von Gerlach*, was formed in Berlin. Several new churches also have been built there, since that stimulus was given. It could scarcely be otherwise, than that many faithful ministers, in their zeal, proceeded in an immature, indelicate manner, yea, even with spiritless bluntness ; yet such mistakes could not conceal the necessity of the case. The circumstance which caused the greatest difficulty was the isolated position of the clergymen in their congregations. If clergymen, so people argued, were assisted by like-minded laymen, the pressure of the burden imposed upon them would be distributed and diminished, while their strength would be increased. In such a position, many gifts and graces which now are unemployed, or seek an outlet in a wrong direction, would find a corresponding sphere of action. But for such an increase of ministerial strength, the organism of the constitution of the Church, had no room. Hence the cause of the cure of souls was transferred to the question on the *Constitution of the Church* which already, in large circles, occupied attention.

That the constitution of the Protestant Church of Germany required revision, was said and admitted by very different parties. They pointed to the hampering dependence upon the State, to the bureaucratic character of the Consistories, to the entire passiveness of the congregations, to the want of synodical life, to the separation of the Protestant Church into individual National Churches, without any organic ties of connection. A historical party, looking to the institutions of the primitive Church, and coquetting with Romanism, beheld in Episcopacy the absolute foundation of every church-constitution ; while a liberal party insisted on a Presbyterial and Synodical constitution. When by the joint efforts of the Anglican State Church, and of the Prussian National Church, the bishopric of St James was established on Mount Zion, this was looked upon as a demonstration for the Evangelical Church of the West. The declaration of the Archbishop of Canterbury, that this work might be the beginning of a lasting connection between the Anglican Church and the Evangelical Church of the Continent, enjoying a less excellent constitution, seemed to prove that. If any such views ever prevailed, there was the least favourable period for them at that time, when public opinion was agitated and excited by fears of hierarchy, Byzantinism, religious edicts, etc. In general, German Protestantism would, at that time, not learn from English Protestantism, which, as a distinguished theologian of the Union demonstrated, in its narrow-mindedness and self-sufficiency did not know anything except to condemn other Churches, while, in consequence of its hierarchical dispositions, it would still fall into the hands of Rome. The same theologian of the Union protested against a Union with the Anglican State Church. While this ecclesiastical Liberalism protested against

Episcopacy, because it saw its introduction in the hand of absolutistic tendencies, it did not in the least conceal with what tendencies its own demands for a representative constitution for the Church were connected. "Even this circumstance," says *Harless*, "that men of a decidedly radical disposition insist upon synods, and demand that not clergymen alone should be members, but laymen also, and so that the latter shall be the majority,—even this circumstance should exhort us to be cautious. For have we not been compelled to hear this demand made by thorough infidels, on the ground of the general priesthood, of which they claim to be members? It is only too plain what it is that these people intend. He who has, only to some degree, followed *Ronge's* triumphal procession from the Polish frontier to the Rhine,—he who knows the meetings of the 'Friends of Light' from among all Confessions, their public dinners and toasts,—he who has read their so-called Confessions of Faith, their addresses, and other pamphlets ;—what is he to think of the general priesthood in our poor people not consecrated, but desecrated in whole masses? In the deepest sleep of conscience, these dreamers cry for liberty of conscience; men who do not know the Shorter Catechism, nor the Ten Commandments, demand liberty of inquiry in Holy Scripture, insist upon the abolition of the symbols, which they declare to be man's work, and to which they will not be bound. That pretended general priesthood, which would like to force its way into the synods, and, if possible, to set aside Christianity altogether, makes us most painfully to feel the fearful apostasy of so many." The Mediating Theology here, too, proposed a middle course. It would not sever the connection between Church and State; the prince was to retain his privileged position, but State influence and bureaucracy were to be done

away with ; with a regenerated consistorial constitution, a presbyterial and synodical constitution, secured against all excesses, was to be connected. As the most objective expression of that which this party wished, the opinion of the Constitution-Committee of the Prussian General Synod may be regarded.<sup>1</sup> The desires for an organic union of the Protestant Established Churches of Germany made a start from below, in the Gustavus Adolphus Association ; from above, in the Conference, which, in the beginning of the year 1846, met in Berlin. The latter was a feeble diplomatic echo of the feeble *Corpus Evangelicorum*, which soon vanished ; but a greater sensation was produced by the *Gustavus Adolphus Association*. It originated in the thought of raising a living monument to the heroic king of Protestantism, by a union of Protestants, for the support of Protestant congregations scattered in Roman Catholic countries, and arose from the combination of an institution already existing in Saxony, with means which a proclamation of *Zimmermann*, in Darmstadt (1841), set in motion, and was soon viewed as a representation of Protestantism on the basis of love, as faith had lost its connecting power.<sup>2</sup> By this tendency, the confidence of those holding stricter views of the Church and her Confessions, was withdrawn from the Gustavus Adolphus Association, although the real object of it was praiseworthy. No one, however, will be able to deny, that a Protestantism which protested against the impure doctrine of Roman Catholicism, without being willing to make use of the pure doc-

<sup>1</sup> *Verhandlungen*, II. S. 104, ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Hase*, Church History (7th Edition, S. 623), says :—" Its object being limited, and the actions necessarily monotonous, its internal significance is placed in the fact, that it is a sacred neutral territory for all the parties of the Evangelical Church, which here again represents itself as an united power."

trine of the Reformation, was there specially at home. Many provincial associations assumed the position of standing armies opposed against the Church. The association seems now to have the culminating point of its power behind it ; very few will still see in it a representation of the Protestant name. What is certain is the fact, that it brought substantial help to oppressed Protestants scattered in Roman Catholic countries. This also may be said in its praise, that by it a religious movement has been brought into the educated middle class, by means of which many a one may have been led farther on.

The energy with which, in the fifth decade, the question about the Constitution of the Church was agitated, was evidently connected with the interest which at that time was devoted to the question regarding the political Constitution. The representatives of religious Liberalism in the Prussian General Synod belonged, in the following year, in the first United Prussian Diet, to the opposition. The harvest year of such seed was the year 1848. Separation of the Church from the State, equal rights in the State for all religions, perfect freedom for every religion in the administration of its internal affairs, separation of the School from the Church ;—these were the rights and liberties which the Francfort Parliament decreed to the German people. How is the Protestant Church, with which the State refuses to have anything to do, and which is not allowed to have anything to do with an atheistic State, in future to exist ?—that was the question. Following the example set by the Preparatory Parliament at Francfort, a meeting for consultation was convened at Wittenberg. To make up for the support which the Church had hitherto found in the State, a Confederation of the Established Protestant Churches of Germany was



proposed ; a Council was to be formed, composed of deputies from the Churches of the individual States, and the Churches of the individual States were to occupy towards the Council the same position as the individual States did towards the Imperial Parliament at Francfort. Just as, a few years before, *Bunsen* had beforehand determined, even to the very details, the constitution of the Church of the Future, so, on the foundation of the *fundamental rights*, decreed by the Francfort Parliament,—"which would never be forgotten, and even though passing away, would form the foundation of the German national law"—*Hase* presented "the Evangelical Protestant Church of the German Empire," ready even to the very house in which the Imperial Synod was to meet. No notice was taken of these projects by the Future. Out of the great Church Union (*Kirchenbund*), arose a moveable conference, called *Kirchentag*, which would hardly have maintained itself, unless it had been supported by the cause of the Inner Mission. The first *Kirchentag* at Wittemb erg, bound the membership of the Constituent Council to the profession of "standing on the ground of the Confessions of the Reformation,"—a formula with which all the Confessions and views of Protestantism could agree. That for which the *Kirchenbund* had, at first, been intended, was now claimed by the *Kirchentag*, viz., representation of the essential unity of the Evangelical Church. In the *Kirchentag* at Berlin (1853), this essential unity was more distinctly expressed by the declaration, that it consisted in the profession of the unchanged Augsburg Confession. But when we consider that the Reformed, and many adherents of the Union did not agree with the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper confessed in the Tenth Article,—that all the adherents of the Union as such could not homologate

the sentence, by which this Article condemns the doctrine of the Swiss, not to mention that of some of the principal speakers of the Conference, it was sufficiently known, that they did not stand fast even in the doctrine of Justification;—one could in this act recognize only the desire of getting out of the ambiguous nature of the Union, and a direction towards the Lutheran doctrine, as the only one in accordance with Scripture! When the wild waters of the Revolution had subsided, and the German States returned again to the relations which had existed previous to March 1848, the former relation of the State to the Protestant Church returned, as a matter of course, with this difference only, that in some countries part of the functions hitherto exercised by the ministry for worship was transferred to an Upper Church-Council (*Oberkirchenrath*). Whatever of the Presbyterian Constitution was tried, would not take root, and proved a failure. Synods were no more spoken of; too sad experience had been made with such representative assemblies during the Revolution. The Unity of the German Protestant Church found, in the meantime, its expression in Conferences, at Eisenach, of deputies from the highest ecclesiastical authorities.

The attention which the Eisenach Conference has devoted to the form of public worship, is connected with a general want. The understanding of those forms of public worship, which *Illuminism* had not only not understood, but had, as far as possible, mutilated and set aside, had again been opened to the revived historical and religious sense. The eye was again opened for the magnificent churches of the middle ages, and for the holy forms of Christian painting; the ear, for the wonderful sound of the bell, for the solemn sounds of the organ, for the sound of all nature in praise of its Creator, for the musi-

cal creations of men like *Bach* and *Händel*. The imitative creations of our time in church building, church painting, and church music, have held up a mirror of humility to our modern time, in its proud consciousness of progress, and thereby opened up the way for the understanding of the great masters of ancient times, and have awakened a sense and a presentiment of the glory of the Church. Wherever the Christian life in any way manifested itself, indignation was expressed at the shocking devastation which Illuminism had perpetrated in the hymn-books. The knowledge was slowly followed by the deed. In the meantime science had time to restore the old texts, to investigate the history of the hymns, to bring back the old church music, to agree as to principles in getting up a collection of hymns. Here also the hymns of modern poets were, for the most part, only fitted to excite hunger and thirst for the old ones. It was felt how great a treasure had been squandered; and again to collect and bring into circulation these treasures, has become a want generally felt,—the gratification of which the Eisenach Conference has considered, and proposed to itself as a worthy task.—The interest for the importance, history, and character of the Liturgy, was awakened by the controversy about the Prussian Liturgy. The Liturgies of the ancient Church have been thoroughly studied; the old Protestant ones have been collected and compared. Furnished with such means, *Häfling*, *Kliefoth*, *Löhe*, *Petri*, and others, have attempted to understand and hold up the peculiarity of the old Lutheran form of public worship, and, if possible, to bring it into application. A reform of public worship, in the sense of the ancient order of the Church, has been aimed at and prepared by various church authorities, and has also been here and there attained. In this historical practical way more has

been gained than in the way of general propositions on the nature of public worship.—The *Pulpit*, once the place of the strength of Protestantism, in the age of Illuminism the place of its debasement, is still the witness of the infinite Subjectivism of modern Protestantism ; however the essays of the Rationalists and Supernaturalists, and rhetorical declamations, are disappearing. The demand that the sermon should edify, and be based on the consciousness of the doctrine of the Church, may be regarded as generally admitted ; and we may well say without exaggeration, that it is not unbelief, but faith, which again fills the churches. The ways, indeed, in which the sermon aims at edification, are infinitively different. Some, in the way of the Reformed, aim above all to impart knowledge and understanding of the Scriptures, and to revive an acquaintance with Scripture. It was *Menken* especially, who, with great skill, has renewed the homily of the ancient Church. It was hitherto, however, only by means of great talents, that this mode of preaching could be raised ; and these talents have often exercised the art of imparting life to the word of Scripture at the expense of that at which they in reality aimed, viz., the understanding of Scripture, by offering, instead of a sound exposition of Scripture, the gift of transferring into Scripture a world of thoughts. The Lutheran congregations, according to old tradition, expected of the sermon an application of the word of Scripture for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, in short, for edification. For instruction in the word of Scripture, Bible-classes were instituted ; and these, in towns as well as in the country, found an enthusiastic reception wherever the ministers knew rightly to apply the old and new things from the treasure of the Church. *Besser's Bibelstunden* are a richly blessed fruit of this

effort. The edification, however, which, in the time of the transition, when the Christian had still more or less of the character of Pietism, was offered by faithful ministers, had pre-eminently the character of an excitement of the religious feelings. Effusions of the heart, truly or artfully popular, passionate sermons after the manner of the Methodists, ingenious speeches, seasoned with materials which excited the nerves, productions of art æsthetically composed,—all were employed for this purpose. The highest in this mode of preaching, working upon the feelings, has been accomplished within a few years by a youth, prematurely removed—by *Hofacker*. In him, evangelical love, holy earnestness, Christian practical wisdom, simplicity and power of style wonderfully co-operated. This mode of preaching was of importance as long as the object was to break the ground; but where faith had taken root, there could not fail to be awakened a desire for a sermon which would exercise a lasting influence, become flesh and bone, and edify, not the individual only, but the Church. It is in this sense that the Confessional party (*Harms, Rudelbach, Harless, Löhe, Petri, Kliefoth*), have understood and treated the sermon.

In now summing up, we find that in the same period when the German mind turned from theory, and pursued practical interests, in the Church also the influence of theological science gave way more and more to those practical efforts which we have just made to pass in review before us. The time when practical theologians were dependent upon the oracles from the chairs was gone; the clergymen professed Christ without waiting for any victory which a faithful theology would achieve against *Strauss*; nor did they ask how the controversy against *Möhler* stood when they turned back to the faith of their



fathers. And it was only a vain book-theology which could lament over such a time. True theological science had cause to thank the Lord of the Church, that the fruits which the tree of knowledge had refused to yield, grew on the tree of life. In this case only some hesitation might have arisen, if practical interests had prevented the growing up into the unity of the faith and knowledge of the Son of God. But it was just on the territory of life that, in contradistinction to the unsettled state and disunion of Protestant science, the necessity was felt and experienced for a Church united and strong in her Confession. We have seen how the ways of the Foreign and Inner Mission, of the cure of souls, of the development of the Constitution, and form of worship, all converged in the centre of the *Church*.

To this centre even the religious errors of the time pointed. The time into which the renovation of Protestantism falls was, for the *Roman Church* also, a time of renovation. In France, the return to the ideals of the mediæval Church was violent and sickly; it was more from within, deeper and more earnest, in Germany. Here it was first that *Romantic* tendency, which pleaded the cause of Roman Catholicism, as being the perennial middle age. The master of this Roman Romanticism was *Görres*. According to the manner of the Romantics, there was in him a positive tendency, which, in poetry, sought faith,—and in faith, poetry. It was first nourished by the remnants of the glory of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation in the countries of the Rhine, his home; then he was, at the hand of the Philosophy of nature, led to the mysterious East, and at length, satisfied in the Roman Church. But according to the manner of the Romantics, Görres' poetical faith could not blaze up on high, without by irony destroying a prosaic world. This ironical tendency had,

in the years of his violence and ardour, not spared the remnants of the mediæval Church. When the German Empire was dissolved, he had his joke with the inventory of the ecclesiastical princes, with their electoral hats, useful for thick heads. But when he had made the Roman Church of the present time the bearer of his positive tendency, he gave Protestantism up for food to that negative tendency.—Most closely connected with this Romantic Romanism is an *historical* one, which, in Protestantism, beholds the revolution, but, in Rome, the legitimate heir of the Church of Christ, founded on the rock of Peter. This rock of the historical development has drawn eminent Protestant lawyers and politicians (*Haller, Jarcke, Phillips*, and others) into the bosom of the Roman Church, and is still, to not a few Protestants, a stone upon which they stumble. To this may be added the power of the name, *Church*, with which Romanism has inscribed its house. As once *Augustine*, after the wanderings of his life, under the crushing feeling of the fragility of all human thinking and striving, embraced the authority of the visible Church, with the confession: "I should not believe the gospel, unless the authority of the Catholic Church induced me to do so;" so, on the deceitful sea of modern intellectual life, Rome appeared to many as the only harbour of truth. Nor did the restored Roman Catholicism set up its doctrines without a *scientific mediation*. *Hermesianism* could safely place its philosophical arms by the side of those with which Supernaturalism defended its dogmas; and the philosophical powers of our theology of mediation are scarcely equal to the philosophical means with which *Günther, Staudenmaier, Sengler*, and others supported the Roman doctrine. When *Möhler*, after having gone through the school of revived Protestant theology, in his *Symbolik*,

attacked the Protestant doctrine, none of those who, in opposition to him, undertook to defend the Protestant cause, were a match for him. It was the opposition to Protestantism which essentially imparted power to restored Romanism, whose hearth in Germany was Munich. This opposition seemed to assume a serious character, when the Prussian Government, by the violent and illegal measure of the deposition of the Archbishop of Cologne, raised a powerful opposition against itself, not in the Church only, but also in the State. With all the strength of his life, which by that event had been challenged, *Görres* wrote his "Athanasius." *Leo*, the ablest of those who, on the part of the Protestants, came forth to oppose him, felt himself bound to make to him a confession of the miserable condition of Protestantism. "I confess it to you candidly, I am sometimes ashamed of being obliged to call myself a Protestant, when I see how many under this name must be taken along who inwardly are not only not in the least affected by that which has called our Church into existence,—who not only have never, perhaps, in their life, received, so as really to understand it, any thing of the doctrines for which their fathers sacrificed their substance and blood, and for the sake of which they transmitted to their sons the name of Protestants;—but who have altogether lost, out of their consciences and lives, those foundations of Christianity which Rome has faithfully held fast up to this day. But what else has brought our Protestant world so far down but the circumstance that we want what you have, viz., the discipline and strict order of the Church? The fate of the Protestant Church is just the opposite of that which you assert of the Roman Church, viz., that it has withdrawn from the circumference to the centre. The Protestant Church has

become altogether circumference; for her centre are the congregations, while her circumference are the office-bearers drawn into the police-state. Everything in our Church which can be created or preserved by the State, all the police arrangements are in an excellent condition—the business and duties of the superintendents, the Church-registers, the administration of Church property, the ringing at the fixed hours and in fixed peals, etc.,—all these are in excellent condition, but the centre has been lost; for the congregation also exists from a police point of view only, while, in an evangelical sense,—according to which it should be a closely united community, sealed in faith, and in the common enjoyment of the sacraments, for mutual moral care, and for the support of the poor and weak,—it has long disappeared. Every community possesses and exercises the right of excluding those who openly defy its principles; but with us, Arians, Socinians, and if, for the sake of public decency, they think it expedient, all indifferent Rationalists, and all Atheists go to the Lord's table. The same is done by every notorious impostor, Sabbath-breaker, and adulterer, whensoever they choose, without having, by any penance and public confession of the sin which they have committed against the life of the congregation, asked its pardon, and vowed to reform. Shall we love a mother who squanders the inheritance of her own children upon the filthy children whom the police rake together in the streets for her?"

These confessions, at that time an abomination to theoretical Protestantism, laughed at by haughty Protestant science, as the utterances of an insignificant party, are now-a-days better understood. They indeed contain what Protestantism has to learn from the Romish Church, and will yet have to learn in many a hard school, unless

it take warning. When Prussia had deposed the Archbishop of Cologne, the liberal mob shouted applause ; Rome raised her lamentation, but she went out, upon the whole, victorious from the struggle. When in German-Catholicism, the revolutionary matter which existed in the Church of Rome discharged itself, the Protestant mob shouted ; but when, after this wind, the whirlwind of the year 1848 was reaped, Protestantism stood there broken, while Romanism was powerful in the strength of its organization. It is certain that the Roman Church assisted in supporting the tottering Prussian State, while the evangelical Established Church of Prussia regained strength on the soil of the strengthened State only.

But even opposite tendencies exerted an influence upon the development of the Church feeling. The liberal and rationalistic matter which had accumulated in the Roman and Protestant Churches since the age of *Illuminism*, having become bolder by the progress both of faith and unbelief, and being borne up by the political opposition, attempted the formation of new ecclesiastical communities. Thus, there arose the religious societies of the *German Catholics*, and of the *Free Congregations*. The circumstance that societies, whose Confession in reality consisted in confessing as little as possible, nevertheless saw themselves compelled to set up Confessions, proved the necessity of a Confession. And these street-reformers, these nonsensical synods, these fabrications of translations of the Bible, hymns, etc.,—this caricature of the great drama of the Reformation, reflected, very much against their will, credit on the fathers and masters of our Church.

Of essential influence upon the development of the Church-feeling were, finally, the struggles of the Union.



In the change of positions which the Union tried, the necessity of every single element in the whole of the Church was impressed upon the convictions. The Union at first tried it with the sentiments of the individual, but came to the conviction that a Church cannot be formed with mere sentiments. It then made an attempt with the form of worship, only to reach the conclusion that there is no use in moving the hands of a clock when the mainspring of the Confession is broken. It then made trial of a Confession, but brought to light nothing but patchwork. It then tried the Constitution, but it will speedily come to the conviction, that two independent Churches cannot be compelled to wear the same coat. The import and meaning of those failures of the Union is to make plain what is requisite for the divine work of the Church.

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Church-theology is neither a handmaid of the practice of the Church, nor an adventurer which intrusts itself at random to the high sea of the intellectual life of a time, but it is the scientific self-consciousness of a Church. The Spirit of Jesus Christ, the Lord of the Church, who works the graces of teaching and ruling in the Church, works also the grace of knowledge, as well as every other grace, for the edification of the Church. The scientific self-consciousness of the Church is an independent object; but it cannot fail to become weak when it puts itself in opposition to other functions for the edification of the body of Christ. That which necessarily constitutes the subject-matter of theology, as the scientific self-consciousness of the Church, is the Confession; but this is designated by our modern theology as *unprotestant, unsound,*

*unscientific*. It is designated as *unprotestant*; for "inasmuch as Scripture is to Protestantism the sole authority for truth, even the doctrinal views of the Reformers cannot be set up as arbiters, as is asserted in even the strictest Confession of the Lutherans." Now, it is certainly *unprotestant* to hold fast any Confession, simply because it has from the beginning enjoyed, in the Church, public authority as a Confession. But just as it is not only *unprotestant*, but even *unchristian*, to boast of Scripture as the sole source of truth, without drawing any truth from Scripture, without knowing and confessing what it teaches for salvation,—just as little would Protestantism have any claim to be a Church, if the life of its congregations did not rest on a firm consciousness of what the word of God has revealed for salvation. The *formula concordiae* says: "And we confess thus also our adherence to the same first unchanged Augsburg Confession, not because it has been got up by our theologians, but because it has been taken from God's word, and has, in it, its good and firm foundation." This conviction the Lutheran Church still holds, and her sound theologians know how to establish it from Scripture; yea, even those theologians of the Union, who, in the Berlin *Kirchentag*, professed their adherence to the Augsburg Confession, bear witness to this fact at least, that one may acknowledge Scripture to be the sole rule of truth, and yet be in favour of, and adhere to, a scriptural Confession of Faith.—It is farther asserted that such a return to the creed of our fathers is *unsound*,—an expression of the tendency of our times towards restoration; for he who has become acquainted with the phenomena of Pietism, of Rationalism, of modern science, and, generally, with the intellectual and mental struggles of our time, can only by a violent effort put himself back to, and feel at home in, a bygone and overcome period of

the Church. But this charge would come home to those theologians also, who, while themselves taking their stand on the Confessions of the Reformation, have declared the Augsburg Confession to be the general symbol of the individual Protestant Churches confederated, or to be confederated. It is, indeed, a strange aberration to consider a return to the positive to be something sound, but an earnest and lasting return to the positive to be something unsound. These polemics always declaim against those who, with a mode of thinking thoroughly modern, rush into that which is ancient, simply because it is ancient. But of such it will not be possible to point out a single instance among the theologians of the confessional tendency. Most of them have, after many wanderings, been brought back to the creed of their fathers by the positive tendency, which, as is shown by the mediating theology itself, after all, pervades the Church of the present time. They are attached to the Confession of their fathers, not because it is old, but because it is true and scriptural. As we have endeavoured to show, all the signs of the times are in favour of that tendency towards the Church. "True," it is objected, "but the Church of the Future is not a new edition of the Church of the sixteenth century. That which has once gone, never comes back. In the Church of the Future the great developments of Protestants, since *Spener*, must be found again preserved and purified. For that very reason, the mediating theology, in which these elements are preserved, very justly calls itself the Church of the Future." But when Ulysses, after twenty years struggles and wanderings, returned to his home, he had become another man, and his home had become something different to him too. Thus, the experience of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries cannot and must not be lost to the Protestant Church; but it is erroneous, and almost

ridiculous to imagine that the systems we have gone through must be preserved as elements in the Theology of the Future. What theology would that be which would, at the same time, be a little Pietistic, a little Rationalistic, a little Speculative, a little Mystic, a little Confessional, etc.? The preservation of these systems and tendencies must, on the contrary, be sought for subjectively, in the experience of theologians. A theologian who has gone through these schools will look upon the Confession with a different eye than did the theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. *Augustine* was something different to *Hugo* of St Victor, something different to *Luther*, something different to the Jansenists. But it is, in general, not the question, whether a system and tendency is in harmony with the progress of the time, but whether it is true. If it be true, then it is our part to follow it; but it is the part of the Lord of the Church to make something new to arise in the kingdom of God.—But, finally, we are told that it is *unscientific* to return to the orthodoxy of the sixteenth century. But let him who asserts that, in the territory of religious development, a tendency which has truth on its side, and which promises to be the tendency of the future, must always appear in the form of science, see how he gets on with the gospel of the fishermen and publicans. Our modern theology, which is disposed to consider Pietism as a supplement of the Reformation, will be obliged to confess that this school was, as regards scientific acquirements and profundity, far inferior to the orthodox masters of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. *Löscher* alone was, in that point of view, worth a whole Pietistic theological faculty. And many of our modern theologians should not forget the time when they, being esteemed as Pietists, appealed not to science, but to life only. That which has proved itself in life



as a solid reality, will be acknowledged by science also. The father of the *Rauhe Haus*,<sup>1</sup> who always brought forward and carried out his practical affairs at the expense of modern science, obtained the highest honour of theology, after he had obtained the good opinion of the public. The fame of science follows but too often public opinion, which again is a partizan of success. And the Lutheran theology can bring forward a line of theological ancestors, of whom she need not be ashamed. From the dogmatical opinions passed upon the theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which are still current in many theological circles, we may confidently appeal to the more thorough studies of the future. But no such warning instances from the period of orthodoxy, such as the estates possessed by *Hoe von Hoenigg*,<sup>2</sup> or the many wives whom *Calovius* outlived, are required in order to warn the Confessional theology against an unreserved alliance with the theology of that period. It is not to the theology, but to the Confession of the Lutheran Church of the sixteenth century, that the Confessional theology wishes to return. And it is not in order to boast, but only to give glory to truth, that it may point to scien-

<sup>1</sup> An establishment near Hamburg, founded by *Wichern*, D.D., for the carrying out of the various schemes of the Inner Mission.—TR.

<sup>2</sup> *Matt. Hoe von Hoenigg*, born 1580 at Vienna, died 1645 as principal chaplain to the Elector John George I. of Saxony. He was distinguished by his violent hatred of the Reformed, and had considerable influence upon the events of that time. It was at his instigation that John George made, in 1635, the peace of Prague which was so injurious to the Evangelists; and he is even charged with having received a bribe from the Emperor for that purpose. There seems, however, not to be any other foundation for the latter charge except his wealth, which is sufficiently accounted for from his position, and from the circumstance that he was descended from an old noble family.—TR.



tific works to which party spirit and prejudice alone can refuse the claim of scientific depth. He who says that he cannot learn anything from the biblical investigations of *Harless, Delitzsch, Caspari, Keil, Oehler, Philippi, Hofmann, Baumgarten*, and others, and from the historical researches of *Rudelbach, Guericke, Schmid, Kurtz, Lindner*, and others, and from the doctrinal investigations of *Thomasius*, and others, and from the practical investigations of *Höfling, Kliefoth, Löhe, Petri*, and others, gives to himself, from that very circumstance, a *testimonium paupertatis*. As yet, the Confessional theology has not reached the goal; but it is exerting itself to reach it. It forms part of these efforts to settle with the systems and tendencies of the last century, and conscientiously to avail itself of the scientific means of the time.

Let us now take a few glances at the single departments of Theology, in order to show more distinctly how we understand this.

Protestantism stands and falls with the principle of the sole authority of Scripture; but this principle is quite independent of the doctrine of inspiration, as taught in the old systems of divinity; and it could only be by shutting our eyes to the truth, that this doctrine could be again received in this form. The relation of God the Holy Spirit, to the writers of the Books of Scripture must, beyond any doubt, be conceived of in a manner different from that in which this doctrinal theology conceived of it, in order to carry through its proposition that God is the real author of Scripture. No doubt, the testimony of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those who live in accordance with Scripture, is to be considered as an argument in proof of the divine authority of Holy Scripture; but the testimony of the Church (*fides humana*) is more closely connected with this divine foundation of faith

(*fides divina*) than our old systematic Theology admitted. The very circumstance that the Reformers and orthodox leaders of the Church, down to *Calovius*, made a distinction between the real and principal books of the New Testament, and the so-called deuterocanonical, because the Ancient Church did not agree as to their reception,—this very circumstance proves how decisive is the testimony of the Ancient Church in determining what is canonical. The most recent criticism, for which the testimony of the Holy Spirit is a mere phrase, has with a vandal-like delight in destruction, endeavoured to break in pieces the historical foundations of Holy Scriptures. Against such assaults faith had, no doubt, to defend the firm citadel of the Church, even to the last stone; but what should not have been done, was to unite the means of defence with the citadel itself. *Apologetics* require us not only to speak, but also to be silent. It is no disgrace to say: Here is a difficulty which I cannot remove, an objection which I cannot refute, a contradiction which I cannot reconcile. That which every human science allows to itself, without losing confidence in itself, will surely be permitted to a science which has to deal with divine mysteries. We feel constrained to confess that, by means of that apologetical versatility, and pretence of knowing everything, a spirit of untruth has crept in among ourselves, which will yet bear its sad fruits. As regards the interpretation of Scripture, all centuries will be obliged to admit that the Reformers accomplished that which was just their mission, *i.e.*, to evolve from Scripture the Confession, and to prove that which they had evolved. But it was quite natural that the pre-eminently doctrinal use which the Reformers and orthodox divines made of Scripture, prevented them from giving its due place to the historical view. Altogether

disregarding the gradual growth of the new dispensation out of the old one, they proved the specific doctrines of Christianity with equal confidence by texts from the Old as well as from the New Testament. By those transition-systems of the eighteenth century, the way was opened up for a freer, a more immediate and living exposition. The circumstance that Rationalism became the heir of these schools cannot prove the soundness of that turn which it gave to Scripture exposition,—a turn as unscientific as it is unchristian. But with all that, we must not forget the fact that, in opposition to the orthodox narrow-mindedness, to the ascetic fervour of Pietism, to the unsound strainings of the school of *Bengel-Crusius*, it worked as a purifier of the atmosphere, and has led to a more natural and sober historical mode of viewing things, which has opened up the way for an interpretation which enters into the spirit of Scripture more deeply, and yet, at the same time, more objectively. A philological school, which proceeded from Rationalism, put limits to its arbitrarily extenuating Exegesis, inasmuch as, without regard to the use to be made of its results, it objectively, by means of classical and Oriental Philology, determined what, according to the language, context, and history, was the sense. Although some distinguished representatives of this school assigned to themselves the position of vine-dressers, who laboured in the vineyard of the Lord, digging, purging, cutting, pressing, without enjoying the vine; yet a more living interpretation has reaped the benefit of their labours. With the means employed by them, the Rationalistic school brought out the meaning of the words; but the duty of a sound Exegesis is to reproduce, out of the word, the spirit who has produced the word. The words of the Apostle Paul: “Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of

the law" (Rom. iii. 28), are not yet understood, although we may understand the meaning of the words, and the immediate context; but only when we know the place which they occupy in the doctrine of Paul. Thus it was, that attempts were made at representing the doctrinal systems of John, Paul, Peter,—attempts which found a hold only within the historical representations of the development of the doctrines of the Old and New Testament, which were called sometimes Biblical Theology, and sometimes Biblical *Dogmatik*. The numerous writings of this kind have, upon the whole, not been very successful, because their authors indeed confessed that they were as much as possible free from the prejudice that the doctrine of Scripture must agree with the Creed of the Church; but so much the more were they prepossessed with their own doctrinal views, and hence they have not attained a purely historical representation. But it is, in general, not possible to treat the development of the Old and New Testament independently of the development of the kingdom of God under the Old and New Dispensation. There exist important starting points for a truly historical exposition of the course of Revelation in Scripture; but much yet requires to be done. Notwithstanding all his aberrations in details, *Hofmann* has hitherto accomplished most in this territory. It is not only the Protestant Church, but the Church in general which stands and falls with the conviction that the same Spirit who has revealed himself in the Old and New Testaments, prevails in her. It is therefore in the spirit of the Church that the Scriptures must be interpreted. It was, hence, a necessary progress of Exegesis to reduce the word of Scripture to the Christian consciousness (*Tholuck, Olshausen, Stier*, and others), how much soever that school of Philology declaimed against it with the

coarseness of vine dressers (*Fritzsche, D. Schulz, and others*). The mistakes and aberrations of this mode of exposition coincide with those of the theology of feeling in general, viz., a formless, subjective Christianity. It is not the consciousness of this or that individual, but the consciousness of the Church which must interpret Scripture. Nor has this consciousness been left without witnesses. The interpreter must go to the work connected with the voices of all centuries. Very able investigators of Scripture (*Bleek, Harless, Hengstenberg*) have, from very different stand-points, co-operated towards this interpretation in the spirit of the Church. But there remains as yet much to be done.

The Church sees in her Confession the sum of the doctrines of the Bible; and it is the duty of systematic theology (*Dogmatik*), systematically to represent these doctrines. The systematic representation of the *Dogmatik* is, more particularly, argumentative and evolving. The Lutheran *Dogmatik* proves its contents from the formal principle of the sole authority of Scripture; and evolves it from the material principle of Justification by faith alone. Following the model of *Melanchthon's Loci*—an analytical development of the doctrines of Justification on the foundation of the Epistle to the Romans—the systems of divinity of the sixteenth century had pre-eminently the character of statements in accordance with the Confessions; and hence the importance of those first works on systematic theology lies pre-eminently in the supplement which they form to the Confessions. After this period, which laid the foundation, and formed the materials, came the scholastic period in which the argumentation pre-eminently appears as Polemics, and the evolving as an elaboration and systematic comprehension of the ideas. The analytical method, according to which



the materials were systematically formed, and which from the object of salvation went back to the subject of salvation, was not only most insufficient, in a formal point of view,—with the last divines of this school, *e. g.*, *Hollaz*, it hangs round the materials just like a loose garment—but (and this was a very serious affair), displaced also the material principle of Protestantism from the centre, into which it just placed the indefinite idea of salvation. One-sided formal development gave way, in that time of transition, to the function of proving from Scripture; so that a great portion of the polemical, scholastic, and other materials, were now put down in the circumference, as historical materials. The school of *Wolff* joined to the proving from Scripture the formal demonstration which, as we saw, introduced that method which proved by arguments drawn from reason. This *Dogmatik* of transition fell into two directions, the supernaturalistic and the rationalistic, both of which agree, in point of form, in this, that they do not bring into a systematic form, but merely prove,—the former from Revelation, the latter from reason; while both occupy, towards the Confession of the Church, more or less of an external relation; so that there are broad historical materials running along the properly dogmatical ones. From this unscientific path, *Dogmatik* has been freed both by the speculative school, and by the theology of the religious consciousness, which centered in *Schleiermacher*. In both of these schools, the function of evolving prevails. The *Speculative Dogmatik*, supposing a system arisen and proved independently of *Dogmatik*, undertakes to evolve the doctrine of the Church, according to its method, and to bring it into harmony with its results. Although the stand-point of *Schleiermacher* is widely different from this, inasmuch as *Schleiermacher* has not

to do with ideas, but with statements of the Christian consciousness ; yet the method of evolving is common to both. Now, this is the fundamental error of *Schleiermacher*, that he evolves only, and does not prove.—It is now quite obvious what a sound *Dogmatik* has to accomplish. It has both to prove and to evolve the creed which lives in the consciousness of the Evangelical Protestant Church. It is Scripture alone from which it can take its arguments. But this ground, which was undoubted and firm for a time, which was rooted and grounded in Scripture, must itself be proved to be necessary. *Dogmatik* has to show that Christianity, from its very nature and truth, does not admit of any other rule of truth than this: Whatever is in accordance with Scripture is true. But the argumentation from Scripture must not only be exegetically regulated in the details, but also rest on an objective, comprehensive view of the course of revelation in the old and new dispensation. *Hofmann's Schriftbeweis* (proof from Scripture), however erroneous some of its results are, is yet an important contribution towards the solution of this problem. It stands differently with the attempts to derive from Scripture a system of doctrines, without the mediation of the development of the doctrine by the Church ; and among those attempts, *Beck's Christliche Lehrwissenschaft* stands foremost. To go thus immediately back to Scripture, appears, at first sight, as the truly free proceeding, and yet, at the same time, truly bound ; in one word, as the truly Protestant proceeding. But if every Protestant divine were to expound Scripture in his own way, were himself to form the doctrines, and to shape their building according to his own method,—what would be the result? A chaos of stand-points atomistically crossing one another, with which no Church, no sound science would be possible.

Behind this apparent objectivity, an unbounded subjectivity is concealed. Men so rich in intellect and spirit as *Beck*, must not influence the opinion as to what the stand-point is in itself. If the Protestant Church calls the Scriptures the rule of the doctrines of faith, it does not thereby say that Scripture is the source of them. Even before the books of the New Testament were written and collected, there existed in the congregations a consciousness of faith. It was founded upon the oral word of the Apostles, and very early, according to the Confession at Baptism, assumed the form of rules of faith, which were regarded as the sum and substance of both the oral and written word. The first *Dogmatik* (*Origen* on the Fundamental Doctrines) proceeds from the rule of faith. This rule of faith is, for the Evangelical Lutheran Church, her Confession, of which she is convinced that it is at one with the Confession of the Catholic Church, as is declared in the Augsburg Confession, at the close, and in the *formula concordiae*, at the commencement. Every *Dogmatik* has anew to compare the doctrine of the Confessions with the rule and measure of Scripture; it has merely, in a scientific manner, to evolve the Confession, but not to produce it from Scripture itself. It may be that the argumentation from Scripture comes into contradiction with the Confession of the Church, inasmuch as it is, after all, of human origin. But, without prejudice to the rights of Protestantism and science, we may well demand from our divines, that they shall not consider their own opinion to be infallible, while they assert the fallibility of the Church. People have at all times endeavoured to remove, by means of Scripture exposition, those doctrines which would not agree with reason. The scientific exposition of the doctrines of faith must consider it as its task to invalidate the reasons which, from time immemo-

rial, have been raised against them by reason. The dangers by which Apologetics have all along been beset, are Sophistry, Rationalism, Dilettanteism. The apologist too easily gets into the position of an advocate who wishes, at any cost, to refute his opponent, without thoroughly entering into, and sympathising with the disposition of mind from which his objections flowed; and yet such would be necessary, if it were only in order to discharge his office thoroughly. But of many objections, one must candidly confess, that they have forced themselves, not upon the opponent only, but upon the investigator himself. Now, if a man knows that against deeply rooted doubts, even twenty-four arguments, picked up at random, are of no avail, how can he imagine thereby to silence his opponent? It is in opposition to such apologetical mismanagement and levity that the demand has been very justly raised, that the arguments for the truth of the faith should be evolved from a deeper view. To such efforts, however, it easily happens to imagine the supports which it raises to be absolute arguments and proofs. We have seen in what manner the *Wolfians* pretended to demonstrate the Trinity. Is there any one who does not now smile at such a demonstration? Nevertheless, of late, people of a friendly disposition towards the Church again begin to speak of the Trinity in such a manner, as if he who has conceived of the idea of God must spontaneously fall upon it. Is true science then really benefited by the much boasted proofs from astronomy, geology, chemistry, magnetism, etc., in which people, in more recent times, enjoy themselves? Hand in hand with the superficial many-sidedness and versatility of our science, there goes a want of common sense, of a perception of truth, of logical power, of originality of conception, and of pith in the style, which is surely one

of the dark signs of the times. Our literature is entering upon the Alexandrian epoch.

The second function of *Dogmatik* is evolving. The doctrines of faith are the products of a long evolution. To represent the origin, formation, scientific mediation of the history of doctrines, is the task of the *History of Doctrines*. This science has of late been advanced, less by compendia, than by thorough special investigations. Its results are, in their principal elements, appropriated by *Dogmatik*. The confessional relation of the doctrine of faith is brought out by *Symbolik*, which, without losing historical objectivity, has been freed from the ambiguity of *Planck's* indifferentism by *Marheinicke*, *Möhler*, *Guericke*, *Köllner*. If, then, even in the *History of Doctrines*, and in *Symbolik*, it is impossible to represent, without the writer's judging and deciding at all, such a purely historical proceeding is certainly inadmissible in *Dogmatik*, inasmuch as its task is both to prove and evolve. It has to follow up the historical development given in the *History of Doctrines* by the development of their notion. In this, the Scholasticism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have manifested a skill which will for ever stand out as a model, and the results of which no true *Dogmatik* can warrantably neglect. The study of *Dogmatik* has been truly and permanently promoted by the circumstance that *De Wette*, *Hase*, *Schmid*, *Schweizer*, *Schneckenburger*, and others, have directed the looks of a time, yet so little schooled in its doctrinal notions, to the wonderful structure of this old *Dogmatik*. It cannot, of course, be the aim of our *Dogmatik* to return to all the definitions and notions of that Scholasticism; but these faithful labourers have acquired the right to demand that every Protestant divine should go through their school, and that their definitions should remain



the foundation of every *Dogmatik*. The systematic development must rest on the foundation of a structure reared according to principles; and it is just by this that *Dogmatik* proves itself to be a science. This principle needs not first to be sought for, but is assigned to *Dogmatik* by the Confession, in the doctrine of Justification by faith. It is by this doctrine that to everything else its place is assigned. The man who, by faith, lays hold of the merit of Jesus Christ, is justified by God. In this, three things are implied,—the faith, the object of faith, and the effect of faith. The object of faith is the revelation of God in Christ Jesus; faith is the fruit of regeneration which the Spirit of Christ works by the means of grace; justification is the judicial union of man with God, which, by and through sanctification, becomes a union of eternal life with God in the heavenly Church, the goal of the Church Militant. But in whatever way we may proceed as to the method, at all events, as long as the doctrine of Justification by faith is acknowledged as the material principle of Protestantism, it must, in *Dogmatik* also, hold its position as a principle. But, in the latest works on *Dogmatik* (*Martensen, Lange, Ebrard*), not even an attempt is made. As in the History of Doctrines, so in the *Dogmatik* of our time also, the most successful labours are not to be sought for in Compendiums, but in Monographs. The study of *Dogmatik* will, in all probability, not for a long time produce any comprehensive representations of that importance which *Gerhard, Quenstedt, Calovius, Hollaz* had in the seventeenth century.

On the study of *Church History*, as we already pointed out, the historical spirit, after the liberation-wars, has exercised a considerable influence. While the period of *Illuminism* had been satisfied with the one-sided demand

of a critical, pragmatical treatment, according to the sources, this historical spirit added the demand that the historian should enter more deeply into the life pervading the Church. Even historians like *Gieseler*, who still stood in the service of *Illuminism*, could not refuse to render obedience to this claim. Here also—and we only mention *Neander*—it was, in the first instance, a subjective Christian spirit who, with cordial sympathy, entered into the phenomena of the past life of the Church. In opposition, however, to the narrowness which attached to this stand-point, freer and wider stand-points, like that of *Hase*, had a relative right. The spirit of historical representation which alone corresponds to the history of the Church, is to feel as a Churchman. But since there does not exist a Catholic Church, but only particular Churches, the historian who feels this, who has that spirit, will not be able to deny the peculiarities of his particular Church. There needs not, however, to be any fear that the Lutheran Church-historians will return to the stand-point of the Magdeburg Centuriators. The period which we have reviewed has, among other things, also made provision that such may not be the case.

The Confessions again stand arrayed against one another. They who see nothing but mischief in this may well ask themselves whether they seek what is divine, or what is human. Many impure elements are mixed up with this struggle, but it would be against truth to deny that an earnest striving after the victory of truth manifests itself in it. And how can the sad discord of the individual Churches ever be removed, unless that which separates them be again made the subject of earnest inquiry? But wherever there is inquiry, there is, in the sublunary world, fighting also. Certain it is, that the Evangelical Lutheran Church cannot adopt the Tridentine

conclusions, nor can she adopt the Reformed Confession, both on account of the distinctive doctrines, and on account of the position which the Confession there occupies. The watchword of our Church, in this struggle, can only be : " Hold that fast which thou hast, that no man take thy crown." Our crown is our Confession.

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



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